

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Rashid Ali's coup was scotched. Allied influence was, it might be said, forcibly re-established in all Arab lands. As a gesture of reconciliation, the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, in May 1941 made his statement in favour of Arab unity, which cleared the way to the establishment of the Arab League. The establishment of the League marks the end of one and the beginning of a new chapter in the story of Arab nationalism.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

A Group Study

As with all other countries, Pakistan's foreign policy is determined by the inescapable facts of history and of geography and by special influences which may be of a permanent or of a transitory nature. Before saying anything, therefore, of the country's foreign policy, it is necessary first to say something of these conditioning circumstances.

The events which led to the creation of Pakistan are well known. From those events it is not difficult to deduce that for the Muslims of the sub-continent, the creation of their homeland has been a matter of great struggle, not only against the alien ruling power, but also against the preponderating Hindu majority that inexorably set its face against any proposal to divide the sub-continent. The intensity of the Muslim conviction that a homeland for themselves was an indispensable necessity to any assurance of preservation of their beliefs, their culture and their prosperity, is best measured by the fact that this struggle was undertaken and, ultimately, the source of triumph. Those who understand this will also understand that Pakistanis are jealous of the freedom they have won and the homeland they have gained and any judgment of men and affairs in Pakistan will be false unless it is formed with a complete realisation of these facts. Whatever Pakistanis may think of themselves, of their country and of others will, in no circumstances and on no occasion, displace the axiom that the continued existence and growth of Pakistan are inevitable and indispensable.

Pakistan exists in two wings, one on the western side of the sub-continent, whose borders march with India, Afghanistan, Iran and

Chinese Turkestan, and the other on the east side of the sub-continent whose borders are contiguous with India and Burma. The distance between the two wings at their nearest points is about one thousand miles and the combined frontiers with India are about two thousand miles in length.

West Pakistan, which, until recently, consisted of several provinces and acceded states and has since been consolidated into one administrative unit, has an area of 310,236 square miles and a population of approximately 33,779,000 persons, giving a density of 109 persons to the square mile. The density varies considerably in West Pakistan, being as much as 259 persons to the square mile in the Punjab area, and as little as 8.8 persons to the square mile in the vast arid tracts of Baluchistan. East Pakistan has an area of 54,501 square miles and a population of 42,063,000 persons, giving a density of 777 persons to the square mile.

West Pakistan is a dry area, experiencing a wide range of temperatures and depending for the survival of its people upon the huge system of irrigation, which has rescued millions of acres of land from the desert and has made possible the sustenance of the present population. The communications—roads, rivers and railway—run approximately in the direction north to south. Thus the historic Khyber Pass, which lies in Pakistan territory, is linked with the modern port of Karachi. The western frontier is guarded by mountain ranges that are continuous from the Hindu Kush, down through Baluchistan to the Arabian Sea. Within these natural battlements, the land is level, offering every facility for air transport, radiating in all directions, and for the movement of armies.

East Pakistan, a much smaller area and, as we have seen, more densely populated, has a tropical monsoon climate. The land is divided by innumerable rivers and the tributaries that feed them. It is this network of rivers that provides the most convenient means of transport, although railway and airfields exist. The heat and rain combine to produce a lush vegetation and the jungle recedes only as the population grows. As it is, the hilly tracts in the east, the north-east and the Sunderbans, are still covered with dense natural growth. The tactical difficulties of this terrain were experienced by the Allied armies as well as by the Japanese in World War II.

The broader geographical situation of Pakistan, which also tends to shape the country's foreign policy, comprises its proximity to Soviet Central Asia, from which the northwest frontier of Pakistan is separated by

a tongue of Afghan territory nowhere more than fifty miles in width. Tashkent is approximately 500 miles from Peshawar and about 1,000 miles from Karachi over the Great Circle. Both Peshawar and Karachi are about 1000 miles from Teheran. The important oilfields of the Middle East are within easy air and naval striking distance of West Pakistan.

On the eastern side, the Indo-Chinese frontier is less than 500 miles from the eastern frontier of East Pakistan and that of Siam even less. The distance between Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, and the cities of Kunming and Bangkok is, in each instance, about 1000 miles.

Thus, in the west, Pakistan impinges upon the Middle East with all its important cultural, religious and economic significance. In the east, Pakistan forms an important part of South East Asia. The effect of all this upon Pakistan's foreign policy can scarcely be overlooked.

The special influences which have done much to shape the country's foreign policy are: (a) relations with India, (b) the Paktoonistan movement sponsored by Afghanistan, (c) the denial by India of Pakistan's fair share of military stores, (d) membership of the British Commonwealth, (e) the need for assistance in making economic progress, and (f) Muslim ideology.

The history of Pakistan's emergence and of Indo-Pakistan relations makes it clear to what extent Pakistan's course of action has been, and may well continue to be, influenced by those circumstances. The Hindu majority that today rules, and must continue to rule, the Indian Republic, actively opposed the creation of Pakistan and when the partition came about, the then circumstances gave rise to a succession of differences between the two counties, so embittered and so implacably pursued that Pakistan was forced to conclude that India, if she could, would not shrink from encompassing the ruin and destruction of the new Muslim state. There is no doubt, and Mr. Nehru himself has said it, that in 1950 the two countries were on the verge of war. This, happily, never occurred, but the point is mentioned here to show to what degree the relations between India and Pakistan had degenerated. India has four times the population of East and West Pakistan combined, is much larger, more prosperous and much more industrialised. India has all the pre-partition arsenals and arms factories and is in a position to maintain larger armed forces. These are substantial matters of which Pakistan cannot fail to take count.

It is true that in the recent past, relations between the two countries have been less bitter and a number of irritating differences, of an admittedly minor nature, have been removed. The establishment at Lahore of the new capital of the West Pakistan administrative unit shows that Pakistan has confidence in the future of Indo-Pakistan relations. Unfortunately, however, suspicion continues to lurk because of India's intransigence over Kashmir, the encouragement that India gives to the present regime in Afghanistan and because of India's obvious ambitions in terms of influence, if not territory. Pakistan is too close to India not to be concerned with India's plain desire to occupy a prominent place in world affairs, and that as soon as possible and at whatever cost. Whether this is a passing phase, due rather to Mr. Nehru's personal desire to be regarded as a pre-eminent world figure, to whose lightest word all men give ear, or whether this arises from a national ambition to become a powerful country, dominating all its neighbours, is not easily decided. What is quite obvious are the inconsistencies and difficulties that arise from flirtations, now with this country, now with that, and Pakistan, as a close neighbour is bound to take count of these manoeuvres.

Arising out of the history and circumstances of Indo-Pakistan relations are two further special influences which have exercised important consequences upon Pakistan's foreign policy.

It is a regrettable fact that from the time of Pakistan's emergence, Afghanistan has maintained a consistently hostile attitude to its new neighbour. Afghanistan was the only member of the United Nations that opposed the membership of Pakistan in September 1947. Whereas Pakistan looked for sympathetic and friendly interest from a country which is, after all, another member of the comity of Muslim nations, there has in fact been continual unfriendliness showing itself in hostile propaganda in the press and on the radio, in an effort to create dissension and turbulence among the tribesmen and, above all, in undisguised encouragement for the so-called Pakhtoonistan movement.

The Pakhtoonistan movement amounts to a claim that the ethnic group, known to the world as "Pathans" and to themselves as "Pakhtoons", should have an independent state of their own. The basis of the claim was that if India was to be partitioned as between Hindus and Muslims, then, by a parity of reasoning, there should be a further partition to provide the Pakhtoons with their own homeland also. The fallacy of this

claim resides in the fact that the case for Pakistan rests not on ethnic divisions but on religious, cultural, historic and economic considerations. By the partition in 1947, it was provided that in the North West Frontier Province, whose people are almost entirely Pakhtoons (and Muslim by religion) a referendum should be held to decide whether the province should form part of Pakistan or India. As is well known, the referendum, held under the jurisdiction of British authority, gave an answer overwhelmingly in favour of Pakistan. The number of people who voted for Pakistan was larger than the number that had voted in any general election in the past. This clearly shows that there were few enthusiasts for Pakhtoonistan.

It is with the knowledge that Afghan interest in Pakhtoonistan is designed to expand Afghanistan's territorial possessions at the expense of Pakistan, that Pakistan has resisted, with steadiness, firmness and yet without provocation, the hostile policy which Afghanistan has pursued with encouragement from India and Russia. It seems that India's interest in this matter is no other than to maintain a policy of encirclement of Pakistan which India is about to do by reason of the combination of her own frontier marching with that of West Pakistan, her occupation of Kashmir and the maintenance of close relations with Afghanistan. Russia's aim in the matter is to punish Pakistan for aligning herself with the West.

Pakistan views the policy of the present Afghan Government with great regret. There are several very clear reasons for that. The impartial observer can easily conclude for himself, after visiting the north-west frontier and the tribal areas, that there is no prospect of Pakhtoonistan, nor is there any general desire for it. The majority of people realise that a Pakhtoonistan, buried in that sterile and mountainous region, would be incapable of supporting itself and its independence would be merely nominal. Such a state must fall either into the hands of Afghanistan or into the hands of Pakistan—there is no alternative—and the Pathans of Pakistan have so far discovered nothing that would lead them to suppose that dependence on Afghanistan would make them either richer or happier. On the other hand, a study of conditions in Afghanistan might lead them to think that the change would make them poorer and less free.

It has been the policy of Pakistan to wean the Afghan Government away from its misguided views and, by consistent restraint combined with efforts to demonstrate a genuine friendliness, Pakistan has sought to create

an atmosphere in which the two countries could come together. By observing faithfully the provisions of the Treaty of 1921 and the Trade Convention of 1923, by providing cement asked for by Afghanistan, by offering sugar manufactured at the Mardan Sugar Factory, by offering special inter-transit facilities at the Karachi Port and by supplying, against payment in Pakistan rupees, petrol and aviation spirit which are bought with foreign exchange, Pakistan has tried to show sincere collaboration, which would convince Afghanistan of her genuine intentions.

The unfortunate fact is that these efforts have so far proved useless and recently Afghanistan went out of its way to repulse all Pakistan attempts at *rapprochement*. In April 1955, the Pakistan Embassy at Kabul was sacked and the Pakistan Consulate at Jalalabad was attacked. The Pakistan flag was torn down and insulted and the official protests, made in accordance with the protocol, were treated with what amounted to levity. As a result, relations between the two countries have undergone further deterioration, although Pakistan will try, by restraint and forbearance, to create conditions in which these memories can be erased and a happier atmosphere introduced.

The second special influence upon Pakistan's foreign policy, arising out of Indo-Pakistan relations, derives from the fact that after partition, India failed to give to Pakistan a due share of all military stores. Out of the defence stores to which Pakistan was entitled, not more than two per cent were despatched and even then, no arms and ammunition were sent. India not only detained stores due to Pakistan, but India also acquired, at much reduced prices, immense quantities of munitions of war, left by the British Government as surplus to postwar requirements. Pakistan was, therefore, confronted with the urgent necessity for acquiring arms for its defence services and constructing essential military installations, including arsenals of which there was none throughout the territory of Pakistan. This task was immediately undertaken and it threw an immense burden upon the economy of the country. So long as foreign trade continued to provide adequate exchange earnings, the burden could be carried, but when the economic recession began to show itself, the strain began to tell. As we shall later see, the deliberate denial by India of defence stores exercised a decisive effect upon Pakistan's foreign policy, an effect of which India was to complain with much bitterness, indignation and inconsistency.

Pakistan, though a republic, is a member of the Commonwealth. It is doubtful whether the Commonwealth can today act decisively in world

affairs. However, Pakistan recognises its strength as a unifying factor among like-minded peoples. Nor does Pakistan forget the benefits enjoyed under the Colombo Plan which was originally a Commonwealth venture. It is also important to notice that the United States is in close treaty relations with several of the Commonwealth countries, including Pakistan, a fact which adds to the significance of Commonwealth membership. On the other side of the medal is the important fact that Pakistan, along with the other Asian members of the Commonwealth, is acutely conscious of the colonial problem throughout the world, a consciousness which does not seem to be as fully shared by what may, perhaps, be termed the "Anglo-Saxon" Commonwealth members who acquired complete independence of the mother country many years ago.

To a significant extent Pakistan depends on outside aid for rapid improvement of its people's lot. Such being the case, it follows that foreign policy is likely to be affected by considerations of practical help from abroad. Whether, without implying any criticism of friends and well-wishers, Pakistan has at all times had the measure of sympathy and assistance which it deems necessary to give to its eighty million souls a normal, as opposed to the present sub-normal, standard of living, is a question which need be no more than indicated here. The important point is that, as with other backward countries, Pakistan turns towards those nations which show themselves ready to help, and do help. It is not considered that this involves playing the sycophant, for if by some perversity the Government refused to collaborate with those nations genuinely anxious to raise the standard of life of Pakistan's people, it is quite obvious that those very people would, in their desperate exasperation, dispose of the Government and make approaches themselves.

Finally, something must be said of Muslim ideology which is a very important factor in the determination of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan calls itself a Muslim country for two reasons. First, 85.8 per cent of the population confesses Islam as its religion; secondly, Pakistan was created to meet the irresistible urge of Muslims of the sub-continent to have a homeland of their own where they could preserve, in safety and tranquillity, their religion, their culture, their way of life and where they could ensure the advancement of their people.

There is still, unfortunately, much world-wide misconception as to what and who a Muslim is. People at large seem to think of a Muslim

(or Mohammedan as he is sometimes called) as a man with a beard and a scimitar, whose religious beliefs consist in having four wives, abstaining from eating pigflesh, drinking large quantities of the wines of Shiraz (albeit alcohol is forbidden by the Quran) and, when he is not drinking wine, he is eating *hashish*. He is thought to be mostly occupied in trying, by fire and sword, to convert others to these curious religious convictions.

If such gross illusions could be dispelled from the public mind, something valuable would have been achieved. It is a pity that even in the twentieth century, with all its means for the dissemination of knowledge, Islam is not generally recognised for what it truly is, namely, a religion of submission, of prayer and of a spiritual, rather than material attitude to the world. The intention here is not to argue the merits of a certain religious belief; it is to show that the nature of Islam is such that so far from teaching men to be gross and materialistic, it directs their minds to virtuous thoughts and deeds. It is deeply insistent on life regulated by law; it stimulates enquiry into the nature of things and it prescribes an economic system by which the poor cannot starve and by which the accumulation and monopoly of immense wealth through inheritance and idleness, is impossible. Unfortunately, the scientific, philosophic and legal literature of Islam is generally inaccessible to the world because of the languages in which it is written, but it may be said here that no other religion or system of ethical belief possesses writings so voluminous and so scholarly.

These few words on the nature of Islam will serve to indicate the kind of ideology permeating the minds of the people of Pakistan, but it is sometimes further suggested that the religious background of the country's formation is itself a legitimate object of criticism. It has been suggested that because of the Islamic basis on which Pakistan came into being, the lives, property and beliefs of those who live in Pakistan, but do not profess Islam, are, in some way, prejudiced or endangered. It so happens that in Great Britain, the Established Church occupies an important official place in the constitution of the country, a place, it may be said, having a significance which has never been given to Islam in Pakistan. The Queen is designated "Defender of the Faith", meaning the Christian faith, and the oaths taken by the monarch are administered by the Archbishop of Canterbury. As Lords Spiritual, bishops take an important part in national deliberations and public affairs. The Ecclesiastical Commissioners administer church property far exceeding in value anything devoted to religious endowments in Pakistan. Yet, in spite of the prominent place which the church

occupies, no one has ever suggested that Englishmen who do not confess the Thirtynine Articles are in danger of their lives, liberty or property. On the contrary, Great Britain is, frequently, held up to the world as an outstanding example of a well-run, liberty-loving democracy.

Pakistan is fully conscious that universal or international religions, such as Islam and Christianity, have unfortunately not succeeded in maintaining peace among the nations professing these faiths and there are, even today, important matters of difference between Muslim countries. In spite of this, or, perhaps, because of it, Pakistan has exerted itself in the cause of Islamic unity. Pakistan's active attachment to the cause of the Muslim world must be considered a paramount consideration in her foreign policy.

Pakistan began its existence imbued with an understandable desire to be as independent as possible in as many ways as possible. Having just emerged from a state of foreign rule, Pakistanis were determined to breathe the pure air of freedom untainted by attachments or obligations. Hence, long before there was talk of Point Four Plan or the Colombo Plan, Pakistan had drafted its Six-Year Plan, was energetically fostering trade in order to acquire funds for development and for defence and had made up its mind to steer a steady course between the power blocs whose wranglings threatened the peace of the world.

It must be remembered that at the time of its coming into existence, Pakistan was little favoured and less understood. Not a few people (apart from opponents in India) considered the Pakistan conception as fundamentally unsound and many people daily expected the new country to disappear beneath the weight of economic circumstance, the burden of setting up a new administration and the appalling problem of receiving and settling the millions of refugees. This initial misapprehension was demonstrated in the general attitude over the Kashmir problem, not to mention the manipulations, behind the scenes, during March and April of 1948, when it became clear that, on all the merits, Pakistan had the better case. After this superiority had been demonstrated, India gave up urging the urgency and importance of prompt Security Council action and, instead, asked for an adjournment, which was granted. The Indian Delegation, led by the late Mr. Gopalaswamy Ayyengar, returned to Delhi and, during the period of adjournment, events occurred which led the Security Council, on resumption, to adopt a course of action inconsistent with the views it had previously expressed and had apparently come to hold.

Hence, in those days, there was little to encourage Pakistan to think that any alternative lay before it—even assuming an alternative would have been welcome—other than pursuing such policies as plain wisdom dictated. Certainly, there was nothing to encourage attachment to any nation or group of nations and at one time the apparent uselessness of the Commonwealth as an instrument for the solution of problems between its members, led many Pakistanis to express the wish to give up membership.

Time passed, and it became evident that so far from being still-born, the new state was making good progress. Favourable economic conditions prevailed for some time and provided funds for development and the procurement of some defence stores. Other nations began to note that Pakistan was making its mark. With a characteristic political clear sightedness, the Soviet Union, in 1949, invited the late Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan to Moscow and although the invitation was not refused, it was not pursued. It is to be doubted whether Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan or any other Pakistani statesman ever contemplated a pact or alliance between Pakistan and the Soviet Union, but it is important to notice that within two years of its creation, Pakistan had thus far impressed the Soviet Union. There are important divergences of outlook between Pakistan, with its Islamic background, and the Soviet Union with a background of Marxism which is atheistic. Pakistan had noticed the subservience which was forced upon the allies of the Soviet Union and, as we have seen, independence had been won after too profound a struggle for its loss to be risked. Furthermore, there was the question whether Russia could supply the aid, both material and technical, which Pakistan so urgently required. For these reasons, an alliance between the two countries was, *ab initio*, improbable.

In 1950, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United States of America where he was well and cordially received. If Pakistan had previously been an area of doubt, it now ceased to be one and it was evident that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's visit laid the ground for a friendship which was to grow stronger before many more years had passed.

Pakistan could not remain indifferent to unmistakable world developments. Apart from the obvious division between east and west, there was the ever-growing importance of the regional pacts which were exercising powerful influences in world affairs in more than one direction. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, formed in 1949 as a development of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, and the ANZUS Pact of 1951 showed clearly the direction in which events were moving.

Moreover, India continued unmistakably unfriendly, not only with respect to the special problems affecting the two countries, but in a broader sense. In later years, India began to show ambitions, coupled with vagaries of policy to which Pakistan could not, in her own legitimate interests, remain indifferent. India exhibited a bewildering spectacle of inconsistent enthusiasms and attachments (described by Mr. Nehru as a "policy of neutrality") that boded no good for any of India's neighbours, leave aside the question of India itself. Pakistan does not presume to say what is good for India; it does, however, claim to know what is best for the safety and advancement of its own peoples. All these circumstances began to impress Pakistan with the truth of the maxim that "it is good to have friends".

Meanwhile, the Western Powers, anxious for the defence of the Middle East, proposed, in March 1953, the establishment of a Middle East Defence Organisation, a combination which would naturally excite Pakistan's sympathy. For various reasons, the Middle East countries raised their own opposition to the proposal, which was ultimately dropped, while Mr. Nehru, for entirely different reasons, assailed the project with much vehemence, obviously and explicitly directed towards Pakistan. Pakistan could deduce from the violence of Indian opposition that India viewed, with the utmost dislike, any prospect of an increase in the defence potential of Pakistan. Thus far, by retaining Pakistan's due share of defence stores, India had been able to keep Pakistan somewhat weakened and it was obvious that if Pakistan succeeded in forging a friendship with any powerful country, India's manoeuvres would be nullified. These circumstances, now plainly revealed, had to be weighed against Pakistan's anxiety not to fall into the pocket of some powerful nation. In a word, the time had come for serious decisions on foreign policy to be taken.

The necessity for taking these decisions was accelerated by a combination of adverse events in 1953 of which the first was the threat of famine. On that occasion, the United States came forward and, with a gift of 610,000 tons of wheat, averted what must otherwise have been a disaster of great magnitude. This act of generosity considerably strengthened a friendship that had begun with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's visit in 1950. Secondly, the strain of financing her own defence requirements from foreign exchange resources, already much attenuated by adverse economic conditions, began to impose a great strain on Pakistan.

The entire trend of events led, naturally, to a drawing together with the West, represented by the United States of America and, by a logical

corollary, towards Turkey. On 2 April 1954, an agreement was entered into with Turkey for friendly co-operation. In May 1954, a Military Aid Pact was signed by Pakistan and the United States. This Pact makes provision for mutual aid including the supply of arms which, it may be added, are specifically not to be used for purposes of aggression. The Pact does not place any obligation on Pakistan to go to war or to take sides in the event that the Western Powers are involved in an armed conflict. Nor does the Pact prevent Pakistan from following its own policy with respect to such important matters as colonialism, the Palestine problem and those questions on which it is possible, even likely, that Pakistan and the United States may find themselves at difference.

No sooner was the Pact signed than the Soviet Government made a protest to the Government of Pakistan. In rejecting the protest, Pakistan made it perfectly clear that there was no question of the provision by Pakistan of military bases for the United States. In India, there was widespread agitation and a good deal of public clamour and demonstrations against the Pact. What was more important was the seizure, by Mr. Nehru, of the Pact as a pretext for further procrastination over Kashmir on the ground that circumstances had been changed. When Pakistan protested at this, Mr. Nehru replied: "I can only repeat that the decision to give this aid (i.e. American aid such as may come to Pakistan as a result of the Mutual Security Pact) has changed the whole context of the Kashmir issue, and the long talks we have had about this matter have little relation to the new facts which flow from this aid".¹ Indeed, Mr. Nehru went a great deal further than this when addressing the Lok Sabha of the Indian Parliament. On 1 March, 1954, he said: "This grant of military aid by the United States to Pakistan created a grave situation for us in India and for Asia; it adds to our tensions; it makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan".²

The important decision which Pakistan took in entering into a Mutual Security Pact with the United States had, therefore, the advantages of bringing Pakistan into alliance with powerful as well as like-minded friends; it offered a prospect of some relief from the undue burden of defence expenditure thrust upon it by India's retention of defence stores and it en-

¹ *Negotiations between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India regarding the Kashmir Dispute* (White Paper published by Govt. of Pakistan), p. 73

² *The Statesman*, New Delhi, 2 March, 1954.

hanced the prospects of receiving further aid in the development of the country. The principal disadvantage was that India disliked the prospect of a strengthened and strengthening Pakistan and, by way of retaliation, threatened prolongation of all matters in dispute between the two nations.

So far, little has been said with respect to Pakistan policy in relation to South East Asia, although Pakistan has obvious interests in that area also. To some extent, Pakistan was, for several years, more interested in the Middle East and indeed, in Europe and America, for it was in those directions that she had to look for help in solving the great problems confronting the new state. In addition, the Kashmir problem concentrated interest in the western wing. Nevertheless, it was reasonable to expect that sooner or later a foreign policy would have to be formulated vis-a-vis South East Asia and this was ultimately brought about by developments in Indo-China.

The consequences of the Geneva settlement made it almost inevitable that the United States should seek to promote a regional organisation in South East Asia and, as is well known, a conference was held at Manila in September 1954, for which Pakistan accepted an invitation to attend. This conference was, again, not conformable to Mr. Nehru's ideas, especially as any regional security organisation of which Pakistan is a member, adds further to Pakistan's strength and influence. The Manila Conference led to agreement upon a proposal to create a South East Asia Treaty Organisation, of which Pakistan is a member and India is not.

In April 1955, Pakistan declared its adherence to the Baghdad Pact, of which the original parties were Iraq and Turkey, and which was subsequently joined by the United Kingdom and Iran. This, too, is a defensive arrangement intended to ward off aggression. It has also some clauses which aim at promoting economic co-operation between the participating countries. Though the Baghdad Pact is not adhered to by most of the Arab countries, it does bring Pakistan formally into Middle Eastern affairs, and is a reflection of her policy of close co-operation with Muslim States.

To this extent, therefore, Pakistan has been able to consummate one of the main objects of its foreign policy, namely, to contain the threat of Indian aggression, if not by war, then by keeping Pakistan weak and amenable. There remain the matters of dispute which are still to be settled.

It may be thought that Pakistan's foreign policy, in the wider sphere of world affairs, discloses some selfishness and the service of purely material needs. This is not so. In the formulation of that policy Pakistan has, like every other country, seen to its security and prosperity, but in doing this, it has also sought never to do anything which provokes tension, is contrary to the United Nations Charter or which whittles away peace. Such alliances or regional security pacts as Pakistan has joined have all been formed within the framework of the United Nations Charter and "the pillars of peace", which were clearly set forth by the Pakistan Prime Minister at the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in April, 1955.

Pakistan believes that foreign policy should be conceived in terms of the world and of all peoples. It does not believe in the limited concept of Asia such as appears to dominate Indian thinking on foreign policy. In the view of Pakistan, to conceive of foreign policy on such a narrow basis is utterly incompatible with the era in which we live.

DOCUMENT

SEATO Conference Communiqué

The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization today concluded its second meeting, held in Karachi from March 6 to March 8, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hamidul Huq Choudhury, Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

2. The Council members reaffirmed their Government's support for the United Nations and their continued intention to conduct their policies in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

3. The Council also reaffirmed the dedication of the member governments to the objectives of the Treaty and of the Pacific Charter: to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom; to coordinate efforts for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security; to uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries.