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Halil ERDEMİR

İZMİR - 2007

TURKISH POLITICAL HISTORY

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CELAL BAYAR UNIVERSITY

LECTURER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OCTOBER - 2007

İZMİR / TÜRKİYE

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By Manisa Ofset Basın Yayın Matbaacılık San. ve Tic.

*To those Turkish martyrdoms who sacrificed their lives for
worldwide peace, justice and equality for humanity*

CONTENTS

Contents	V
Acknowledgements	VIII
Abstract	IX
Summary of the Book	X
Preface	XI
List of Abbreviations	XIII
<i>INTRODUCTION</i>	1
<i>CHAPTER 1</i>	
<i>HISTORICAL BACKCLOTH: WESTERNIZATION OF TURKEY UNDER THE OSMANLI AND IN THE TURKISH REPUBLIC</i>	
THE OSMANLI STATE PERIOD OF WESTERNIZATION	25
The Tanzimat Era 1839-1876.	38
First and Second Constitutionalism (Birinci ve İkinci Meşrutiyet).	42
Ziya Gökalp and Turkish Nationalism	59
Modernization during the Young Turk Era.	62
THE TURKISH REPUBLIC PERIOD OF WESTERNIZATION	65
The Westernization of Turkey and Turkish Society under Mustafa Kemal.	66
Changes In Social Life, Symbols and Cultural Identification.	69
<i>CHAPTER 2</i>	
<i>THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF TURKEY</i>	92
DEMOCRATIZATION UNDER THE SINGLE PARTY REGIME	92
The Emergence of Political Opposition.	92
The Emergence of an Opposition Party.	104

The National Election of 1946.	110
The Coming of Democracy.	112
The Democrats' Struggle For Survival.	121
DEMOCRATIZATION UNDER THE DEMOCRATS	123
The Elections of 1950.	123
The Democrats after 1950.	128
The Democrat Era (1950-1960).	129
The Election of 1957.	134
Table 1: Turkish general election results for the Assembly, 1946-1961.	135
Figure 2: Turkish general election results for the Assembly, 1946-1961.	136
The Economic, Social and Political Situation during the RPP and DP Eras.	138
Conclusion	142
<i>CHAPTER 3</i>	
<i>THE TURKEY'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS SINCE THE 1960s</i>	144
THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY	144
Transitional stages	144
1960s: Freedom and Democracy under the Turkish military	145
The 1970s: the Military memorandum, political and social instability	148
The 1980s: Military intervention and the flight of political refugees to Europe	151
The search for political identity and its effects on democratization since the 1980s	153
Politically oriented migration prospects	156
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON TURKISH POLITICS	162
The International political climate and the structuring Turkish international economy	162
Decision years: the 1960s	164
Economic independence struggles during the 1970s	167
New challenges, opportunities and reflections on policies: the 1980s	171
Economic alternatives to the west and Turkey's relations with the Muslim World during the 1980s	172
The Turkish Economy since 1990	175
Current Overview of Turkish economy	176

The PKK/KADEK Terrorist Organization and its connection with the Turkish Politics and the EU policies	178
Turkey-EU relations	191
Turkish EU prospects	193
Turkey's prospects for the future	194
<i>CONCLUSION</i>	
Modernisation in the Osmanlı State.	202
Modern Turkey and Westernisation.	207
Democratisation of Turkey.	209
Multi-party experiences.	210
Western influence on Turkey.	211
Turkey's migration experiences.	211
Turkish Minority in Europe and its Influence on Turkish Politics.	212
<i>BIBLIOGRAPHY</i>	216
Appendices	
Appendix 1: The List of Turkish Political Parties	231
Appendix 2: Turkish Republic Governments	240

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ABSTRACT

The overall objective of this book is to analyse the reasons and the stages of how Turkey decided to become a democratic and western state. The subject has been analysed by looking at the historical and political development of Turkey's westernization and democratisation.

The continuities and changes in Turkey's process of integration into the Western world and its adaptation to Western civilization are examined in detail in the first and the second chapters of the book. The book argues that the crucial processes of westernization and democratization of Turkey helped to change the thinking, mental outlook, and levels of skill, education and consciousness of Europe of millions of Turkey's inhabitants, and in these ways they fortuitously prepared Turkish people for more or less successful reorientation and adaptation to life of western and democratic understanding Turkish political development. The success of these conditioning processes helps to explain how and why Turkey became a democratic country. Why Turkish people have felt more comfortable receiving the westernisation and democratization rather than to other potential destinations of religious and/or socialist way of life and administrative systems. Without the crucial conditioning of decades long changes in the way of westernization and democratization factors, Turkish political history would have encountered far greater opposition and difficulties than it has done, and might well have been thrown into reverse.

SUMMARY OF THE BOOK

The Turks have long migrated from east to west. The character of this movement was initially to conquer territory, and this continued as long as Turkish military capability was at a peak and established institutions worked well. The second stage was characterized by the importation of Western technical, military, and institutional practices and a Western way of life. This second stage intensified towards the end of the 19th century and particularly during the Republican period from 1923 onwards. Westernization and intense democratization under the influence of Western countries have had a great impact on the Turks. Massive internal and external political propaganda affected Turkish policy-makers' decisions to promote Westernization. At the same time, there were many national and international factors which motivated Turkish people to follow western and democratic system.

The Westernization, urbanisation and democratization of Turkey were some of the primary causes of the making of Turkish political history and changes. Centuries-long crucial processes helped to change the philosophical ideas, mentalities, political and cultural perceptions, and levels of skill, education and consciousness of the West of Turks. This fortuitously prepared millions of Turks for their future roles as western-minded and greatly helped their successful adaptation to and integration in to life and mentality of the West and the EU.

Turkish politicians reshaped democratic policies in accordance with the changing nature and scale of international and national pressure which were adapted to Turkish peoples' social, economic, politic and cultural requirements. The considerable success of these historical, political and socio-economic conditioning processes helps to explain why the Turkish authorities re-organised Turkey and Turkish people accordance the new requirement of the age.

PREFACE

The decision to conduct research upon the Turkish Political History was prompted by the growing Turkish and international concerns for the criticisms and changes in the Turkish political life and democratic practices in Turkey. Turkish politics attracted a number of scholars and researchers to investigate political development in a variety of aspects. In fact the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century of Turkey was ‘the century of intense westernization and democratization’ in Turkey. Without a clear understanding of the economic, social, cultural and historical background of political development, it is not possible to understand the events which took place during the era of democratic experiences in past decades as well as modern practices.

This issue is of personal interest to the author for several reasons. The author studied in the department of history for the degrees of Bachelor of Arts and Master of Philosophy in Selçuk University. He further completed his MPhil and PhD in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Wales Swansea. Academic background in modern and contemporary history has helped the author to analyse modern Turkish history in the light of detailed examinations of historical materials. This was particularly needed in political history-related research studies, and this constitutes one of the main contributions of this book to the field of political history studies. The primary intention was simply to examine the westernization and democratization processes of Turkey which created the Turkish political history of modern Turkey.

I asked myself why Turkish people had imitated Western practices, even though Turks had traditionally regarded Europeans as “infidels”, instead of largely Muslim-populated countries of the Middle East and North Africa or the Soviet Union. Having these questions in my mind, I studied modern

Turkish history and taught in high school while I was completing my MPhil degree on the nineteenth century Osmanlı history. During the period I was studying, the Osmanlı undertook an extensive Westernization policy in order to raise their state to the level of the, then, advanced nations, with the encouragement of Westerners externally and of officials and bureaucrats internally. In fact, it is hard to determine whether Western support was forthcoming primarily for the development or for the disintegration of the Osmanlı (Ottoman) State.¹ Either way, the Westernization policy clearly affected at least the Turkish elites and has continued to do so throughout the Republican period. One must therefore examine the influence of the West on the Westernization and democratization history of the Turks in order to understand the recent Westernization and Democratization policies of the Turkish policy-makers.

One intention in this book is to emphasize that the roots of Turkish westernization and democratization are based on economic, political, cultural and social factors which are substantial explanation of the creation of Turkish political history and its processes.

¹ On the usage of the term of “the Osmanlı State” instead of “the Ottoman Empire”, see re “Osmanlı” Erdemir 1997:199-200; Erdemir 2001:55-62 and re “State” Karpas 1974:1-13; İnalcık 1974:50-58.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADD	Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği/ Ataturkist Ideological Associations.
AK PARTİ	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)/the Justice and Progress Party
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi/the Motherland Party
AP	Adalet Partisi/the Justice Party.
BBC	The British Broadcasting Corporation.
BC	Before Christ.
CENTO	The Central Treaty Organization.
CIA	Central Intelligent Agency.
CIS	Central Asian Independent States.
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States.
CSU	The Socialist Democrat Party.
CUP	İttihat ve Terakki/ The Committee of Union and Progress.
DEP	Demokrasi Partisi/ the Democracy Party.
DEVSOL	Devrimci Sol/the Revolutionary Left
DEVYOL	Devrimci Yol/the Revolutionary Way)
DP	Demokrat Parti/ the Democrat Party.
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi/the True Path Party
DPT	Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı/the State Planning Organization.
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti/the Democratic Left Party.
DİSK	Devrimci İşçi Sendika Konfederasyonu/the Confederation Union of Revolutionary Workers.
ECU	European Currency Unit.
ECJ	European Court of Justice.

EEC or EC	The European Economic Community or European Community.
ERP	The European Recovery Plan or the Marshall Plan.
EU	European Union.
Europol	European Police Office.
FRG	The Federal Republic of Germany.
FO	Foreign Office.
FP	Fazilet Partisi/the Felicity Party.
FRP	Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası/ the Free Republican Party.
GDP	Gross Domestic Product.
GNP	Gross National Income.
GLO	The German Liaison Office.
HADEP	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi/the Democracy Party of People.
HEP	Halkın Emekçi Partisi/the Peoples' Labour Party.
IMF	International Monetary Fond.
İP	İşçi Partisi/ the Workers' (Labour) Party.
İTC	İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti/the Committee of Union and Progress.
JP	Adalet Partisi/ the Justice Party.
LTD	Liberal Türk Alman Birliği/ the Liberals Turks-German Union/ Liberale Türkisch-Deutsche Vereinigung e.V.
ODTÜ	Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi/ the Middle East Technical University.
OEEC	Organization of European Economic Community.
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OJ	Official Journal.
OPC	Operation Provide Comfort.
MBK	Milli Birlik Komitesi/the National Unity Committee.

MGK	Milli Güvenlik Konseyi/ the National Security Council.
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi/the National Movement Party.
MIT	Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı/the National Security Organization.
MP	Millet Partisi/ the Nation Party.
MOSSAD	
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi/the National Salvation Party.
MNP	Milli Nizam Partisi/the National Order Party.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations.
NP	Millet Partisi/ the Nation Party.
RPNP	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi/ the Republican Peasants Nation Party.
RPP	Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (Partisi)/ the Republican Peoples' Party.
RNP	Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi/ the Republican Nation Party.
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan/ the Worker's Party of Kurdistan.
KADEK	The Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan.
PRP	Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası/ the Progressive Republican Party.
PRO	the Public Records Office.
SCF	Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası/the Free Republican Party.
SP	Saadet Partisi/ the Virtue Party.
SPO	Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı/ the State Planning Organisation.
SWAC	Güneybatı Asya Ülkeleri/ the South West Asian Countries.
US(A)	United States (of America).
\$	(US) United States Dollar.

TEU	Treaty on European Union.
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly.
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi.
TGRT	Türkiye Gazetesi Radyo ve Televizyonu.
TİP	Türkiye İşçi Partisi/the Turkish Workers Party.
TKP	Türkiye Kominist Partisi/the Turkey Communist Party
THKO	Türk Halkının Kurtuluş Ordusu/the Turkish People's Liberation Army)
TRT-INT	Türkiye Radyo Televizyon International.
TC	Türkiye Cumhuriyeti/ the Turkish Republic.
TCF	Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası/the Progressive Republican Party.
Türk-İş	Türkiye İşçi Konfederasyonu/the Confederation of Workers' Union of Turkey.
TÜSİAD	Türk Sanayii ve İş Adamları Derneği/ Turkish Industrial Business people Association
UK	the United Kingdom.
UN	the United Nations.
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republics.
WEU	the Western European Union.

INTRODUCTION

The Western countries' influence on Osmanlı and Republican ruling-elites and policy-makers and on the subsequent development of the Westernization and democratization processes in Turkey continued more than two centuries. The decision to conduct research on the nature and relative importance of various influential factors in Turkish leaders' decisions to pursue Westernization policies and its historical, political, economic and cultural roots or context of Turkish Westernization and democratization emerged as a result of academic consideration. The roles played by Turkish Westernization in the development of Turkey and the contributions of Turkish Westernization policies to the economy and society of Turkey, was prompted by the growing presence of western influence in Turkey and the rapid economic and democratic growth from the 1950s up to 2008. Similar economic, political and social developmental trends were observed with an ever-rising Western influence in some former colonies of West European emparialist states, such as British Empire and French Empire (Spencer 1997:25-161; Hargreaves 1995:1-37). Turkey attracted a number of scholars and researchers to investigate and examine of Turkish Westernization and democratization process in a variety of aspects. The political and economic behaviour patterns of Turkish peoples' cultural and social changes and structural developments subjects became central topics of research. Without a clear understanding of the economic, political, social and

historical background of Westernization, it is not possible to understand the events which took place during the period of democratization and related policies or problems, prospects, the shape of the emerging policies of Turkey and the European Union (EU), and the prospect for future policies.

The Aims of the Book The aim of this book is to evaluate the effects of the West on Turkish modernization (or Westernization) policies and its subsequent influence on Turkish westward developments and democratization of Turkey. To do this, certain issues will be dealt with in the next three chapters in order to complete the examination of the political history of Turkey.

In the context of the background of Turkish Westernization history and Turkish democratization, this study adds to the body of knowledge about the historical and political background of these processes and it addresses the 'whys and wherefores' of Turkish democratization. It also emphasizes that Western influences played roles in the development of Turkish democratization policy. In addition, the book throws light on the importance of Turkish Westernization process to the economic, social, cultural and political developments of Turkey.

To provide a coherent view of this period it was necessary to extend the scope of the research backward in time to take account of the formative influences from preceding centuries (from the 18th to the 20th century) and forward in time (post-1960s) to reassess the origins and overall significance of Turkish democratization. Turkey's two centuries of modernization and Westernization helped to change the thinking, mental outlook, and levels of skill, education and consciousness of the West of Turks. These developments prepared "secularised and Westernised" Turkish mentality for successful

reorientation towards, adaptation to and integration into life and work in West European countries. Political and socio-economic developments in Turkey paved the way of Turkish people orientations to Europe revealed the unavoidable fact of having become Europenized/westernized Turkey. At present, the considerable and ever-growing Western (European) influence has become a significant permanent addition to Turkish political changes and an important player of the transformation of Turkey into a western minded and democratised society.

The political changes and improvements in Turkey was a successful adaptation of the Turkish policy makers in Western democracies in general and in the EU particular can be explained by the historical conditioning processes undergone by Turkey as well as by the socio-economic situations in Turkey and Europe at the time.

Turkish migration and Turkish Westernization movements have continued throughout their history, from the sixth century BC until the present day, predominantly in one direction: westwards. The initial mass migration of Turks was from Central Asia towards Anatolia and Europe.¹ The Turks adapted their distinctive culture and practices to the local traditions of those they conquered. When their civilization was at its apogee from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries they looked down upon their Western neighbours (Gibbons 1916:54-262; Rycout 1668:1-94; Bailey 1942:129-78; Toynbee 1974:24-25).

Europeans have had diverse relationships with the Turks. The characteristics of these relations were friendly, hostile or neutral at one time or another.

¹ See for more detailed information Gibbons (1916), particularly chapters II, III and IV pp.54-262. See also the first-hand observation of the Turks by Rycout (1668:1-94) and Creasy (1961 (1878):1-212).

Militarily, the Osmanlı Turks had the upper hand over central and south-east Europe from the late fourteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century. When Western and Central European countries became more advanced than the Turks, and the Turks became aware that they were behind the Europeans in many aspects of life, they began to adopt Western institutions, ideas and cultural values. Turkish adaptation to the West has continued from the eighteenth century to the present time. Towards the end of the Osmanlı State (Ottoman Empire), Westernization became the official goal of the Osmanlı governments under the influence of the Osmanlı western-educated elites and associated elites (Barker 1974:30; Davison 1968:8-9; Toynbee 1974:27).

Centuries of Turkish domination over the Balkans and the Christian Holy Places affected European perceptions of the Turks, mainly negatively. There was massive propaganda against the Turks.² However, when the Osmanlı military advance came to a halt from the end of the seventeenth century onwards, a movement to reverse these setbacks started with the adoption, reformation and adaptation of contemporary Western institutions (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:181-2; Aka & Koprman 1976:366-8; Göyünç 1999:317; Gladstone 1877:5-80; Karpat 1974:3-4; Shaw 1974:120-22; Stiles 1989:151-2).

Extensive adaptation and reform of institutions, particularly military ones, started with the importation of experts from European countries.³

² See chapters one and three. The negative stereotyping of Turks was started initially by the feudal lords during the formative stages of the Crusades against the Eastern infidel "Turks", starting from the eleventh century onwards.

³ Alexander Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmed Paşa), Baron de Tott, Giuseppe Donizetti, Calosso (Rüstem Bey), Field Marshall Helmut von Moltke, Jean Victor Duruy during the 17th and 19th centuries.

These military and technical experts modernized the Army on Western lines. While these experts kept their own distinctive identities and connections with their countries of origin, they were also allowed to bring their books and other equipment to Turkey. Western influence penetrated, slowly but steadily, into Osmanlı society and has continued ever since. Sultans Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) attempted to change the Osmanlı military structure, and their reforms were modelled on the modern Western military. Grand Viziers (Ağa Hüseyin Paşa, Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa, Mustafa Reşit Paşa, Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa, Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Paşa, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa and Ahmed Vefik Mithat Paşa) and officials were changed very often by the ruling Sultans, (who were influenced either by internal pressure groups or foreign European powers) according to their attitudes towards and perceptions of Westernization policies (Davis 1923:291-9; Erdemir 1995:25-150; Kuran 2000:39; Lamouche 1934:209-12).

Printing also came to the Osmanlı State very late (1727), and this was in response to the requirements of the social and economic situation.⁴ A number of newspapers and journals appeared within a short time, profoundly affecting Osmanlı society (Tütengil 1985:3-4).⁵ New practices, alien to Osmanlı society, were adopted, censuses were held, travel permits started to be issued, and a postal system integrated with its Western counterparts was instituted in the first half of

⁴ A number of hattats (calligraphy writers) resisted modern printing in İstanbul while this would have caused for them to becoming unemployed.

⁵ Among these newspapers were: Bulletin De Nouvelles, Gazette Française De Constantinople, Vakay-ı Mısriyye, Takvim-ı Vekayi, Moniteur Ottoman. Tütengil (1985) examines the Turkish newspapers printed and published in European countries from the second half of the nineteenth century to the second half of the twentieth century, particularly in Britain.

the nineteenth century. These developments increased the Osmanlı elites' awareness of Europe and its customs, political systems, techniques and social situations. Furthermore, on the advice of General Helmut von Moltke (whose uncle Moltke the Elder also served to the Osmanlı in the 1830s), the modernization of factories, the establishment of model battalions and squadrons in the infantry and cavalry, and the training of military men with the latest weapons and tactics took place under ever-increasing German influence. These influences has continued under Baron von der Goltz, who left the German Army in 1883 when he reached the rank of major to take up a training post with the Turkish Army until he returned to Germany in 1896 as a lieutenant general. Goltz was transferred to İstanbul in December 1914 as a military adviser to the Turkish government. After a power struggle, in March 1915, Goltz replaced Liman Von Sanders as the commander of the Bosphorous Army and commanded the Sixth Army on the Mesopotamian Front in 1916. General Otto Liman Von Sanders became Inspector General of the Turkish Army in January 1914, commander of the Turkish First Army until March 1915, served in the Dardanelles with the Fifth Army and in February 1918 took command of the Turkish-German Army on the Palestine Front. All these German officers' influences in the Turkish military system and Turkish people have continued to the present with their ever-increasing military purchase from Germany (Göçmen 1995:98-106; Hale 2000:79-109; Şahin 2000:215-8; www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWgoltz.htm; www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWsanders.htm).

In the *Lale Devri* (the period of the Tulip) (1712-1730) a luxurious Western life style and institutions were adapted by the İstanbul (*Konstantiniyye* or *Constantinople*) elite. There were some riots and

revolts against the wealthy elite's luxurious life style and anything identified with them. During the reign of Mahmud II, the names of institutions were changed to Western styles while preserving their previous structures. On the other hand, the Translation Office (*Tercüme Odası*) educated many diplomats and bureaucrats who played extensive roles in the Westernization programmes of the influential Osmanlı leaders and elites. A number of new schools were opened, on Western models and employing Western-educated teachers (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:241; Aydüz 2000:503; McCarthy 1997:293).

Osmanlı Society was gradually transformed to Western patterns of life by its leading members during the last two centuries of its existence. However, leaders who wanted to implement Western styles of life or institutions differed from one to another in respect of their aims. The understanding of "Westernization" or "modernization" differed even among those people who favoured a reformation of Osmanlı society. Some of these influential people saw imitation of Western institutions without initiating any substantial wholesale changes in their society as the best way forward, while others tried to be selective in their adaptation of Western institutions and styles of life to the requirements of Osmanlı society. The former were identified as persons who favoured "Westernization" ("*baticı*" or "West-philes"), while the latter might be named as a "*çağdaş*" or "modernizers" who favoured selective "modernization". Despite the above differences between leading members of Osmanlı society, some implementation as well as adaptation of Western institutions and styles of life took place. However, Westernization -as it was understood at the time- was really only effective in İstanbul and some other big cities of the Osmanlı State. The bulk of Osmanlı society remained largely untouched by the

official Westernization of the State. The changes were mainly among elites and were not popularly accepted by the lower strata of the population, for numerous social, religious and structural reasons. Contrary to the main expectation of the Osmanlı leaders, although Westernization was carried out with the aim of preserving State unity, this Westernization did not help it to hold on to its Balkan provinces in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:237-9; Davis 1923:301; Lamouche 1934:215,252; Luke 1936:40-5).

A *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayun* (Imperial Rescript) was proclaimed in November 1839 in İstanbul by Mustafa Reşit Paşa. The *Hatt-ı Hümayun* was a declaration of what the Osmanlı State governments were really attempting and putting into practice. Contrary to the general claims of (mostly Western) historians, the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* did not bring about any substantial changes in Osmanlı governments' administrative practices with regard to wider Osmanlı society (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:235-50; Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi 1985:45-55). The Men of the Tanzimat worked to promote change and to apply their ideas on society with the support of the European powers. Britain and France supported the Porte *Sadrızam* (Grand Viziers), while Austria and Russia supported the Palace *Sultan* (Sultans), as the best hopes for their own policies and the interests that would sustain the state. Western-style Palaces were built in İstanbul.⁶ Sultans began to act like Western Kings (Karal 1983:564-5; Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi 1985:40-60).⁷

⁶ Dolmabahçe, Çırağan and Yıldız Palaces.

⁷ Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi's (1985) memoir *Tarih Musahabeleri* is one of best descriptions and well presented first hand experiences while he worked both in Osmanlı and Republic periods' governments. His memoir is widely used as a source book for historians. It beautifully explains what had happened during

A new taxation system was established and the administration was reorganized. Foreign merchants flourished. Non-Muslim merchants backed by Western powers began to have more privileges in social, legal and economic matters than their Muslim counterparts. Secular education and teaching started with the opening of Western-style schools with increasingly Western-educated teachers. Long-established and new style educational systems started to compete. All this produced further division in an already divided society. Judicial and legal reforms were enacted throughout the Tanzimat Era, inspired by French and Italian models. Along with widespread road and railway building, communications developed even further when the telegraph was introduced. Students were sent to Europe to study, and there were improvements in social conditions, particularly in the big cities. During the Tanzimat period literacy started to rise with more extensive schooling and increased circulation of books and newspapers, while a number of theatres opened to satisfy ever increasing public demand. The 'Young Osmanlıs' (*Genç Osmanlılar*) emerged as products of the new secular schools. They argued in favour of parliamentarianism and more radical reforms in Osmanlı society. After the Crimean War, the Osmanlıs were influenced further by Western technology and organisation, which also increased their admiration for the West (Shaw & Shaw 1977:123-41; Haytoğlu 2000:531-8).

the last period of the Osmanlı state and the formative years of the Turkish Republic. Enver Ziya Karal's (1983) book *Osmanlı Tarihi VIII. Cilt Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri 1876-1907* is the last book of an eight volume series. Combined with İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's first four volumes, it is certainly an extremely valuable, well-documented and extensively used source book for 19th-century Osmanlı history.

The first written Constitution was proclaimed on 23 December 1876. At this time, Russia attacked the Osmanlı State, which resulted in heavy Osmanlı losses, financially, politically and territorially. Other European states also began to attack Osmanlı territories for the realisation of their imperialistic aims. Greeks, Bulgars and Serbians began to dream of re-establishing the empires they had once founded in the Balkans (Karal 1983:565-75; McCarthy 1997:306-8; Pavlowitch 1999:115-229).

A total of 380 foreign schools was opened in a short space of time throughout the country, which affected the State's educational system and communities noticeably. The State, the Millets (religious communities) and the foreign schools created various different types of educated persons in Osmanlı society. This could have been used to strengthen the centralized State, as Osmanlı leaders dreamed or expected. However, further diversification of society was encouraged and was widely used by most European powers for the realisation of their imperialistic dreams in various regions of the State, by attaining various ethnically and socially diversified communities through false promises, financial support and educational training (Erdemir 2001:45).⁸ Abdülhamid II's reign (1876-1909) produced a great number of secular-minded educated people with Western ideals and dreams on their minds. Several political groups emerged. The Young Turks formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP or *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*). A number of newspapers began to be printed in the Osmanlı State as well as in European countries who supported and encouraged political movements. Most of them opposed the rule of

⁸ Numerous examples were recorded as in the cases in Arabs, Greeks, Serbs' revolutions, Armenians rebellions and Kurdish riots against their state.

Abdülhamid II. All the discontented groups were united against the Sultan, but everyone with their own expectations and aims completely differed from each other. The Sultan warned the European Powers that, in the event of any mistreatment by the European Powers of their Muslim subjects in their dominions, the Osmanlı State would support oppressed Muslims against their European oppressors. There was thus an ongoing power struggle between the Sultan and the Western imperialistic powers within and outside of the Osmanlı State (Erdemir 2001:45-51; Er 2000:518; Erdem 2000:554; Haytoğlu 2000:533-9; Kuran 2000:37-9).

There were writers and scholars who wrote nationalistic Turkish histories under the influence of their Western counterparts. Nationalistic feelings and writings were widespread and extensively used in books, newspapers and plays towards the end of the nineteenth century. Ziya Gökalp and his disciples combined Western-style education with (Pan) Turkism. Turkism was widely used in their arguments. On the other hand, there were also Islamists who argued that Islam should be the basis for state unity. Another group of people argued that Turks should accept Western civilization as whole if the Osmanlı State wanted to be accepted as part of Europe (Erdemir 2001:51-53; Doğan 1984:129-44; Jung & Piccoli 2001:59-78). The Young Turks adapted Gökalp's ideas on Westernization. Political and ideological developments influenced by Germany started through military and educational reforms and relations with Germany starting from the 1880s onwards. This situation forced Osmanlı military leaders into close association and relations with their German counterparts, with the long term consequence that the Osmanlı state entered the First World War on the German side. When Germans was defeated at the end

of the war, various parts of the Osmanlı State were invaded by Greek, British, French and Italian forces.⁹ Turks started to resist the invaders throughout Anatolia. They succeeded in pushing them out (Erdemir 2001:53-54; Kahya 2000:45; McCarthy 1997:323-4).

When the new Turkish Republic was established, the deputies were divided among themselves on the matter of what type of political system to choose for the new Republic. There were deputies who were in favour of an Islamic (theocratic) system. Contrary to this, a considerable number of deputies argued for a Western-style parliamentary system. However, Mustafa Kemal managed to take control of the new state at the very beginning and started to follow a Westernization policy. The so-called “elites” of the Osmanlı State and the new Turkish Republic, under the influence of Western tradition, education and admiration of the West, without any substantial background or related information about their society’s needs, attempted to replace based on cultural and moral values Islamic tradition by embracing Western civilization as a whole. The ideas of Mustafa Kemal and his close friends became the principles of the new state, codified as: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Revolutionism and Secularism.¹⁰ Turkey underwent a far-reaching Westernization programme, which affected in many ways Turkey's relations with its European as well as Muslim neighbours (Aydemir 1968:33-8; Atatürk 1987:910-32; Cin 1993:1-2; Davison 1968:1-2; Kinross 1978:429-40). The reformers of the new Turkish Republic were well aware of the fact that most Europeans did not see the Turks as part of their

⁹ Greece was used by European Powers for their own political and economic interests against the Osmanlı.

¹⁰ Cumhuriyetçilik, Milliyetçilik, Halkçılık, Devletçilik, İnkılapçılık, and Laiklik.

continent/civilisation. Therefore, the new Turkish Republic's policy-makers took care not to join the Muslim countries' organizations. However, Turkey endeavoured to take part in any alliance aimed at peace or security, for her own and as well as the region's benefit¹¹ (Erdemir 2001:55-67; Çalış 1996:69-75).

For the realisation of the new Turkish Republic in a Westernized mode, centuries-old institutions such as the Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished. In order to demolish the ancien régime's heritage in legal life, Turkey's reformers preferred to borrow laws from Europe, without making substantial changes. The Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code, and the German and the Italian Commercial Codes were blended together and adopted in 1926. The Turkish Constitution was further secularized. A number of religious establishments were either closed or replaced with secular ones, which was deemed necessary for the adoption of Western social mores. Education was put under the control of the government and all religious-oriented authority was eliminated.¹² Secular cinemas, museums and theatre houses were built, and these were seen as encouraging and advocating the imperatives of Western civilization. According to

¹¹ The Islamic Congress of Mecca in 1926, the third Islamic Congress of Jerusalem in December 1931, the Saadabad Pact in July 1937 and the accession of Turkey into the League of Nations in June 1932.

¹² Evkafs, Medreses, Tekkes and Zaviyes were closed. The Use of Seyyid and Şeyh were banned. The fez and the turban were outlawed. The Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet, and the Hicrî calendar with the Gregorian. Reciting the prayer call (Ezan-ı Muhammediye) in Arabic was prohibited. The day of rest at weekends was altered from Friday to Sunday. Turkish melodies were replaced with Western classical music on the radio. Arabic and Persian language courses were deleted from schools and the study of Islamic history was dropped from the lycée curriculum in the favour of the study of the Latin and Greek languages.

Kemal, Western technology and Western civilization could not be separated from one another. The one should complement the other. He believed that the only means of survival lay in acceptance of contemporary Western civilization (Yetkin 1983:137-40; Ceylan Eylül II, III 1991:149-366, 13-400). The new reforms and revolution came from above, not from below. Indeed, revolution was ostensibly made for the people, although the changes in the people were only reflections of changes at an official level initiated from above.

Atatürk's revolution, namely Westernization, needed a single-party system in order to be imposed and gradually to gain acceptance by the people and to move forward in accordance with revolutionary exigencies. Despite the fact that opposition was reduced by the careful stratagems of Kemal and İnönü, the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*) felt that some adjustment was needed. The RPP renewed itself through the inclusion of some moderate opposition members and, in fact, opposition started to emerge even within the RPP early on (Erdemir 2001:68-72).

In the course of its Westernization policy, Turkey started to experience the democratic formation of political parties. The first was the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), which lasted from 17 November 1924 to 5 June 1925. The second was the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*), which survived from 12 August 1930 to 18 December 1930. These two experiences of a two-party system failed, because of the high-handed actions and attitudes of the leaders of the Republic. Consequently the state leaders were able further to strengthen their domination and the application of Westernization principles (Yetkin 1997:235-244). However, these two experiences also

showed that many people were against some aspects of the Westernization programme. Those who were against Westernization and reforms were soon identified and subsequently eliminated from positions of power and office (Avşar 1998:36; Çalış 1996:44-5; Erer 1966:127-59; Tunaya 1952:612-2,657).¹³

With the establishment of the new Turkish republic, Westernization intensified and has remained official policy ever since then. With the end of the Second World War Turkey started to take its place among the Western democracies. First, internal moves towards the West took place in politics in response to external pressures. The United States and other Western powers started to put pressure on neutral countries to decide whether they would accept the democratic system or face the consequences of intervention in their affairs by democratic countries. The pressure of Western countries affected İnönü's decision on further democratization in Turkey. The pressure of Russian territorial demands on Turkey also affected Turkey's decision to democratize the system and join the West (Erdemir 2001:75-80; Erer 1966:228-33; Karpat 1959:150-51; Rubinstain 1960:206; Tunaya 1952:646-7).¹⁴

Turkey moved to a multi-party system with the emergence of the Democrat Party (DP). The first election, in which the DP struggled under constant harassment by the ruling RPP, took place in 1946. A number of regulations and laws were changed during

¹³ Tekin Erer's memoir *Türkiye'de Parti Kavgaları* (1966), as one of the DP deputies, gave first hand valuable information on how democratization emerged in the early formative years of Turkey's politics. Tarık Zafer Tunaya's *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952* is a highly regarded study and an excellent source book for present researchers.

¹⁴ Kemal Karpat's *Turkey's Politics* (1959) is a well-researched study in English, extremely useful on the formative stages of Turkish democratic development and its experiences up to 1959.

the next four years which enabled opposition voices to reach the electorate, which played an important part in the progress of democratization up to the May 1950 general election (Erdemir 2001:80-97; Davison 1968:10-11).¹⁵

The country experienced very impressive democratic advances during the first period of the DP governments. In the second half of the 1950s, however, the DP governments became more autocratic and started suppressing opposition and criticism. On the other hand, Westernization continued, as it had done in the RPP period. As a result of the economic boom and the large mainly public but also private investments which took place during 1951 – 1953, the DP governments were supported by the masses whose living conditions were improved by the new economic development (Balkır & Williams 1993:Introduction 5-8). However, the DP neglected to consolidate a multi-party system and democracy, which it had aimed at before it came to power. Economic difficulties began after the election of 1957 and steadily increased until the military intervention of 27 May 1960. These were exploited by every possible means by the RPP, in order to regain power (Balkır & Williams 1993:7-15; Erdemir 2001:97-108; Internet 27 Mayıs Belgeseli).

However, the political and socio-economic situation of Turkey changed and improved considerably compared to previous decades during the 1950s and 1960s. These changes were mostly influenced or produced by the Westernization policies carried out by the various RPP and the DP governments, alongside the support and insistence of Western countries in promoting democratization and liberalization. A

¹⁵ Martial law was ended in December 1947, which enabled the press to enjoy freedom of expression and criticism. In December 1949 the existing election law was changed by more liberalised one.

number of economic and political international ties were established between Turkey and Europe which affected first the Turkish elites, and then subsequently, to some extent, ordinary middle-class Turkish people. Through the Republican and early Democratic eras, Turkish people attempted to be extensively educated rather 'indoctrinated' in the Western styles of life and cultural norms. These developments were hailed and encouraged by Western governments who gave positive signals and included Turkey in some of their international organisations, notably NATO and OECD. The Western Powers and policy makers tried not to alienate the Turks from their own civilization. Whether these policies were elaborated and carried out deliberately or happened inadvertently, there were certainly Western influences on Turkish policy-makers and on the Turkish people.

While dealing with the issue of westernisation and democratisation in a particular region or country, any comprehensive approach to the full picture of political developments will need to contain at least two essential analytical elements: the first one is related to the macro-level factors, which can be viewed as determining the overall pressure to political changes, while the second one is concerned with the micro-level factors which determine what kinds of political changes and where and when took places. The former is mostly global and regional structure in emphasis, while the latter is largely by local or individual countries. The macro-level factors are the structural contexts and comprise the economic, social, political, cultural, historical, and demographic frameworks. The micro-level factors, which are conditioned, even if not determined, by the macro-level factors, are part of the behavioural mobility responses. The macro-level factors in political changes are correlated to those various influences of the global powers and

institutions. The countries of political destination and their peoples' choices might be determined by the possibilities available to those who take part in politics.

There has been, and still is, a need for studies and research investigations concerned with the complexities of the relations between political developments and a variety of other factors including: economic development, poverty, social change, cultural mobility, population increase, political instability, violation of human rights, and geographical and historical consequences of mass movements. Analyses of these kinds point to a great number of social, political, cultural, demographic and historical factors on which the past, present and future of political changes also depend, besides a number of socio-economic factors. As far as the recent Turkish westernisation and democratisation is concerned, socio-economic, political and historical factors have affected the policy-makers' decision in different ways and to differing degrees (İçduygu 1999:22; Türk 26 October 2000:Italy Conference).

The Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s together with rapid state industrialisation efforts can be considered as 'significant changes of social structure' and a 'seeding' of Turkish economic and social development in Westernization policies whose effects were to be observed in the rapid acceleration of change in Turkish society post-1950. However, the effects of the Kemalist development strategy are only one side of the complex picture of the rapid acceleration in Turkish social, economic and political development and transformation from 1950 onwards. The period following World War II represents a good benchmark for the social and political incorporation of Turkey into the Western capitalist world system. There were two considerable developments which

occurred in this constructional period. Internally, decades of painful political development led to the establishment of a multi-party system in 1946 and created an opportunity for one of the newly organised political parties, the Democrat Party, to win the general election of 14 May 1950. Internationally, close economic, political and military ties were established with the West, particularly with the United States. Foreign capital started to flow to Turkey with the extension of Marshall Aid in 1947 for military purposes and after 1948 for military and economic purposes under the European Recovery Plan (ERP). In 1948 Turkey joined the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), and over the next 11 years 1,200 million US dollars were granted in economic aid. In 1949 Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, and in 1952 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Starting from 1950, the Democrat Party attempted to implement a liberal economic programme, and the government used much of the Marshall Aid for the mechanisation of agriculture and extensive highway building programmes, as was advised internally and internationally (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/relations.htm; www.state.gov/www/background/notes/turkey9910/bgn.html; Dilipak 1990:11-50).

The introduction of machinery and other agricultural advances such as fertilization and irrigation after 1950 resulted in a rapid expansion of the cultivated area and agricultural production. However, this expansion together with a population increase caused a transformation of the traditional land tenure system (most peasants were sharecroppers and small landowners) and created a widespread agrarian polarisation between big landowners, on the one hand, and small landowners and the landless

labourers on the other. Many rural people who could not continue in agriculture, even as wagedworkers, then migrated to the cities. At the same time, improved transportation and communication mobilised the rural population and brought a previously isolated peasantry into close contact with modern urban society. In the following stages of this process, 'going to the cities' became so widespread that it implied an institutionalisation of migration during the 1950s and 1960s.

During the massive rural-urban exodus of the post-1950 period, millions of peasants migrated to the urban areas, mainly to big cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, and Adana. It is estimated that more than 200,000 peasants moved annually to the cities between 1950 and 1970. The corresponding figures for the periods of 1970-1980 and 1980-1990 were 350,000 and 450,000 respectively. In the post-1990 period, this figure was over 500,000 annually (Ayhan & İçduygu & Ünalın & Hancıođlu & Türkyılmaz 1999:7-10). The main direction of this mass population flow was from the relatively less developed areas of the country to the relatively more developed regions, taking people from rural to urban areas and from east to west.¹⁶ However,

¹⁶ According to the current research tradition in Turkey, the country can be divided into five geographical regions: the Northern, the Western, the Southern, the Central, and the Eastern. The Western region, which is the most industrialised and socio-economically most developed area in Turkey, is the most densely settled region. The Southern region has very fertile plains and rapidly growing industrial and tourism sectors. The Central region, which specialises primarily in agricultural production, has some recently developing industrial sectors. The Northern region, which has a narrow but long coastal strip, is relatively isolated from the rest of the country by mountainous terrain. The Eastern region, which is the second largest, is the least densely settled, the least industrialised, and socio-economically the least developed region of the country (geography.about.com/library/cia/ncturkey.htm).

while a significant proportion of the labour force shifted from rural to urban areas, the urban economy failed to create enough jobs in the developing industrial sector for those people who migrated. In fact, although the industrial sector was expanding quite fast, this was not having an equal effect in creating jobs (İçduygu 1999:23-24). Turkey has undergone an intensive process of urbanisation, especially since the 1950s. In the early 1950s, less than 20 per cent of the total population was located in urban areas (localities with more than 10,000 population). According to the latest data (SIS 1999), 65 per cent of the population was living in urban areas.

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has experienced substantial changes in its demographic structure. Turkey has a young population as a result of declining mortality and high fertility rates in the recent past. One-third of the population is under 15 years of age, while the proportion of elderly is comparatively low. Recent decades, however, have witnessed dramatic declines in fertility rates (OECD 1982:38; 1983:16).

In the early 1960s Turkey, alongside many former colonized and newly independent African and Asian countries, provided a convenient and interesting context in which to study of internal as well as international migration. Emigration flows of Turkish people in general, and Turkish labour migration to Europe in particular, begun in this context, can be divided into two main phases: the first one was labour migration from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s, and the second one was of family reunion from the mid-1970s onwards. There were three distinct types of emigration in the second phase: a)- family reunification, including marriage migration; b)- politically motivated migration (particularly since the military coup of 12 September 1980), which accelerated

in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s (this movement often overlapped with irregular/ undocumented/ clandestine labour migration) and, c)-labour migration of so-called illegal or undocumented labour.

Although labour migrant recruitment and labour flows from Turkey to Europe tailed off in the early 1970s, the migration did not end. Rather, it continued in other forms, such as family reunion, refugee flows and clandestine labour migration. It is estimated that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, through the various types of migration, there was a movement of nearly 300,000 people annually from Turkey to Europe.¹⁷ In the early 1980s there were nearly 1.9 million Turkish migrants in Europe. By 1995 the numbers had increased by more than 900,000 to over 2.8 million, and they reached four million in 2000. This last increase occurred in a period when most receiving countries had become more selective and restrictive. They had adopted strict selection policies either on the basis of close family ties or of high levels of labour market skill, or of international asylum regulations (Ünalán & İçduygu 1999:3-4; Spencer 1997:132-39).

The book examines Westernization of Turkey and its subsequent developments in Turkish cultural, societal and political life, and is subdivided into two chapters. The first chapter deals with how Osmanlı governments and its leading elite's modernization programmes and Westernization reforms led to "official policy" of the Republican governments and political and historical developments will be evaluated. The second chapter deals with "Democratization of Turkey". In this chapter, the political situation of Turkey before its application to the EEC will be

¹⁷ The total number of Turkish Citizens travelling abroad in 1998 was 4,601,349, which was almost the same as the amount in 1997, 4,632,876 (www.turkey.org/tourism_fr.html).

evaluated, including how and why Turkey chose a multi-party system. The emergence of the DP, changes in governments and social situations, the democratization of Turkey under the influence of the West, and subsequent developments, will all be examined. The consequences of the new shapes and functions of the alliances between the West and Turkey are also analysed.

The final chapter, as a conclusion, will draw together what may seem to be quite disparate issues, which in reality were viewed as a single concern in German immigration policy towards Turkey and the Turks. One of the main concerns of the European Community has been with Turkish migrants as distinct from Turkey's other problems en route to full membership of the EU. However, this was not spelled out openly by the politicians. The other problems may not have been the main concerns, but they were nevertheless important and legitimate concerns.

There is a vast array of literature on most of the topics are discussed, given the wide scope of the book. Indeed, to read much of it would serve me to see the issues in many different angles and provide a list of authorities with whom I agreed or disagreed. It is appropriate to mention a point about bibliographic notation here. To refer to works found in the bibliography, the Harvard form of referencing was used. Quotations from Turkish and other language sources were translated into English by the author of this book unless otherwise stated.

It should also be noted that the material in the appendix is not, strictly speaking, directly relevant to the main direction of the book. It is placed in the appendix as a matter of convenience, as the discussion of the role of the westernization and democratization entailed an examination of the types of material included in the appendix, which became too large to be

condensed into a footnote. As such a discussion did not seem to warrant space in the main body of the text, it was included in an appendix.

CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL BACKCLOTH: WESTERNIZATION
OF TURKEY UNDER THE OSMANLI AND IN THE
TURKISH REPUBLIC

THE OSMANLI STATE PERIOD OF WESTERNIZATION

Examining how Westernization emerged and what stages it passed through during the late Osmanlı period, when there were people for and against the Westernization policy, will help to explain the background to the Turkish application to join the European institutions. How did the governments of the new Turkish Republic decide to pursue Westernization as an “official policy”? Did this official Westernization policy affect the decisions of the citizens of Turkey to undergo further Westernization? Turkish people were indeed influenced by their State’s policies of Westernization, including the secularization of Turkish education. This chapter examines how this process took place and how it affected Turkish peoples’ familiarization with the West. Were these decisions optional or brought about by force of circumstances?

In the 18th and 19th centuries the policy of Westernization followed by the Osmanlı State was affected by the growing technological superiority of the West over the Osmanlı State.¹⁸ However, in previous

¹⁸ During the Osmanlı period, particularly 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries Westernization was interpreted as transferring technological and some social advances of Western countries into Osmanlı society. The understanding of Westernization gradually changed from time to time and from

centuries, Turkish military and technological advantages over the West had adversely affected Western attitudes and behaviour towards the Turks. In France between 1480 and 1609, 80 books were published on the Turks and Turkish culture, and most of these publications were based on crude anti-Turkish propaganda. There was massive propaganda carried out by the leading Western powers which increased ordinary Europeans' fear or hatred of the Turks and anything associated with them, and Turkophobia developed in European societies (Göyünç 1999:317; İnalçık 1974:51-3; Lowry 2001:7-92).¹⁹ Religious leaders referred to Turks in their religious discourse as evil, Satanic, barbarous, uncivilized and violent. Certain Kings and Princes used the Turkophobic fears of their subjects for their own benefit, or to bolster their power. This abuse of the Turks had continued since the 4th century, when Europeans first encountered Turks (Gladstone 1877:5-80; McNeill 1974:34; Palmer 1995:8-15; Stiles 1989:151-2). So long as the Osmanlı were militarily stronger than the Europeans, they had paid little attention to the institutions and practices of European States and empires. After starting to lose battles and territories (for the first time in the 1690s) to the Europeans, the

person to person. Earlier understandings of the adaptation of Western technology step by step was altered by elites into assimilation of Western culture and life styles into their own. So, the context and explanation of Westernization ranged from those people who wanted to change the system for their own better existence to those who wanted to live like Westerners because of admiration of the West. The use of the term 'Westernization' is not going to be differentiated in the thesis because both understandings are present at any one time.

¹⁹ Nejat Göyünç indicated that the number of publications relating to Turks in Europe in the sixteenth century was: 1000 in German and 455 in Latin and French. The total number of publications was 2463 in various European languages such as English, Italian and Spanish (Göyünç 1999:315-19).

Osmanlı realized that they needed to change or adapt their armed forces and institutions to the requirements of the age.

The first attempt to change the structure of the *Yeniçeri Ocağı* was made by Osman II, but this ended in his deposition and murder in May 1622 (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:181-2; Erer 1966:21). There were other attempts, either adapting instruments from the West or creating their own, to change the military structure on European lines (training, uniform and formation of the troops) in the course of several decades of small or large-scale rebellions²⁰ (Davison 1968:68; Gibbon 1916:180-262; Aka & Kopruman 1976:366-8; Güngören 1985:6).

During the period of "*Lale Devri*" (the period of the Tulip)²¹ an extensive Western life style came to flourish in Osmanlı cities. Entertainments, celebrations and parties increased in high society, with extensive construction of Western style kiosks.²² Progressive measures were implemented in science, cultural activities and the arts.²³ Envoys were sent to the major European capitals: in 1719 to Vienna; in 1720-21 to Paris; and in 1722-23 to Moscow (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:214-6; Davison 1968:68; Karpat 1959:6-7; Palmer 1995:33). Humbaracı Osman Ahmed Paşa, alias Claude-Alexander Comte de

²⁰ For example, in 1656, in 1658, in 1687 and in 1703.

²¹ During this period tulips were used extensively among the élites of Konstantiniyye (İstanbul). It was a very expensive pleasure to have a tulip at the time. There were 234 different tulips in the period of Lale in Konstantiniyye. The period was between 1712 and 1730.

²² Sa'adabat Köşkü (Kiosk), Şeref-abat, Bağ-ı ferah, and the Damad İbrahim Paşa's kiosk Çırağan Place (Palmer 1995:34-5).

²³ Such as Çinicilik (the art of tile making) or minyatür (miniature) painting (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:216).

Bonneval,²⁴ founded the *Humbaracı Ocağı* (Artillery Corps or *corps de mortiers*) in 1734 in Konstantiniyye. He also re-trained and re-equipped many Turkish units with the aim of moulding the whole army into a modern European force following the French and Austrian military models (Çataltepe 2000:59; Palmer 1995:41-2; Roider 1972:43-4,94-172; www.enfal.de/otarih29.htm). Baron de Tott, who was a French aristocrat of Hungarian descent, was invited to re-establish cannon foundries and armaments production. This was another attempt to modernize the Osmanlı Army in the Western style. He invited and employed a number of other Europeans to establish a French-style army, with the encouragement and permission of the Sultans (Çataltepe 2000:59-60; Palmer 1995:41).

The need for changes in the structure of the state or its institutions differed from reign to reign. Sultan Ahmed III was deposed, and a number of high level officials were hanged as a result of mass protests against their “*Gavur*” (infidel) lifestyles and Western approaches (Davison 1968:69; McCarthy 1997:285-6; Palmer 1995:39). The Osmanlı made an effort to “modernize” their institutions, particularly military institutions, so that the Osmanlı State would be able to compete with Western states and fend off any Western aggression. This modernization would also be regarded as “development” and “Westernization”²⁵ in

²⁴ Bonneval, a French general and adventurer from Limousin, had a personal conflict with Prince Eugene and fled from Austria to Sarajevo in 1728. He embraced Islam and came to Konstantiniyye, willing to help the Sultan to drive the Habsburgs from Hungary.

²⁵ Westernization: to make Western in character, especially to make an eastern country or race more Western in regard to its institutions or ideas (Simpson-Weiner 1989:166-7), to influence or make familiar with the customs or practices of the West (Collins 1993:988).

order to reach the levels of advancement attained by Western nations. This was commonly understood as “*Modernleşme*” (Modernization), “*Batılılaşma*” (Westernization), “*Avrupalılaşma*” (Europeanization) or “*Gavurlaşma*” (Infidelisation) among the Osmanlı citizens. “Westernization”, “Development”, “Modernization” or “Europeanization” –whatever one might call these approaches– were adopted and applied to all modern institutions, whether they were developed in Western European countries, in America, in Asia, in Africa or elsewhere (Ahmad 1984:5; Mardin 1991:11-3; McCarthy 1997:287). However, the above terms were used interchangeably, particularly in the second half of the 19th century, to refer to development to the advanced level of European states. Even today, some of those people who cannot differentiate the delicate nuance between Westernization and modernization use both terms to convey almost the same meaning.

The Osmanlı State, while trying to modernize its institutions, brought in Western experts in military and technical matters. These instructors and experts kept their own distinctive cultures while they lived in the Osmanlı State. The Osmanlı élites and officials were influenced by the teachings and life-styles of these recruited Europeans. So Western influence slowly but steadily began to permeate the Osmanlı State. When French military inventions and methods were transferred to Osmanlı, related books and instructions also came with them. High-level officials, military personnel, secular school teachers and academics started to learn foreign languages in order to understand and use all the important new technologies, systems and foreign teachers’ instruction. In learning a foreign language, they also learned about France and other European countries’ political, social and cultural life and systems (Davison

1968:71; Karpas 1959:7; McCarthy 1997:288-91 Palmer 1995:53-55).

In addition to inviting Western instructors and teachers to the armed forces and schools, embassies and envoys were sent to European countries in order to collect information about their systems and institutions. Three embassies went to Vienna, London and Paris²⁶ and reported back (Kuran 2000:39; Palmer 1995:55). These reports had a considerable influence on the ruling class of the Osmanlı and this was an important stage in the Westernization of Turkey.

On 29 May 1807 Sultan Selim III was deposed and killed because of his attempt to modernize the Osmanlı State along Western lines and his reorganization of the armed forces, especially the creation of the *Nizam-i Cedid Ordusu* (the Army of the New Order). Sultan Mahmud II saw Selim's reforms and their consequences and, in order not to repeat Selim III's tragic error, he planned carefully and acted accordingly (Karpas 1974:94; Palmer 1995:62-76). He knew that reforms had to encompass the entire scope of the Osmanlı institutions and society for a real modernization of the state. In order to make the new reforms effective, old institutions and practices had to be destroyed and support had to be obtained beforehand to ensure their substantial success (Karpas 1959:8; Lamouche 1934:208, 248-258; Luke 1936: 33-45). Sultan Selim III's newly-formed and short-lived Western style army, called the *Nizamı Cedid Ordusu*, was re-established under the name of the *Sekban-i*

²⁶ The embassies were Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed to Paris in 1720, Ebu Bekir Ratıp Efendi to Vienna from February to July 1792, Yusuf Agah Efendi to London 1793 and 1797 and Halet Efendi to Paris 1803 and 1806. They presented their detailed reports about the related countries' political system, institutions, social life and the like.

*Cedid*²⁷ (irregular troops of musketeers) in order to avoid opposition during the reign of Mahmud II. The *Sekban-ı Cedid* was stationed in the former's barracks in *Levent Çiftliği* and *Üsküdar*, a total of 10,000 men and officers in all (Davison 1968:71-2; Erdemir 1995:25-150; McCarthy 1997:292; Palmer 1995:77-93).

The *Yeniçeri Ocağı* was abolished on 15 June 1826 in what came to be known as *Vaka-i Hayriye* (the Auspicious Event). For the first time a major four – centuries– old institution was destroyed to make way for a new one. Those people with a vested interest in the old order could only resist with words, not having any military support this time, rather than with the kind of violence or force they had used previously. The motivation of the military's support for the reforms and revolutionary ideas originated from their education and knowledge, particularly of the advanced Western nations' technology. The new corps was modelled on the modernized Western military styles (Palmer 1995:92-5). Regimental bands²⁸ were

²⁷ Just as Sultan Selim III established the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, Mahmud II established the *Sekban-ı Cedid* as an instrument of personal power. It was also the first step toward modernizing the army and the state. After experiencing setbacks he spent 18 years rebuilding a cadre of devoted people who would enable the Sultan to reform the institutions. External and internal threats forced Mahmud II to concentrate his efforts on the military. The fleet, the artillery, naval arsenals and the gunpowder factory were rebuilt and modernized with help from foreign technicians. New military equipment was purchased in Europe and stored in İstanbul. Mahmud II acted very skilfully in order to gain total political control in the Palace. His opponents were appointed to other posts but not for long enough to allow them to establish their authority (Karpas 1959:9; Lamouche 1934:208-63). Mahmud II became a perfect example for Mustafa Kemal to follow in the Republican period of Turkey. He used *Kuvva-ı Milliye* (the National Army) as his personal and government power against internal and external oppositions.

²⁸ The word “band” was introduced into Italian in the 18th century from Turkish word “*tabl u bend*” as “*banda*”, which was in

introduced on Western lines, under the direction of Giuseppe Donizetti, brother of the famed composer, who stimulated the rise of Western-style music in the State (1828-1856). The Grand Viziers were changed very frequently and in accordance with their attitudes towards the Westernization of the Osmanlı State.²⁹ The new Western-style cavalry corps was formed in Silistria, on the Danube and in Konstantiniyye, and consisted of three different ethnic groups, Tatars, Turks, and Christian Cossacks, who were trained by an Italian captain named Calosso (Rüstem Bey), who introduced French organization and drill, including the new battalion reform (Davison 1963, 1968:75; Palmer 1995:91-2; Tanrıkorur 1999:500; Shaw & Shaw 1077:23-5).

French newspapers, the *Bulletin de nouvelles* and the *Gazette française de Constantinople*, had been published in Konstantiniyye since 1796 and in İzmir since 1824 (Tütengil 1985:3-4). Mahmud II wanted to enlighten his subjects on what was happening within and outwith the Osmanlı State in order to make them participants in contemporary European civilization. These newspapers³⁰ and other literature played

turn introduced into Turkish as a Western word “bando” during the Republic period (Tanrıkorur1999:500 esp.ft.24).

²⁹ Ağa Hüseyin Paşa was replaced by Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa, who had advocated modernization as early as 1801 after seeing both the British and French forces in Egypt and modernized the fleet while serving as grand admiral. Under Hüsrev Paşa, the Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiye (Trained Victorious Muhammedan Soldiers), was modernized along the lines established in France (Erdemir 1995:27-35).

³⁰ Vakayi-i Misriye (the Events of Egypt) had been printed in the Osmanlı domains since 1829. On 25 July 1831 the first official Osmanlı newspaper appeared as the Takvim-i Vekayi (the Calendar of Events), weekly. The French version, the *Moniteur Ottoman*, was issued periodically to Europeans resident in the Osmanlı domain (Palmer 1995:94; Şahin 2000:215-8; Tütengil 1985 3-4) For further information on Turkish press history particularly

important roles in shifting the traditional Osmanlı literature to a European style of writing, which was called “*Tanzimat edebiyatı*” (the Tanzimat literature). This new Tanzimat literature deeply affected Turkish intellectuals’ attitudes towards Europe and European ideas (Okay 1999:69-76,195-206; Palmer 1995:94). One can easily observe the extensive French influence on the leading members of Osmanlı State, starting under Selim III (1789-1808), it flourished in the major Osmanlı cities by promoting education and training in military and civil schools, modern print media, technological transformations and reform. This enormous French influence led to the establishment of close relations and involvement between leading members of the Osmanlı public and France and French culture. One cannot be surprised at the resultant dominance and popularity of the French language in the Osmanlı State towards the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century (Erdemir 2002:641-46).

On the other hand, in the name of restoration, and in some cases Westernization, the names of institutions were changed. The entire bureaucracy of the ruling class was reorganized. All officials were now paid by salary according to rank, instead of encouraging to take *bahşiş* (fixed amount taken for every dealt issue in Osmanlı bureaucracy which was interpreted as “bribes” in modern Turkey), and the structure of the bureaucratic hierarchy was established with the Western-style model in mind (Davison 1968:75-6; İhsanoğlu 2000:35). The first *Tercüme Odası* (the Translation Office)³¹ was

in foreign countries outside of the Osmanlı territory, see Cavit Orhan Tütengil 1985, *Yeni Osmanlılar'dan Bu yana İngiltere'de Türk Gazeteciliği (1867-1967) Belge yayınları 2*. Baskı İstanbul 1985 and Şahin 2000:215-8.

³¹ See for further information (Aydüz 2000:499-511).

established in the Foreign Ministry in 1833 and produced not only diplomats and educated bureaucrats but also the new intelligentsia who would play major roles in the future of the Westernization program, cultural change and in the understanding of the Turkish intellectuals (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:241; Aydüz 2000:503; İhsanoğlu 1999:271-96; McCarthy 1997:293).

For the purpose of a just system of rule and taxation, a census was carried out between 1831 and 1838. The first regular Osmanlı postal system was established in 1838. *Mürür Tezkeresi* (travel permits) were issued from local police offices to persons wishing to travel from one area to another in order to prevent mass migrations which might affect financial and social stability of the State. This system was further developed later to register the entire Osmanlı population and to furnish identification cards for the census procedure. These reforms became the initial steps of the reforms that were to follow in later years (181 and 183 Nolu Şer'iyye sicils; Palmer 1995:94-104; Shaw & Shaw 1977:40-41). In the *Mekteb-i Ulum-i Harbiye* (the School of Military Science), established in order to train new officers in Western military methods, Western instructors were invited but the School lacked trainers and trainees from poor background people. Trainees were the sons of grandees and notables. They owed their promotion to political influence rather than to their quality or military ability. This clearly explains why only the élites of the Osmanlı communities insisted on a continuation of the Westernization policy in subsequent years. The unified corps was regrouped into six regiments in accordance with contemporaneous French patterns. With the arrival of Prussian advisers in 1833, the artillery shifted toward

the Prussian system (Hale 1994:20; Lybyer 1913:199-226³²; Robinson 1963:3).

The British supplied industrial and military equipment along with personnel to Osmanlı, while from Prussia Helmut von Moltke came to Osmanlı with a team of advisers, starting the strong links between the German and the Turkish military which have continued to this day. Von Moltke advised on the development of modern factories, establishing model battalions and squadrons in the infantry and cavalry, and training military men with the latest weapons and tactics. However, even though the Osmanlıs admired and respected these advisers, many of them remained reluctant to accept and sometimes to practice the advice of infidels. Moreover, the Prussians shared the prevailing Western scorn towards Muslims, and associated instead with foreigners and with minority groups in the Osmanlı population, joining them in making fun of their hosts, bringing hostility upon themselves and contributing to a mutual lack of understanding (Ahmad 1993:4; Davison 1968:75; Hale 1994:18; McCarthy 199:295). The increasing number of British and German advisers and personnel gradually started to challenge French influence. The developing relations with the United Kingdom and particularly Prussia imbued the Osmanlı authorities as well as peoples of Turkey with a kind admiration which would affect Turkey and the Turkish people in the following years.

Students were sent abroad to study in 1827 for the first time since Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa's ascendancy.³³ However, since most of the students

³² This book contains a very good detailed explanation of the Osmanlı institutions.

³³ Mehmed Ali Paşa sent students abroad to study starting from 1809 to 1843 with four groups consisting of 221 students in a variety of subjects. The students were sent to various European

either did not return or did not receive all that they should have, this experience was not as beneficial as had been expected (Erdemir 1997:3-13; Kireççi 2000:61-2). On the other hand, some students came back and helped to form schools on the Western pattern and worked as teachers and lecturers in schools for the further Westernization of Osmanlı society.³⁴ Even though little progress was achieved in the short term, these schools were the basis for the further development of the Tanzimat and for the later creation of the Turkish Republic.

Mahmud II tried to transform Osmanlı society into a modern society, like the West, in order to withstand Western technological advances. The changes were not only technological but also cultural as well. Mahmud II started the change and built a new palace, the *Dolmabahçe* Palace, designed with Western-style sofas, tables, and chairs replacing the pillows and divans of the old palaces (Palmer 1995:130-31). He himself dressed like a European monarch, shortening his beard and wearing Western hats, frock coats, and trousers. He appeared in public riding in European-style *faytons* (carriages). He attended public receptions, concerts, operas, and ballet performances, imported Western musicians, and developed the hassa musicians into a Western style military band in order

countries to study. These students were the engine of the Westernization of Egypt in following years. See for further information İhsanoğlu 1999:295-6; Kireççi 2000:61-7; Palmer 1995:94-104.

³⁴ The Tıbhane-i Amire (new Medical School), the Cerrahhane (School of Surgery) was opened in 1832, the Müzika-i Hümayun Mektebi (Imperial School of Music), and the Mekteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye (School for Military Science) were established in 1836, and the Mekteb-i Şahane-i Tibbiye (Imperial School of Medicine) in 1839, all using new techniques. Books were imported from foreign countries, although this achieved little progress (İhsanoğlu 2000:27-30; Kahya 2000:40-2; Kireççi 2000:61-2).

to offer Western-style concerts to his (European) guests. Soon his officials started to emulate him. The new forms of dress were accepted as the most prominent marks of the modern man, obliterating the differences of religion, rank, and class which the turban had symbolized and manifested in traditional Osmanlı Society. In 1829 modern clothing was made compulsory by law for male civilians as well as for soldiers and bureaucrats, with turbans³⁵ and robes being allowed only for the religious officials of the different millets (181 Şer'iyye sicils; Davison 1968:76; Hourani 1974:73-4). Mahmud said once: "I distinguish my Muslim subjects in the mosque, my Christian subjects in the church, and my Jewish subjects in the synagogue, but there is no other difference among them. My love and justice for all of them is very strong and they are all my true children" (Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi 1985:52). Mahmud II also started to learn French.³⁶ The learning of foreign languages became important and helped to improve relations with the West (Kahya 2000:41-4). However, Mahmud was called the "*kafir sultan*" (infidel sultan) by his opponents. None of his reforms affected the Ulema and other religious institutions, which remained unchanged (Davis 1923:301; Luke 1936:40-5; McCarthy 1997:294-5). Reforms did not fundamentally

³⁵ Turbans (head scarves) today (2001) are seen as a religious ideological expression by the secular "élites" of Turkey. In fact, this is a process of Westernization and expression of being away from the Islamic orientation. Female students who wear head scarves are not allowed to enter most of Turkey's universities, as a result of governments' and military officials' policies (the Economist 17-23 April 1999:60; 18 December 1999:36).

³⁶ It is been suggested that Mahmud II's mother was a French woman, Aimee Dubuc de Rivery, a native of Martinique in the West Indies. She was captured by Algerians and presented to Abdülhamid I, who was the father of Sultan Mahmud II (Davis 1923:300, esp. footnote 1).

change society but only its appearance, as it was difficult 'to teach an old dog new tricks'. However, his efforts helped other reformers in many ways. Without Mahmud's reforms the later achievements of the *Tanzimat* and *Meşrutiyet* eras and eventually the Turkish Republic itself could not have been accomplished (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:237-9; Hale 1994:21; Lamouche 1934:216,252).

The Tanzimat Era 1839-1876: The *Tanzimat-ı Hayriye* (Auspicious Reorderings) was another, more far-reaching period of legislation and reform in order to modernize the Osmanlı State and society, which would be taken as the model for all subsequent reforms until the present day. Until the first Constitution period, the reform and Westernization programmes were carried out either by the Sultans themselves or by the Grand Viziers with the support of the Sultans.³⁷

During the Tanzimat era, the *Dolmabahçe* Palace, the *Çırağan* Palace and the *Yıldız* Palace (pavilion) were built with European-style apartments and gardens. The nineteenth-century Sultans' habits and manners also changed considerably compared to

³⁷ As Men of the Tanzimat, Mustafa Reşit Paşa (1800- 7 January 1858), Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa (1815-7 September 1871) and Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Paşa (1815- 12 February 1869) were important figures who planned to transform and reform the state and society and lead them along the same paths as Western countries. The mentioned officials prepared a decree, which was signed by Sultan Abdülmecid and officially proclaimed on Sunday 3 November 1839 in the Gülhane (Rose Chamber) Garden, also known as Gülhane Hatt-i Hümayunu (the Imperial Rescript of Gülhane) (Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi 1985:40-60; Davison 1968:79; Karal 1983:564-5; Palmer 1995:110-11). There were other reformers among from the Men of the Tanzimat whose names were less well known than these three most prominent reformers. Two of them were Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (1822-25 May 1895) and Ahmed Şefik Mithat Paşa 1822-1884 (Abdurrahman Şeref Efendi:149-172).

previous Sultans. The Sultans travelled within and outside of İstanbul as well as to Europe. These visits considerably affected the attitudes of the Sultan towards the reformation and transformation of Osmanlı society. The armed forces were further reorganized with more widespread secular education. Weapons were renewed with Prussian and German equipment, which also helped the Germans to influence further the Osmanlı armed forces. Mining operations were regulated for the first time in the Mining Code of July 1861, and that code was supplanted in 1869 by a new regulation based mainly on the French Mining Law of 1810 (Davison 1968:82-3; Hourani 1974:74; Palmer 1995:124-63).

Institutional and bureaucratic changes were accompanied by tangible progress in improving Osmanlı society into a secular and modern state alongside an awareness of the outside world. There were numerous reorganizations and reforms as well as the establishment of new secular schools during the period of the Tanzimat. Ali and Fuad Paşas invited the French Education Minister Jean Victor Duruy to visit İstanbul in 1860, to advise on the establishment of a new schools system. He recommended the establishment of inter-denominational secondary schools, a secular university, new professional technical schools, and a public library system; changes that survived in the decades to come. Without going into detail, one can nonetheless name those schools which followed some sort of secular curriculum in teaching, importing foreign books, instructors, teachers, and the like. Also a number of foreign schools were opened which fostered deepening social divisions among Muslims as well as between non-Muslim and Muslim subjects. The new bureaucrats were arrogant toward the old bureaucrats in that they thought they knew what was best for the state and its

people³⁸ (Davison 1963:244-50; Erdem 2000:548-50; Karabıyık 1984:50-65). This division between the old and new has continued ever since.

The Western countries competed among themselves for domination of the Osmanlı State.³⁹ The telegraph was introduced and operated into the Osmanlı domain by British and French engineers and entrepreneurs in 1854, during the Crimean War. Telegraph communications were conducted both in French and in Osmanlı Turkish.

After the trade agreements with England (in 1838) and other European powers, many European merchants came and settled in various parts of the Osmanlı territory. They bought raw materials and sold manufactured goods to the host state and its subjects. These Western merchants established close communications with local Muslim and non-Muslim merchants. Such connections fostered Western awareness in the major seaports and trading cities of the Osmanlı State. Secularist systems and institutions made possible further demands from the European powers and also helped in the awakening of the millets in Osmanlı. The millets were used by the European powers to influence further Osmanlı internal affairs. The number of non-Muslims admitted to secular Osmanlı schools to serve in the bureaucracy after their graduation increased still further (Davison

³⁸ Most of the politicians and officials of Turkey today (2001) are western educated people. The children of the Turkish élites' receive their education either in universities teaching in foreign languages or in highly popular private universities or go to the Western countries to study and earn some kind of social acceptance and recognition.

³⁹ France mainly inspired the judicial and legal reforms carried out through the Tanzimat era, whereas Italy helped to establish a secular education system. Foreign steamship companies, French, Russian and English, started to compete for the running of domestic as well as European ports.

1968:80; Palmer 1995:164-74; Shaw & Shaw 1977:123-28). With the influence of new reforms and education, the middle class of Osmanlı society started to express their ideas and ideals openly. The popularization of modern forms and ideas developed within secular schools and with printing.⁴⁰ The theatres also helped to spread new ideas and secularization, with positive effects on literacy (Davison 1963:72-4; Davison 1968:82,96).⁴¹

One group impatient to introduce Western institutions and ideas to Osmanlı was the “*Yeni (Genç) Osmanlılar*” (Young Ottomans) Society, established in 1865. These people were either products of the Tanzimat schools or completed their education abroad. Most of these people were not employed in the bureaucracy and found themselves becoming critics of the system, arguing through the press for parliamentarianism, nationalism, and patriotism. Their emphasis was on the progressiveness of the state, with the adoption of new Western political institutions. They wanted to change the constitution in order to limit the power of the bureaucracy. Young Osmanlı ideas did not match the reality of Osmanlı society, since they admired European parliamentary systems. The Osmanlı State was an exceedingly heterogeneous state which varied widely in language,

⁴⁰ During the short period of the Tanzimat, 3000 books were published. Numerous newspapers appeared either officially or privately; the *Takvim-i Vekayi* (the Calendar of Incidents), the *Ceride-i Havadis* (Chronicle of Events), the *Tasvir-i Efkâr* (the Description of Ideas), the *Ceride-i Askeriye* (the Army Newspaper), the *Muhbir* (the Informant), the *Hürriyet* (the Liberty), the *Basiret* (the Understanding) and the like.

⁴¹ There were three theaters in Beyoğlu known as *Fransız Tiyatrosu* (the French Theater), founded by an Italian named Giustiniani in 1839. Productions were mainly in foreign languages and audiences were largely non-Muslims and occasionally Turkish guests. However, as time went on the number of theatres increased and Turkish writers became more prominent.

race and religion. The Men of the Tanzimat tried to keep the old millet system while the Young Osmanlıs tried to change the system into Western style parliamentarianism (constitutional monarchy). They believed that all non-Muslim and Muslim subjects of the Sultan could feel a sense of belonging to the same “fatherland” (*Vatan*) through voicing their interests in a shared/common parliament. *Osmanlıcılık* (Osmanlısm) was to be achieved through abolishing the millet system and replacing it with a single Osmanlı nation (Davison 1968:85-6). The Young Osmanlıs were assisted by the arrival of refugees, foreign officers, and soldiers with their families in the Osmanlı big cities, which enabled them to familiarize themselves with European manners and ways of life, to the benefit of local people (Haytoğlu 2000:531-8).

First and Second Constitutionalism (Birinci ve İkinci Meşrutiyet): For the drawing up of the first Osmanlı Constitution a commission consisting of 28 members (16 bureaucrats, 10 Ulema, and 2 members of the military) was established. An elected chamber of 120 members was established, consisting of both Muslims and non-Muslims of the Osmanlı State. The Constitution comprised 119 articles and was proclaimed on 23 December 1876. The Constitution was a declaration of the basic civil rights and institutions that had been developing since the beginning of the century. It tried to shift the parliament to a Western pattern in order to counterbalance the power of the Porte. This move did not come from the Sultan or Grand Viziers but started with ideas among intellectuals which became group ideas. This latest experience was unique for the Osmanlı and continued for the duration of the Tanzimat period. It was announced just before the İstanbul Conference on 23 December 1876, and was designed to weaken Western leverage on Osmanlıs

internal affairs (Davison 1968:87; Karal 1983:565; Karpal 1959:13; Palmer 1995:145-6).

The new Osmanlı Parliament, opened on 19 March 1877 in the *Dolmabahçe* Palace, consisted of 4 Jews (each representing 18,750 males), 44 Christians (each representing 107,557 males), and 71 Muslims (each representing 133,367 males). The presence of deputies all speaking the common Turkish rather than their own language in the capital seemed to improve the sense of brotherhood between diverse subjects and devotion to “Osmanlısm”, in accordance with the Constitution (Özçelik 2001:9-19; McCarthy 1997:305; Palmer 1995:149).⁴²

This Constitutional state period was short but it was an important step and also a kind of political education for Osmanlı society at that time. Unlike the previous reforms of 1839 and 1856, the first (1876) Constitution was not dictated by foreign advice. However, the reformers were Western-educated officials and bureaucrats who were considerably influenced by the West and its culture. In the period of the first Constitution, reform initiatives came from the Osmanlı themselves, not from direct foreign (European) influence. Therefore, Western powers did not support the authors of the Constitution. On the other hand, heavy defeats at the hands of the Russians and widespread suffering from deteriorating situations forced Turkish-Muslim Osmanlıs to re-

⁴² W.E. Gladstone wrote in his book that the Porte encouraged the Turks to massacre Bulgarian Christians according to reports he received from the area. However, Creasy wrote in 1878 “... In England the eyes of the public were completely opened to the error committed by Mr. Gladstone, and a revulsion of feeling set in in favour of the policy originally started by Lord Beaconsfield; and which had he been suffered to carry it out, unchecked by the “Bulgarian Atrocities” cry, might have wholly prevented the war.” and accused him provoking Russians and western powers against the Turks and Muslims (Creasy 1878:550-1).

think their identity and origin, and to have doubts about honesty of the Western powers help with the survival of their state. There were some riots and demonstrations against the West and its culture in Konstantiniyye, involving strong Pan-Turkish as well as Muslim mystic elements (Davison 1968:88; McCarthy 1997:306-7; Müller 1978:25). These developments clearly indicated ambivalent feelings in Osmanlı society towards Western countries and towards Westernization. This still exists today.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, through Western missionary activities, an Armenian national cultural revival was supported particularly by the new Catholic and Protestant communities. Armenians sent their children to study chiefly in France, and were much influenced by French culture and nationalism. When they returned to the Osmanlı State they advocated radical reforms, secularization and autonomy, and many become active members of the Young Osmanlı. Armenians were extensively used, like other minorities, for the purposes and designs of the Western powers within the Osmanlı territory (Lowry 2001:1-75; Palmer 1995:175-84; Shaw & Shaw 1977:200-211).

In 1878 the *Memurin-i Mülkiye Komisyonu*, (the Civil Service Commission) was established to appoint, promote, supervise, transfer and retire all bureaucrats, as in the Western model. Küçük Sait Paşa (1838-1914) modernized the civil service system, introducing exams for official jobs and pension funds for bureaucrats. The first modern Osmanlı government printing press was established, the *Matba-i Amire* (Imperial press), which helped the development of Western scientific and scholarly

systems among the Osmanlıs.⁴³ Sait Paşa as minister of justice introduced the institution of public prosecutor in the courts and developed new commercial and criminal codes. He advised the Sultan on how to reduce the budget deficit and how to restore centralized control of the State. He later served as Grand Vizier. He increased tax collection, negotiated a public debt settlement with foreign powers, created the *İstanbul Ticaret Odası* (İstanbul Chamber of Commerce),⁴⁴ built a secular school system, and organized a police force and courts free from external interference. Due to lack of capital, technological expertise and experience, railway building fell entirely to foreign companies since the Osmanlı companies, had little knowledge about such construction. Consequently Abdülhamid II and his Grand vizier Mehmet Kamil Paşa (1832-1913) turned to and encouraged private European companies to invest in and build railways and industries in the Osmanlı domain (Davison 1963:68-9; Palmer 1995:128-9).⁴⁵ Konstantiniyye was connected with the European capitals and Mesopotamia. Railway construction and

⁴³ İbrahim Ethem Paşa (1818-1893) was the inventor and, Halil Ethem, İsmail Galip, Osman Hamdi, Ahmed Vefik Paşa (1823-1891) were the other distinguished scholars of the Osmanlı. Vefik Paşa wrote *Lehçe-i Osmani*, the first scientific dictionary of Osmanlı Turkish (1876) and *Fezleke-i Tarih-i Osmani* (A History of Osmanlı State), and he translated 16 comedies of Moliere into Osmanlı Turkish. For further information on the development of science, literature and technology in the Osmanlı domain, see Aydın 2000:499-511; Er 2000:513-519 and Kahya 2000:40-46.

⁴⁴ The İstanbul Chamber of Commerce was/is an active trade body to promote Westernization programmes and is in favour of joining the European Union. It has considerable influence in Turkey's politics.

⁴⁵ German, French and English companies alongside their states fought to obtain the privilege of building the railroads which were started during the Crimean War and continued throughout Abdülhamid II's reign (Palmer 1995:118; Shaw & Shaw 1977:119-21).

connections contributed to economic and political change in the Osmanlı State.

The *Duyun-u Umumiye Komisyonu* (Public Debt Commission) was established in 1881 with one delegate each from Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Osmanlı and a representative of the Galata bankers serving for five year terms. There were 5,000 staff in all, 9 per cent of whom would be foreigners and non-Muslims. They lived in very good economic and physical conditions in the best parts of Konstantiniyye. The way of life of these foreigners influenced the Osmanlı élites and high society to imitate Europeans (Davison 1968:99; McCarthy 1997:308-13; Shaw & Shaw 1977:223). Abdülhamid II diverted political and imperial rivalries into economic ones, as a result of which the foreign powers competed to invest in the State. Private European and Osmanlı companies had operated with their steamships using internal and external ports (Pamuk 1987:15-6, 55-81). The network of telegraph lines extended, and its foreign operators (since the Crimean War) were replaced by dedicated young Osmanlı after 1876. The postal service was entrusted to foreign countries.⁴⁶ The existence of competing postal services enabled Osmanlıs to receive good, cheap and accurate postal services, along with an increasing awareness of the West (The British Library stamps collection section; Palmer 1995:189-202; Shaw & Shaw 1977:226-28, 30).

⁴⁶ Austria had been given the right to operate in 1727 a postal service between Konstantiniyye and Vienna. This was followed by Russia 1728, France 1812, Britain 1832, Greece 1834, Germany 1870, Egypt 1873, and Italy 1908. The Osmanlı state established its own postal system in 1841. The Osmanlı postal service expanded between 1888 and 1904 from 11.5 million letters and packages to 24.38 million.

Osmanlı students (including Greeks, Armenians and Muslims) who were sent Europe to study agricultural science returned as agricultural inspectors and the *Halkalı Agricultural School* was opened at Küçük Çekmece in Konstantiniyye in 1892 and a veterinary medicine college in 1895. The *Ticaret Cemiyeti* (trade association) and the *Ziraat Cemiyeti* (agriculture association) had been established in 1876 for economic development. After establishing the *Ticaret Odası* (Chamber of Commerce) and the *Ziraat Odası* (Chamber of Agriculture), members advised the government on the development of a system of economy, and the Konstantiniyye Chamber of Commerce published *Le journal de la chambre de commerce de Constantinople*, starting in 1885. Osmanlı chambers of commerce were established in European capitals to encourage trade relations. The *Ziraat Bankası* (Agricultural Bank) was created in 1888 to provide credit for businesspeople. Agricultural equipment was initially imported from England and the United States, but in the end Germany gradually gained a dominant position. Foreign firms operated in the Osmanlı domain, for example the Franco-German company called the *Régie cointéressée de tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman*, in the tobacco business. While foreign trade was flourishing, merchant guilds and the Konstantiniyye Chambers of Commerce mounted pressures and lobbying which resulted in the building and repair of quays and roads, the simplification of the customs tax system, and the adoption of the decimal system. New commerce and trade schools were opened in order to understand and improve relation with Europeans. These taught modern European law, cultural life-styles and the like. These latest developments helped European merchants and companies to increase their profits in the Osmanlı territory. The major relations for both exports and

imports were with England, France, Austria, Italy, Germany and Russia, involving the leading ports of the Osmanlı State: İzmir, Konstantiniyye, Beirut, Salonika, Baghdad, Alexandretta and Trabzon (Palmer 1995:196-99; Pamuk 1987:148-61; Shaw & Shaw 1977:236-8,241). By the end of Abdülhamid's rule, big cities such as İstanbul, İzmir, Edirne and Salonika had well maintained streets with pavements and street lamps, and these were kept clean and safe. Luxury items were available everywhere. Postal and telegraph lines, steamships and railways made good communications available. Modern medical services also became available. Osmanlıs who lived in the cities were affected by the Europeanized developments that had been carried out. This is one of the explanations why urbanized areas were opened to Western influence rather than rural areas, both in the Osmanlı and in the later Republican period.

Another important reason why Westernization began its influence in the big cities can be found in the development of the Turkish military and its western-oriented education. Germany, when Helmuth Von Moltke was Germany's chief of the General Staff, sent Colonel Colmar Von der Goltz to serve the Sultan for over a decade and help to establish the *Teftiş-i Umumi-i Askeri Komisyon-u Âlisi* (the High Commission of Military Inspection) to investigate the military and legislate necessary changes. As a consequence of these relations, Osmanlı relied on German industry for cannons manufactured by Krupps, Mauser rifles and other weapons.⁴⁷ Thus, German material and technological influence started among Turkish army members (officers and officials) which was the starting point for further German

⁴⁷ General Otto Kähler was a first-rate salesman for Krupps of Essen (Palmer 1995:170).

influence in other areas such as education and culture (Koçak 1991:1-3; Palmer 1995:170-71).⁴⁸

Schools were opened to apply the Tanzimat programmes of reforms and secular education. A new tax, *İane Vergisi* (the Assistance Surtax), was imposed to finance the development of secular educational expenditures.⁴⁹ The military school system was the most important one, totalling 7,313 student/cadets in all, a larger number than the civilian higher academies during the same period. That is one of the fundamental reasons why reforms' initiatives and enthusiastic support came all the time from the military class.⁵⁰ In addition, a number of foreign schools opened in Osmanlı. Their numbers were: the United States 131; France 127; England 60; Germany 22; Italy 22; Austria 11; and Russia 7. Their main aim was the conversion of people to their respective forms of Christianity. However, these schools soon also developed attachments to Western cultural values and ways of thinking. They encouraged the non-Muslims' nationalist aspirations. There was considerable external pressure on the Osmanlı educational authorities not to supervise the curriculum of these foreign schools. A number of textbooks were translated, published and imported for new state schools as well as for foreign schools (Aydüz 2000:499-

⁴⁸ Goltz persuaded Abdülhamid II to send chosen officers to Postdam for further training which was more thoroughly organized and continued until the First World War. German military influence was aroused when Kaiser William II paid a visit in 1889 (Palmer 1995:171).

⁴⁹ Similar measures were taken to achieve almost the same aims of further secularization in education in modern Turkey in the 1990s. The name of the surtax is "Sekiz yıllık Eğitime Katkı Payı", the Contribution Surtax for Eight years Basic Education.

⁵⁰ Even today, the Turkish military continue to play an extensive constitutional role in preservations and protection of secular Westernized Turkey.

508; Kahya 2000:42-3). With increasing literacy rates compared to the previous decades, a new generation were educated in the Abdülhamid II era's schools, later to become the founders of the Turkish Republic. The educational system in practice also created divisions among people in that the state schools, the millet schools, and the foreign schools gave rise to different ways of thinking and different methods and objectives, which produced several distinct educated classes. Westernized cultural activities, public libraries, printing press (books, journals, and newspapers) increased popular awareness of the outside world for Osmanlı society. The economic and political impact of Europe was imported to Osmanlı through all these activities mentioned earlier and in the newspapers of the time like, *Sabah* (the Morning), *Vakit* (the Time), *Ceride-i Askeriye* (the Military Journal), *Takvim-i Vekayi* (the Calendar of Events), *Ikdam* (the Struggle) and *Tercüman-i Hakikat* (the Translator of the Truth) as well as books, plays, and periodicals (Davison 1968:76; Kushner 1977:14-9; Şahin 2000:216-8). The *Servet-i Fünun* literature writers were influenced by the French Parnassian School, emphasizing art for art's sake and concentrating on technique rather than content.⁵¹ Their writings were for élite readers, which reflected their social and intellectual experience of the impact of the West on Osmanlı society (Atay 1980:11-15; Kushner 1977:56-79; Shaw & Shaw 1977:254-5). However, this Western influence on Osmanlı society varied among middle class strata from one European

⁵¹ Ahmet İhsan founded in 1891 a periodical *Servet-i Fünun* (the Wealth of Sciences), famous writers for that periodical were Tevfik Fikret (1867-1915), Abdülhak Hamid (1853-1937), Cenap Şahabettin (1870-1923), Süleyman Nazif (1870-1927), Halit Ziya Uşaklıgil (1865-1945) and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın (1875-1957) (www.milliyet.com.tr/ozel/edebiyat/yazarlar/yazarlar/index.html).

country to another. This influence would be reflected itself in Turkish international relation patterns to European countries, as will be evaluated in chapter two.

The educational explosion during Abdülhamid's reign produced large numbers of bureaucrats, doctors, officers, and writers who were influenced by Western educational and secular system. These people started to argue that infrastructural reforms must be accompanied by fundamental political and social reforms in order to promote Western-style education, life-styles, culture, and technological development.

The Young Turks (*Genç Türkler*) formed discontented groups which protested against the reign of Abdülhamid II both within and outwith the State. One of them, called *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (the Committee of Union and Progress, CUP), was formed in the Imperial Medical Academy in May 1887 by Kazım Nami Duru and five fellow students.⁵² They called for programmes of constitutionalism, Osmanlısm and freedom, plus the deposition of Abdülhamid II. Many of the Young Turks were in exile in Paris, London, Geneva, Bucharest or Egypt, from where they expressed their opposition in a series of letters which were smuggled into the Osmanlı domains chiefly by foreign postal companies (British Library Stamp collections; Davison 1968:99; Karpas 1959:14; Palmer 1995:203-19).⁵³

⁵² An Albanian Muslim, İbrahim Temo, Mehmet Reşit, two Kurds, Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sükuti who changed the name as Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the Ottoman Society of Union and Progress).

⁵³ *La Jeune Turquie* was published in Paris by Halil Ganim, a Lebanese Maronite and former deputy to Parliament in 1877 (Shaw & Shaw 1977:255).

Ahmed Rıza⁵⁴ and Halil Ganim gathered exiled Young Turks around themselves in Europe and produced a bimonthly and bilingual (Osmanlı Turkish and French) newspaper *Meşveret* (the Consultation). The *Meşveret* was circulated through the foreign post offices and among the intellectuals. Mehmed Murat Efendi⁵⁵ published his newspaper *Mizan* (the Balance) and entered the country through the British and French post offices (the British Library Stamps collection).⁵⁶ Prince Sabahaddin (1877-1948) founded his own group and newspaper, *Teşebbüs-ü Şahsî ve Adem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti* (the Society of Private Initiative and Administrative Decentralization) and *Terakki* (Progress), respectively. He was more radical than other groups in advocating fundamental social changes and the deposition of the Sultan. He wanted to abandon the centralized institutions of government, replacing them with the old Osmanlı decentralized system. Individual and local initiative was to be developed, invoking the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on individual effort and private enterprise. Ahmet Rıza and Murat abhorred European intervention as well as revolutionary action, but Sabahaddin was in favour of using all available European resources, including revolution and pressure from powers like Britain and France. Sabahaddin called all discontented and opposition groups to a general Congress of Osmanlı Liberals in Paris from 4 to 9 February 1902, including

⁵⁴ Ahmet Rıza (1859-1930), son of an Austrian mother and Anglophile Osmanlı Father, went to Paris in 1889 and returned as a follower of the positivist movement of Auguste Comte. He published a series of memorandums to the Sultan demanding a constitutional regime. He based his idea with an Islamic and Osmanlı tradition of *Meşveret* consultation.

⁵⁵ Mehmed Murat Efendi (1853-1912), a Caucasian Turk from Dağistan, presented several reform proposals to the Sultan.

⁵⁶ There were a number of stamps sealed as “kaçak posta” (smuggled post) in Osmanlı Turkish.

the various Young Turk liberals scattered around Europe with minority groups. They stressed their ideals of equality among all of the peoples and races of the State, continued loyalty to the Osmanlı dynasty, and the idea of the territorial integrity of the State, with full execution of all the “reforms” imposed by the treaties of (Konstantiniyye) 1856 and (Berlin) 1878.

However, certain minorities were not willing to support the strengthening of the State by relying on certain Western countries’ support. Abdülhamid II tried to protect the Osmanlı State against all internal and external influences and threats, especially by using two movements, Turkism and İslamism respectively (Davison 1968:8,10,13; Karpas 1959:14-9).

There were also considerable groups opposed to the Westernization of Osmanlı institutions and culture. The Ulemas stressed that the Tanzimat movement undermined the basic ideals, traditions and institutions of Islam by imitating European mores. The financial plight of the Osmanlı State had been worsened by the European use of the so-called capitulations to destroy the traditional Osmanlı industries and the destabilization of the economy with high-interest loans, as well as French and English occupation of Tunis and Egypt, which escalated the distrust of Europeans among Osmanlı Muslim subjects. European powers reacted with medieval religious fanaticism by clamouring over the deaths of a relatively small number Christians while ignoring the large-scale massacres of Muslims by Christians in the Balkans and Russian Central Asia. This was a reason why some intellectual and religious people were starting to adopt a reactionary stance against Western influence and foreign penetration of the State (Creasy 1878:550-51; Gladstone 1877:1-15; Hozier 1878:908-18; Karal 1983:569).

The Frenchman de Gobineau had developed the idea of blood and race as the most important influence on human development and history, with some races naturally superior to others. Ethnically Turkish Osmanlı intellectuals could not totally ignore nationalism while minorities were aspiring to national independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The refusal of the minority nationalists to accept the equality which was offered them in the form of Osmanlısm, together with the success of unity movements in Germany and Italy, aroused ethnic Turks to develop nationalist aspirations to a Turkish identity. In addition to this, books and other publishing materials against the Turks and Turkish culture in the Western and central European countries forced the Young Turks to respond with extensive research and publishing of their own, which led eventually to the awakening of Turkish nationalism. Therefore, Europeans played a crucial role in several ways in forcing Turks to accept that they were “Turks”, ignoring the Muslims who were being massacred in the Balkans, and encouraging ethnic minorities to seek independence from the Osmanlı State (Karal 1983:570; Kushner 1977:90-96). There were European Turkologists who ‘discovered’ the Turkish past, the great Turkish Central Asian civilization, and the importance of its language and culture in history (Kushner 1977:27-40).⁵⁷ There were also cultural relations through intellectuals between

⁵⁷ These Turkologists included A. J. de Guignes, A. L. David, Mustafa Celaleddin Paşa, Arminius Vambery (1832-1913), Leon Cahun (1841-1900), Russian V. V. Radlov and Danish philologist Vilhelm Thomson. These academics explained in their books and reports that Turks had relations stretching from China to the European countries and also their racial, linguistic and cultural ties with inhabitants of this vast area, mentioning that the undeniable Turkish world contribution to human civilization cannot be ignored or forgotten.

the Osmanlı and Central Asia. Many Central Asian intellectuals came to the Osmanlı State to study and teach. Europeanized ideas were also transferred through intellectuals as well as published materials.⁵⁸

In Abdülhamid's schools, most students came from lower (poorer) class backgrounds and felt that they had no relation to the existing ruling class or establishment. These new emerging bureaucrats were willing to change the system in whatever ways were necessary to achieve their goals. These students from poor backgrounds were particularly predominant in the military schools, where they were educated with Western ideas and developed political minds which came in to their own in later decades. Primary, secondary and high school education became popular nation-wide. Nevertheless, they did not achieve all their expected goals, and in the end were wholly insufficient in numbers (Er 2000:518; Erdem 2000:554).

The provinces were the active seedbeds of rebellion, for example Damascus, where a young lieutenant, Mustafa Kemal, graduated from the War Academy in

⁵⁸ The leading intellectuals were Gaspıralı İsmail Bey. Ağaoğlu Ahmet (1869-1939) in his newspaper in the Caucasus desired a Turkish unity against the Russians. Buharalı Süleyman Efendi wrote a book called as *Lügat-i Çağatay ve Türki-i Osmani* (the Çağatay and Osmanlı Turkish languages) in İstanbul in 1928. Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933) who took education in İstanbul and Paris wrote his *Üç Tarz-i Siyaset* (the Three Kinds of Policy), arguing for Turkish nationalism and unity. Ahmet Mithat Efendi stressed in his writings the Turkish contribution in the development of world civilization in pre-Osmanlı period of Turks. Mizancı Murat wrote on Turkish empires in Central Asia in his general history. The press started to publish articles on the Turks and well-known Turcologists' works. Anatolia became heart of Turkish language, patriotic sentiment and the like. Many of the Young Osmanlı writers wrote their works in simple language in order to communicate with ordinary Turkish people (Çandır 2000:8-42; Davison 1968:102-3; Kushner 1977:41-9; Martin 1994:22).

January 1905.⁵⁹ The revolutionaries expected promotions, higher pay and the wiping out of the provincial rebels. Cemal, Talat and Cavit Beys were active in the revolutionary group and they wanted to influence government without taking responsibility for its exercise, which created a difficult political situation (Palmer 1995:204). The CUP argued that all Osmanlıs should have the same legal rights regardless of religion.⁶⁰ With freedom of the press and of political

⁵⁹ Mustafa Kemal organized a secret group known as Vatan Cemiyeti, (the Fatherland Society). He demanded that the Constitution should be observed fully and the needs of the army had to be dealt with efficiently. Branches were opened in Jerusalem and Jaffa and the name of the society changed to Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti, (the Fatherland and Liberty Society). Mustafa Kemal went to Salonika, where he developed his ideas. Salonika had more contact with Europe than any other Osmanlı city. There were intellectuals, a substantial Jewish population and other minorities open to new ideas. The Third Army of Macedonia was based there and relatively free of the Sultan's police control. Mustafa Kemal spread his ideas to Cemil Bey, adjutant of the military governor of Macedonia and Talat Bey, a local postal official. The name of his society changed to Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti, (the Osmanlı Liberty Society). The society was supported financially with assistance from the lodge of the Masonic order of dönmes (converted Jews). Relations were established with the Young Turks and the name was unified as the Committee of Union and Progress on 27 September 1907. On 27-29 December 1907, the Second Young Turk Congress was held in Paris with all revolutionary discontented groups, regardless of whether they were Muslims or non-Muslims, such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks) and Greek separatist groups. Eventually, without any real plan, the Young Turk Revolution took place on 23 July 1908 (Davison 1968:104; McCarthy 1997:316-8; Shaw & Shaw 1977:264-7).

⁶⁰ No one to be arrested or imprisoned without cause. Courts to be free of any intervention. Travel to be for any purpose and any time as long as the person wished. There should not be any censorship on publications. Non-Muslims should be conscripted for military service alongside Muslims. Special privileges which were granted in previous centuries should be ended for non-Muslims, while the Capitulations were to be challenged and all subjects were to be given the same rights and legal status.

association, newspapers and political parties blossomed in the State.⁶¹ The parties differed in their perspectives on Westernization. Almost all parties supported Westernization, but some included and other excluded Turkism, Islamism or Osmanlısm (Haytoğlu 2000:533-9; Palmer 1995:205). This diversity of approach to Westernization issues among Osmanlı parties still exists in Turkish political parties today. There is a parallel connection between this diversity and the choice of Turkish international political relations in the later twentieth century.

There were different religious groups which blamed the Constitution and the Young Turks' reforms for the Osmanlı State's decline, as a result of their ignorance of or deviation from basic Islamic foundations and traditions. The argument was that, while the technology of the West should and could be borrowed, Islam could be adapted to meet new social and political demands. Some modernists, for example Ahmet Rıza, Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmet Muhtar and Celal Nuri, advocated full imitation of the West with selection of what was best to meet the special needs of Islam and the Osmanlı community. Education was regarded as the key to their respective aims. However, they differed among themselves over the methods and systems to be used (Davison 1968:105; Karpas 1959:16-8; Palmer 1995:206).⁶²

Hafız Derviş Vahdeti formed *İttihad-ı Muhammedi Cemiyeti* (the Society of Islamic Unity) with a newspaper called *Volkan* (the Volcano) on 10 November 1908 with a message of opposition against secularization, the influence of minorities and foreign

⁶¹ These parties were the CUP, İttihatçılar (the Unionist) and Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası (the Osmanlı Liberal Union Party).

⁶² These were the Selamet-i Umumiye Kulübü (the General Welfare Club) and Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası (the Osmanlı Democrat Party) (Shaw & Shaw 1977:278-9).

representatives.⁶³ During the Young Turk era (1908 – 1918), there were high levels of public expenditure, particularly for the army. New guns, cannons, battleships and other equipment were purchased on a large scale, from Germany, Britain and the United States. A number of foreign advisers were invited to train Osmanlı military and technical personnel and a series of new laws modernized the armed forces. Osmanlı society became far more restricted in the name of public order after the Constitution had been restored than it had been under Abdülhamid (Davison 1968:107; Karpas 1959:16; Palmer 1995:164-74; Shaw & Shaw 1977:285-7). Similar (military) repressions on Turkish society were experienced repeatedly during

⁶³ Vahdeti argued that the Constitution should be replaced with the Şeriat (Islamic Law), and Islam should be used to modernize and rescue the State. The secular schools and courts would be replaced with Islamic ones and restore the Sultan's authority. After the society's first meeting on 3 April 1909 they marched to parliament on 12/13 April 1909. Their brief seizure of power was halted by the Hareket Ordusu (Operation Army) on 24 April 1909. The military assumed autocratic control in order to restore the Constitution and democracy in Konstantiniyye. Abdülhamid was deposed and replaced with Mehmed V Reşat on 27 April 1909. With this event both the Liberal Union and the Islamic Unity parties were wiped out. The CUP was the absolutely dominant group in the parliament. However the CUP gave birth to several discontented groups, forming new parties; in February 1910 the Ahali Partisi (the People's Party), the Heyet-i Müttefika-i Osmaniye (the Osmanlı Committee of Alliance), and the Mutedil Liberaller (the Liberal Moderates). In November 1911 another opposition group formed the Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası (the Freedom and Accord Party) led by İsmail Hakkı Paşa, Damad Ferid Paşa and Rıza Nur. Radical groups were formed, including the Islahat-ı Esasiye-i Osmaniye Fırkası (the Osmanlı Radical Reform Party) led by Şerif Paşa and the Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası (the Osmanlı Socialist Party) led by Hüseyin Hilmi. These two rightist and leftist parties were suppressed by the army (Davison 1968:107; Karpas 1959:18-21; McCarthy 1997:318-9; Palmer 1995:207-9; Shaw & Shaw 1977:283).

the formative years of Turkish political development, stretching from the 1920s to the late 1990s.

The CUP ruling class emerged from the new generation of lower class origin in the army and the bureaucracy and they were determined to modernize society for all classes. They were secularists and modernizers using more ruthless ways to achieve their aims than the Men of the Tanzimat or earlier reformers. They set the foundations for the new era that followed, led by new leaders who established close contact with the German military officials who dominated Osmanlı prominent officers and consequently the Osmanlı State⁶⁴ (Kuran 2000:37-9; Palmer 1995:211).

Ziya Gökalp and Turkish Nationalism: Ziya Gökalp (1876 - 25 October 1924) was a sociologist of Kurdish origin and a philosopher whose ideas and disciples shaped modern Turkey.⁶⁵ Gökalp's ideas were to shift the Osmanlı polity from a State (Empire) to a nation, from religious to secular, and from an Eastern to a Western orientation. He argued that culture belonged to the nation whereas civilization was international, which meant nations could adopt any civilization but could not change their culture without losing their identity. To him past traditions and the Islamic background provided the Turks with a stable base for participation in Western civilization, so "Turkification, Islamization and Modernization" were instruments for strengthening the state and society. Therefore he favoured the adoption of Western models and

⁶⁴ These were Talat Paşa (1874-1921), Cemal Paşa (1872-1922) and Enver Paşa (1881-1922).

⁶⁵ The novelist Halide Edip Adıvar, the poet Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, the historian Fuad Köprülü, the writer Ömer Seyfeddin, the journalists Ahmet Emin Yalman and Falih Rıfkı Atay were Gökalp disciples and followers who were active and influential members of the Turkish Republic.

techniques without changing national culture and identity. The Turkish language had to be purified in accordance with the dialect that people spoke in Anatolia, which would prepare the way for the complete purification of the Turkish language of non-Turkish words later in the Republic of Turkey (Davison 1968:111; Karpata 1959:25-7; Kushner 1977:61-80).

Gökalp criticized the Men of the Tanzimat for adopting Western educational systems and Western institutions without also promoting Turkish traditions and culture. Gökalp believed that this led to a dual educational system and consequently widened the gap between the rulers and ruled as well as other divisions within society. Islam was the most important source of ethics and fully capable of being modified to meet the needs of the time, and religion and the state should be separated to rescue both Islam and the nation from their sorry plights. Religious schools and courts had to be eliminated in order to abolish the longstanding dualism between secular and religious elements in Osmanlı society. The position of women had to be restored to the respected level they had held in ancient Turkish society. Family names (surnames) had to be adopted, as had occurred in Europe. Islam had to remain as an instrument to unite society and promote Turkification. Arab influence had to be replaced by Turkish traditions, rituals, and prayers, and the Koran should be read out in Turkish so that the people would understand religion and God in their mother tongue (Davison 1968:113; Doğan 1984:129-44; Karpata 1959:50; Kushner 1977:90-96). Strangely, even today, these Gökalp's arguments are discussed by various political and social groups as constituting the best way forward for Turkish society.

Another considerable group was arguing that Islamism had to be revived after the Osmanlı lost the

Balkans. They emphasized that Islam rather than “Osmanlısm” or “Turkism” would be the key to keep the Osmanlı State alive, as now only Muslim Arabs shared the State with the Muslim Turks (Davison 1968:112).⁶⁶

There were also modernizers who argued the need for unity with both the Turks and the Muslims outside the State, which had to modernize to survive and the only model for that was the West. Tefvik Fikret (1867-1915) and Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) carried on this argument. They thought that the only civilization of the modern world was that of Europe. The old had to be destroyed and replaced by European civilization so that the State would become the part of the West. The Tanzimat ideas and reforms had to be imposed from the top and the people had to be driven to

⁶⁶ The Society for Islamic Unity’s basic message was that Islam had to be maintained as the religion of the state. The Young Turks were not following the Şeriat, so they had to be overthrown. This philosophy was kept alive by Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (1867-1960), who argued that Islam as a faith had to be kept alive if not re-established as a state religion. Nursi’s followers were called Nurcus (Followers of Infinite Light). The other Islamicist groups were the Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i İslamiye (the Society of Islamic Learning), which started publishing its arguments in a monthly periodical, and the Beyan’ül Hak (Presentation of the Truth) led by Mustafa Sabri. He sought British help to implement his Islamic ideas to replace the Young Turks secular institutions. Mehmet Akif Ersoy published his ideas in a poetical way in the monthly Sırat-i Müstakim (The Straight Path), later called Sebil’ur Reşat (the Fountain of Orthodoxy). His argument was that Western civilization had corrupted Islamic ethics and that Muslims had to be returned to Islamic values and unity. Only the science and technology of the West had to be adopted. The West did not have to be wholly embraced, as the Young Turks had done. A tremendous gap between the so-called educated classes and the mass of the people emerged as the former imitated the West without emphasizing their identity while the latter preserved their identity and suffered under the former’s tyranny. So-called “intellectuals” and “educated people” were following different paths (Shaw & Shaw 1977:304).

modernize themselves. Mustafa Kemal had followed some of these ideas in his early years of the Republican period (Davison 1968:103; Karpaz 1959:28; Palmer 1995:219; Shaw & Shaw 1977:305).

Modernization During the Young Turk Era: Gökalt proposed the complete secularization of the religious courts, schools and the religious/charitable foundations, which was carried out by the Young Turks.⁶⁷ The State was modernized in many other ways during the CUP era. They introduced electricity, telephones, airplanes, and the European calendar alongside the Muslim one. The army was reorganized and modernized by Germans, the British reorganized the navy, and the French modernized the gendarmerie and introduced new organization and methods into the Ministry of Finance. The Young Turks followed a careful policy of balancing the political, economic and military influence of different powers, aiming not to let any single power dominate the State (Karpaz 1959:29-31; McCarthy 1997:323-4).

While modernization was continuing in the State, most of the CUP members and the mass of the population still felt closer to Britain and France (because of their influence on the Osmanlı domains in previous decades) than to Germany. Only those officers who had received their education in Germany were in favour of strong relations with Germany.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ In April 1916 the Şeyhülislam was removed from the cabinet and his office became a department. Secularization was carried out in schools, courts and institutions. The Code of Family Law that was promulgated included Şeriat, Jewish and Christian law regarding family relations. The appearances and costumes started in European-style clothing and way of living.

⁶⁸ While Sait Halim and Enver Paşa signed secret agreements with Germany in August 1914, other leaders tried to establish close relations with France and Britain, who refused the Young Turks' co-operation and demanded political and economic support. Germany had no territorial ambitions in the South Western Asian

German officers, such as Limon von Sanders, Von der Goltz and Von Falkenhayn came to the Osmanlı army and affected most of the Osmanlı army members (Davison 1968:115; Shaw & Shaw 1977:310-13). The influence of German officers was supported with other German teachers and professors through educational system after 1912⁶⁹ (Kahya 2000:45; Temir 1998:63-7). Thus, German influence was to be consistently felt not only by high officials in the bureaucracy but also by the middle classes of Turkish society for decades to come.

The Turks had to defend their country against the aggression of European countries throughout the 1910s. The Turkish people led miserable lives during the wars in the Balkans, North Africa, the South West

Countries and its provision of protection against Russia (which was rejected by Britain and France) was one of the reasons why the Young Turks chose Germany as an ally in World War I. The other important reason why the Young Turks took the side of Germany was that Winston Churchill (Britain) appropriated two ships (Sultan Osman and Reşadiye) which had been built by Britain for Turkey and paid for in full with collections of money even by Turkish school children. This disappointed Turkish public opinion and escalated hatred toward Britain. Germany replaced these two ships, offering Goeben and Breslau (Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli), which became another reason to enter World War I on the German side (Palmer 1995:222-27). On September 7, 1914 the capitulations were finally abolished. Foreign post offices were closed and nationalised. The privileges of non-Muslims were abolished and made subject to Osmanlı laws and Muslim courts. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were closed to foreign ships, in order to prevent the Entente from intervening. Germany secretly paid 2 billion kuruş on 21 October 1914 for the encouragement of Turkish entry into the war on her side. The Entente declared war against the Osmanlı: on 2 November Russia, on 5 November 1914 France and Britain. Britain announced the annexation of Cyprus on 18 December 1914 (Erdemir 2000:433-8).

⁶⁹ Lasalo Rasonyi, Benno Landsberger, Güstav Güterbock, Georg Rohde, Annemarie Von Gabain, Karl Steuerwald, Herbert Louis and Walter Ruben worked as lecturers in Ankara between 1935 and 1948.

Asian Countries (the Middle East, SWAC), and in the Western and Eastern parts of Anatolia. When the Turks fought off the Western imperialist powers in the early 1920s, conflicts started between members of the new Assembly over Turkey's future constitution and direction. On 20 January 1921, the Assembly voted for the first Constitution of the newly emerging Turkish Republic, which passed as *Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu* (the Law of Fundamental Organization). The members of the first Assembly consisted of members with military backgrounds (40 per cent), professionals (20 per cent), local landowners and wealthy businessmen (20 per cent), and Muslim religious leaders (17 per cent). They represented a wide range of political and social beliefs on the formation of the new Turkey. They were full of conflicting ideas and ideals: laicism, religion, radicalism, reactionaryism, republicanism, monarchism, pan-Turkism, and Osmanlısm. Some Members of Assembly leaned towards the so-called "Eastern ideal" and others towards the "Western ideal". "Easterners" were trying to restore the Sultan-Caliph under a new republican regime based on national sovereignty and self-rule. Westerners were strongly attracted to the Young Turks' ideas of a constitutional regime based essentially on Western foundations. Westerners also emphasized preserving the political and structural aspects of Islam. The Easterners argued that their ideas were compatible with Western basic social tenets. There were Islamists on both sides. The new Turkish Republic soon established a dynamic interaction between these ideals. Mustafa Kemal used both sides to achieve his goal of creating a Republic with dictatorial powers for himself, without either Bolsheviks or a sultanate, making a synthesis of both sides (Karpas 1959:39; Shaw & Shaw 1977:351-2). Amid all these

developments there took place a civil war and a struggle against the foreign occupiers.

The late Osmanlı period had served as an excellent political laboratory for the leading newstatesmen of Turkey (Mustafa Kemal, İsmet İnönü and Celal Bayar). The experience of relations with Western countries shaped the new leaders' perceptions of the policies to be followed.

THE TURKISH REPUBLIC PERIOD OF WESTERNIZATION

Officials and intellectuals of the Osmanlı State established the Turkish Republic. They were educated in the Osmanlı State's secularist and traditionalist schools. Dualities in educational backgrounds characterized the founders' ideas and ideals during the formative stages of the new emerging Turkish Republic. However, the efforts of military personnel, civil bureaucrats and intellectuals who were mostly educated in secular schools played the paramount roles in the establishment of modern Turkey. *İstiklal Harbi* (the national liberation war) were launched against imperialistic foreign invaders for the liberation of the country from occupation and also against the riots which were organized by those opposed to the creation of new the republic and Westernization policies, while the new leaders were trying to establish a new contemporary (Western) identity (Davison 1968:119-22; Kushner 1977:101; Türkgeldi 1987:208-9).

At the beginning of the 1920s, most of the deputies in the Assembly were in favour of so-called Easternism (Orientalism) for the formation of the new administration and state. This was not surprising since the misery caused by the Balkan wars and the World War I certainly created an atmosphere unfavourable to the proponents of the Westernism.

Moreover, Islamists played a leading role in the national war of independence and Islamic and national symbols were used during the national struggle.⁷⁰ Mustafa Kemal, as a strong supporter of Westernization, preferred to behave like an Islamist, in a rather Machiavellian fashion, to mobilize Muslim people at home. Kemal at the same time used an anti-Western and pro-Soviet rhetoric in international affairs at the beginning of his rule. During the war, he refrained from conveying his real intentions (Çalış 1996:44-5; Cin 1993:1-2; Davison 1968:125; Palmer 1995:258-60). Kemal undoubtedly kept the example of Mahmud II's reformation and revolution process in mind.

The Westernization of Turkey and Turkish Society Under Mustafa Kemal: Mustafa Kemal set two goals when he initiated the independence of Turkish nation: (i) Unity of the state, freedom and independence of the state, and the pushing out of foreign occupational forces; and (ii) modernization of the state and society in accordance with contemporary requirements. This came to be called "*Atatürkism*" or "*Kemalism*" and became synonymous with modernization or Westernization. As an ideology *Atatürkism* emphasized scientifically, national interests, and national identity, and it consisted of six pillars: Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Revolutionism, Secularism and Statism (Cin 1993:1-2; Huntington 1996:144-49).

After experiencing and reading about what had been done from the Tanzimat period until his time, in

⁷⁰ These included the caliphate, the Jihad, the unity of Ümmet, the Koran and Allah, Bayrak (the national flag), Vatan (fatherland) and Devlet (the State) (Aydemir 1968:33-8). At the beginning of the war, the major aim of the war was declared to be to rescue the Sultanate and the Caliphate in İstanbul from the clutches of infidel occupation forces.

the direction of creating an independent state and a Westernized society, Kemal adopted a step by step approach with excellent timing and planning. From the very inception of the liberation war, his actions tended carefully to realise his ideals. Even when he spoke of the liberation of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, he had in his mind the idea of establishing a nation-state where sovereignty belonged only to the nation, as in the Western states, and not to God or to a person. Kemal's Turkey would be a moderate secular nation state with a limited territory, rejecting all irredentist and religious aspirations. In this sense, Mustafa Kemal's society was a blend of civic and ethnic national identity models and "his religion was Turkism" (Kemal 1927:419; Sezer 2000:420-29; Tüfekçi 1983:170).

In order to create a modern nation-state on the Western model, Kemal endeavoured to change mainly the foundations of the old society's identity patterns based on Islamic premises and values. Kemal prevented the Turkish republic from perpetuating the Osmanlı State's theological and traditional roles in the Muslim-populated world (Kemal 1927:420-543; Ceylan Mayıs 1991:209-52; Ceylan Eylül II 1991:15-74,149-64,209-50; Huntington 1996:178).⁷¹ In order to

⁷¹ The success of the Kemalist national struggle in Anatolia contributed to Lloyd George being replaced by Bonar Law as Prime Minister in London, while in İstanbul the Sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922. On 4 November the Tefvik Paşa cabinet resigned and the last issue of official Osmanlı newspaper Takvim-i Vekai was published; Sultan Vahidettin was forced to flee first to Malta and subsequently to San Remo on 16 November 1922. This was important because, in order to implement further reforms, Kemal needed the power of İstanbul. The abolition of the Sultanate was also necessary to a form government based upon popular national sovereignty. By abolishing of the Sultanate and separating the caliphate, the separation of religion and the state from each other was made possible (Atatürk 1987:910-32; Dilipak 1989a:311-2; Kemal 1927:419-21). The second step was to proclaim

demolish the ancien regime's heritage in legal life, Turkey's reformers preferred to translate almost all laws from Europe, without making substantial changes.⁷² These changes were followed by a final touch, the secularization of the Constitution itself. Despite the abolition of the Caliphate, the 1924 Constitution clearly stated that "the religion of the Turkish Republic is Islam". On 10 April 1928, this article was removed from the Constitution. The process of secularization of the Constitution would reach its final phase in February 1937, with the

on 29 October 1923 the Turkish Republic as a nation state whose authority came from the people of Turkey (Atatürk 1987:1068-1100). For a secular and moderate state, the Caliphate had to be eliminated while the Caliph was still an important authority and a respected person in the eye of Turkish people. In this respect, for Kemal, there was no alternative but to liquidate the Caliphate, an institution which had existed for 407 years of Turkish history. On the same date, 3 March 1924 not only the Caliphate but also *Tedrisatın Birleştirilmesi* (the unity of education), *Medreselerin Kapatılması* (the closure of the Medrese) and *Şeriyye ve Evkaf Vekaletinin Kapatılması* (Şer'i and Trusts) were abolished (Atatürk 1987:1128-1134; Ceylan Mayıs 1991:15,31,193,198-206; Kemal 1927:512-5). The Şer'iyye Laws (*Şeriye Kanunları* or *Mahkemeleri*) on 8 March 1924 was abolished. *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu* (the laws of the basic establishment) on 20th April 1920 and the *Şapka Kanununun Kabulü* (acceptance of the law relating to hats) were passed on 26th December 1925 in the assembly as another important step in the Westernization process. The first sculpture was erected on Sarayburnu on 3 October 1927. Secularism was officially proclaimed on 10 April 1928. A new Latin script was accepted on 3 October 1928. Kazım Karabekir was against the acceptance of Latin script. He said "Gazi Paşa (Mustafa Kemal) was deceived by people who were against religion and had perhaps no relation with Turkishness. These people were Hüseyin Cahid, Abdullah Cevdet, Mehmet Ali Ayni, Falih Rıfki and Kılınç Hakkı. Later Abdullah Cevdet regretted this when he realised what he had done" (Karabekir 1988:1080 esp. Footnote 1).

⁷² The Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code were accepted wholesale in February and March 1926, respectively. The Commercial Code, blended from Germany's and Italy's, was introduced in May 1926 (Palmer 1995:266; Yetkin 1983:137-40).

insertion of the principle of *laiklik* as one of the six fundamental tenets of Kemalism into the Constitution (Akgündüz & Öztürk 1999:303; Ceylan Eylül II 1991:149-164,339-366; Ceylan Eylül III 1991:13-400; Karpaz 1959:40-46,54-55).

Changes in Social Life, Symbols and Cultural Identification: In order to sustain Westernization in a society consisting of a Muslim population, social life had to be secularized to facilitate the adaptation of Western social mores. This was a precondition of establishing a new national identity for a Westernized society. Therefore, Mustafa Kemal also launched a series of reforms dealing with social relations. In the first stage, while he put education under the control of the government, the political and economic power of religious establishments was eliminated by the closure of *Evkafs*, *Medreses*, *Tekkes* and *Zaviyes*. Mosques were either neglected or sold. If not used for other purposes, they were turned museums like *Ayasofya* (Hagia Sophia Church) (Çalış 1996:48; Ceylan Eylül II 1991:89-109; Karpaz 1959:54; Lewis 1967:267). Islamic social establishments were replaced by secular cinemas, museums and theatre houses. While all traditional institutions were held responsible for anything that went wrong, the new ones were encouraged and advocated as the imperatives of civilization (Karabekir 1988:1095; Çalış 1996:48).

Kemal also attempted to replace formal signs and symbols of Islamic identity with the symbols of “civilized world”.⁷³ In the name of Turkification of

⁷³ The use of *seyyid* and *şeyh* were banished as religious titles (Ceylan Eylül II 1991:111-148). While hats were being made obligatory for all men, the *fez* and *turban* were outlawed. The Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet, and the *Hicri* calendar with the Gregorian. *A la Turca* time keeping was abandoned in favour of *à la Franca*. Reciting the prayer call in Arabic was prohibited. The day of rest at weekends was altered from Friday to Sunday. The broadcasting of Turkish melodies was

language, many words of Arabic and Persian origin were replaced with European counterparts, some old Turkish words were revitalized, and many new ones were coined from Turkish roots. In reality, there was a de-Islamicization of culture, language and identity (Ceylan Eylül II 1991:251-337; Karpaz 1959:54-55).⁷⁴ Similarly, they attempted to demonstrate that the Turks came from the same origin as Europeans racially as well.⁷⁵

Whether Kemal succeeded in his bid to create a Western nation and eradicate old Islamic identity patterns in the long term may be debated, but there is no doubt that he tried forcefully to do so. Kemal's mission was not just to instil pride in a Turkish identity, but also to undermine Islam as a force within the politics and society of the new Turkish republic. In

banned on the radio in favour of Western classical music. Arabic and Persian language courses were deleted from schools and the study of Islamic history was dropped from the lycée curriculum. In place of them, as the Latin and Greek languages become compulsory in education, so the old Anatolian civilisations such as the Hittite and Sumerian and pre-Islamic Turkish history began to be taught in colleges and universities (Atay 1980:30-8).

⁷⁴ In order to rationalise these changes, Kemal and his companions tried to institute new language and history theories. According to the Sun Language Theory (Güneş Dil Teorisi) started on 12 July 1932, all the languages in the world emerged from Turkish, including European languages. On 24 August 1936 Türk Dilini Tetkik Cemiyeti was renamed as Türk Dil Kurumu (the Turkish Language Association) (Vryonis 1991:77-88; Ceylan Eylül II 1991:209-50; Karpaz 1959:55).

⁷⁵ They did not accept the general assumption that the Turks and Mongols were the members of the same ethnic family. Instead, they argued that the Turkish race was genuinely European as were the ancient civilisations of Anatolia and Mesopotamia, which they saw as having been created by Turks. These views were collected under the title of the Turkish Historical Thesis. Both of the theories were in fact coined to instill pride in a Turkish national identity and to promote nationalist feelings as well as to justify the Turkish revolution (Atay 1980:39-41; Çalış 1996:48-9; Karpaz 1959:55; Kushner 1977:61-80).

this respect, Turkey's official endeavour was not only to adopt Western technology but also the civilisation of the West, while retaining her own ethno-cultural identity. This does not fully reflect reality. According to Mustafa Kemal culture and civilisation could not be wholly separated from each other, therefore the one should be accompanied by the other. All the material and spiritual features of a given civilisation, including religion, should be considered as a whole (Huntington 1996:178-9; Karpas 1959:45,55-6).

The Reforms were a radical break from the Osmanlı and Islamic past. This also means that the new Turkish State certainly opted for a new identity based on the ideas and ideals of Western civilisation which had been followed by the Osmanlı officials for many years. Kemal said "All the roots of Turkey's life have hitherto been in the East, now they will be in the West. From a static civilisation, we intend to become a progressive one. The Turkish revolution signifies a transformation far broader than the word revolution suggests. It meant replacing an age-old identity based on religion" (Çalış 1996:50; Huntington 1996:179; Karal 1986:73-4). Kemal said that the only means of survival lay in the acceptance of the contemporary Western civilisation.

Embracing Western civilisation was the engine of the transformation, the *raison d'être* of the modern Turkish Republic. All the reforms were implied in the name of being civilized, for all "uncivilized people are doomed to remain under the feet of those who are civilized", as Kemal put it. According to Kemal, civilisation meant Western civilisation. He stated: "We want to modernize our country. Our total effort is to create a Western-style government in Turkey. Is there any country which wanted to be civilized and did not face to the West? Countries differ, but there is only one civilisation. And in order to progress, any nation

has to accede to that civilisation. Our policy is to create a European Turkey, or better to say a Western-oriented Turkey. Are you in any doubt about it? If so, you should consider our history. The movements of Turks have followed for centuries only one direction. We have always marched from East to West. Even, at times when our bodies had to be in the East, our souls, minds turned towards the West. We want to modernize our country. All the efforts we have made are to establish a contemporary, therefore a Westernized, government in Turkey.” (Çalış 1996:51; Karal 1986:49-55).

The Mustafa Kemal reforms were a revolution from above, not below; indeed, revolution was made for the people despite the people. These reforms were directed to create a nation identifying itself with the standards of Western civilization. However, Turkey consisted of a Muslim population which originated from the East and was still largely Asian in character. It was a population that was more homogeneous than its Osmanlı predecessor in terms of religion, but not less heterogeneous in terms of ethnic structure. The people came together from very diverse ethnic origins, including the Kurds, the Bosnians, the Georgians, the Circassians, the Jews, the Armenians and the Greeks (Ceylan Mayıs 1991:233-254). The Turks considered that they had their own origins, but saw themselves as a part of the Islamic community much more than anything else during the independence war. When the Westernizing reforms were put into practice, the concept of the Turkish nation was not a reality for most people. In order to survive and sustain the new republic, Kemal had to fight both with the traditional values of Turkish society, with which the people had identified themselves for centuries, and with other

nationalist-oriented movements such as the Kurds.⁷⁶ During the period of reforms and single party rule, Turkey was governed by an authoritarian regime which oppressed opposition and reactionary movements, whether religious or nationalist-oriented (Eroğlu 1982:267-298; Karpat 1959:57-8; Palmer 1995:264).

Due to the very low levels of industrialisation, communication and transportation, most of the rural population were much more out of touch with the Kemalist changes than were the urbanised areas. Therefore, the reforms did not immediately change or penetrate deeply into the identities of all the Turkish people or make them Westernized, other than the appearance of the state itself.

Kemalism⁷⁷ can best be described as the sum of the ideas and the reforms of Mustafa Kemal and his associates. Rather than accepting it as a universal and original ideology, it is possible to see it as a guideline for modern Turkey which was followed by the Governments of the Republic. There is no clear-cut definition for Kemalism. However, it consisted of the six principles of the RPP. As the Constitution stated: "The Turkish state is republican, nationalist, populist,

⁷⁶ The rebellions were encouraged by the most of the Western powers with a promise to support minority's mystical historical aspirations' realization in Turkey (Erdemir 2000:169-216; Ayışığı 2002:501-507).

⁷⁷ Kemalist reforms cannot be categorised with any other known ideology of the time. Although Kemalism (both reform and rhetoric) are widely regarded as a species of nationalism, they were much more far reaching in their impact than most other species of nationalism (Çalış 1996:52; Dilipak 1988:31-5). The ideas and the reforms with which the state has identified itself created an ideology, known in Turkey as Kemalism. In the name of Kemalism a partly dictatorial, partly presidential, system was maintained during the Kemal and İnönü eras. The system would be abused by a number of politicians for their own programmes and plans, despite differences in their ideologies and executions.

etatist, secular and revolutionist.⁷⁸ Its official language is Turkish and its capital city is the city of

⁷⁸ Cumhuriyetçilik (Republicanism) referred to the fundamental character of the state. It symbolised the end of personal rule and religious sources of power. With this principle, the new Turkey made it plain to the world that any kind of authority not coming from national sovereignty would not be acceptable. The slogan was "Hakimiyet bilâ kayd ü şart milletindir" (Sovereignty belongs to the nation without any condition). According to the founders, the new Republic was formed by the people, for the people, of the people of Turkey. Milliyetçilik (Nationalism) was the driving force during the national independence war. However, nationalism was a desire to build up a new society which rejects the identity relations of Osmanlısm, Turkism and Islamism. Turkey's nationality was a secular and humanitarian one and discarded racial and irredentist aspirations completely, unlike Western understanding. Race and religion was not the base of new Turkish nationality. A Turk was a civilised man, who spoke Turkish, felt himself to be a citizen of Turkey and shared the ideals of the Turkish State. The Turkish people were defined as a nation forming the Turkish republic within its internationally recognised boundaries, and its culture was to be called "Turkish culture". There was one state and one nation for those people living in Turkey. In order to create a new generation of Turks who would be proud of their race, history and culture, with a forward-looking society, this new society would not be excluded from the ranks of its European counterparts in way of living, culture and institutions (Turan 1980:150-59). Turkish nationalism replaced regionalism and unified the Turkish people around common goals. Class struggles and ideological divisions were not acknowledged and all people were formally equal before the law. Turkish nationalism was not hostile to its neighbours and the main objective was co-operation for mutual benefit. A number of agreements were signed with near and distant neighbours in the 1930s: with Greece, Britain, Hungary, Germany and the Balkan countries (Atay 1980:39-41). Halkçılık (Populism) signified government by and for the people and in fact it was an extension of nationalism. It meant national solidarity, putting the interests of the whole nation before those of any group or class. In modern Turkey, there was no place for any privileged men such as seyyids, şeyhs, paşas, efendis and the like. All citizens, Muslims or non-Muslims, were granted the same rights and were equal under the law. In addition, populism included by definition a prohibition of political activities based on class struggle. No distinct class was recognised. It was such an

Ankara.”⁷⁹ The principles should be treated as a whole, because “each was interlocked with the other” (Çalış 1996:53; Eroğlu 1982:381-442).

understanding that brought about statism. Devletçilik (Statism) was a response to Turkey’s economic problems in the 1930s. By the same principle, Turkey recognised the fact that the state must be involved in the economic field as well, but only when the private sector was unable to perform its functions. Otherwise, private enterprise should be encouraged (Atay 1980:42-5). İnkılapçılık (Revolutionism) meant the creation a society which is always dynamic and ready for constant change according to the requirements of the age and society. Revolutionism was needed to protect the nation against its enemies and to justify the radical measures taken to establish the Republic while with introducing new reforms. Maintaining the “modern character” of the state and the “civilised identity” of the nation meant continuing to apply the measures necessary for a Kemalist Turkey. Laiklik (Secularism) was separation of the state from the institutions of Islam, liberation of the individual’s mind from and religious concepts and practices, and modernisation of all aspects of state and society. Secularism was the backbone of the ideology, the leitmotif of the Turkish revolution. As should be clear, the Kemalist reforms are based on secular understanding (Çalış 1996:54-5; Davison 1968:139; Karpat 1959:47-51).

⁷⁹ Almost similar articles 1, 2 and 3 on new constitution See: Yeni Anayasa 1982 Serhat Yayınları, İstanbul 1989.p.17. “(I. Form of the State. ARTICLE 1. The Turkish state is a Republic. II. Characteristics of the Republic. ARTICLE 2. The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble. III. Integrity of the State, Official Language, Flag, National Anthem, and Capital. ARTICLE 3. The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background. Its national anthem is the “Independence March”. Its capital is Ankara. IV. Irrevocable Provisions. ARTICLE 4. The provision of Article 1 of the Constitution establishing the form of the state as a Republic, the provisions in Article 2 on the characteristics of the Republic, and the provision of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed” (www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/constitution.htm).

Atatürkist secularism meant not only the separation of state and religion (church, mosques or synagogue) from each other as in the Western sense, but it also meant the state taking control of all religious affairs. Thanks to such an understanding of secularism, it became possible to take radical decisions to modernise the country. Without secularism, it was hardly possible to realise the separation of religion and politics from each other and the separation of education, culture and legal life from religion.⁸⁰ In the end, the West was secularized, so the same had to be done if Turkey was destined for Westernization (Atay 1980:1-9; Schwarz 1978:134-64; Yetkin 1983:140).

Turkey's efforts at modernisation provided a considerable input into foreign policy, and the Turkish state's identification with the ideals and ideas of the Western world intensely affected Turkey's foreign relations, especially those with her neighbours (Çalış 1996:64; Davison 1968:141). The reforms and aims of Mustafa Kemal shaped the foreign policy of Turkey. The principles of the Turkish revolution which were the basis of a modern state and aimed to create a Western society were at the same time the principles of foreign policy. When the Kemalist reforms materialised in society, Turkey accordingly turned its face from the East to the West more than ever before (Çalış 1996:63).⁸¹

⁸⁰ Lutfi Levonian, *Moslem Mentality*, p.141 (London 1928) wrote: "... at bottom there is a materialistic interpretation of human life, and a quite false understanding of religion. They are in revolt against Islam, because Islam is Arabian... They are in revolt against all religion because they think religion and science, faith and knowledge cannot agree; they are essentially opposed to one another ... religious creeds, teachings, and books are unreliable. Religion is for primitive-minded people." Quoted from Karpas 1959:58 footnote 72.

⁸¹ Kemal's main concern in foreign policy was the consolidation of Turkish national independence and sovereignty. The best foreign

Towards the end of the liberation war, Kemal began to follow a more friendly policy towards the West, whilst reducing the intensity of relations with the Muslim-populated countries. The 1920s and 1930s were full of examples of the Western approach of Kemalist reforms. When Kemal sent İsmet İnönü to Lausanne for a treaty, he asked İnönü to take his wife with him. Mevhibe İnönü took off her scarf while she was meeting with other European state's leaders' wives and attending public meetings. Kemal sent encouraging messages to the West that Turkey would be a national, independent, moderate and Westernised state.⁸²

policy was to ensure Turkey's security by avoiding foreign entanglements and by achieving workable agreements with neighbours in matters of local and regional concerns. Indeed, there was a perfect agreement between the principles of Kemalism and Turkey's foreign policy. Despite the fact that the Kemalist reforms were oriented towards the West, Kemalist foreign policy adopted an anti-imperialist, neutral and pragmatic stance in international relations. Kemal's foreign policy was as Western-oriented as his reforms. On the other hand, there is also the fact that Europeans particularly wanted to see the end of the existence of the Turks in their continent. Mustafa Kemal and his reformist friends were very well aware of this fact and thought that giving a Western image to modern Turkey was a prerequisite for its security and its existence. Europeans would only agree to co-exist with Turks if only the latter were or similar to themselves. Because of this fact, and their awareness of the reality, the reformists never had anti-Western thoughts, even in foreign policy, although they were anti-imperialist in some of their policies (Atay 1980:44-56).

⁸² For Kemal, neither pan-Islamism nor pan-Turkism nor Easternism was a viable option in a world under Western domination. As he rejected pan-Islamist and pan-Turkish policies, he had a clear vision of foreign policy direction. With the Mudanya Agreement on 11 October 1922 and the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923 between the Kemalist and the Allied Powers, Kemal's future foreign policy in began to appear (Davison 1968:142; Robins 1998:151-7; Sosyal 1989:63-6). Turkey was accepted and recognised by the international community as an independent and sovereign country and all parties also recognised that the Osmanlı State was dead. Turkey in return gave up its imperial aspirations, such as

When the peace was achieved with the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Turkey began to develop friendly relations with Western countries. Kemalists aspirations and those of nineteenth-century Osmanlı Westernism policies were similar. Both wanted to end the centuries-old hatreds, wars and antagonisms between Turkey and Europe. Of course, this time Turkey's aspiration to becoming a European country certainly affected foreign policy much more than in the previous era. Modernisation and Westernization were the basic domestic and foreign policy goals of Mustafa Kemal's Turkey (Atay 1980:30-42; Çalış 1996:67).

The Kemalist dictum "*yurtta sulh cihanda sulh*" (peace at home and peace in the world) was the best summary of the foreign policy of the new Turkey. The new Turkish leaders recognise their own limits and were determined to keep Turkey a medium-sized country, but with a desire to maintain its territorial integrity and freedom. As long as Europe and the wider West would respect this, Turkey would in return offer them a zone of peace in this potentially explosive region. The new sovereign Republic, geographically poised between East and West, was to be a stabilising element. At the same time, it was recognized that Turkey needed to develop and sustain its own Westernising reforms (Çalış 1996:68; Davison 1968:141; Karpas 1959:60-61).

pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. As a condition of sovereignty Turkey refused to accept any of the capitulations or other privileges for foreign countries in economic, judicial and military matters. The integrity of Turkey was recognised and, with the exchange of populations, Kemalist Turkey was provided with the opportunity of creating a culturally homogenous state (Karpas 1959:49; Sosyal 1989:67-84). In order to reach an agreement with the Western countries, Kemalist Turkey had to accept a smaller map than the National Pact had envisaged on an equal basis with Western countries.

Kemalist Turkey's relations with Islamic and Arabic countries modified considerably during the period of revolution.⁸³ The Kemalists eliminated the Islamic and theocratic foundations of the Osmanlı State in order to modernise the political and social structure of Turkey, and turned away from the SWAC and the Arab world. This was a policy designed to cut off Turkey's oriental and Islamic past. Islam was no longer a valid basis for political relationships. Turkey refused to develop any polity or relationship which was based on religion. The use of religion for political purposes came to be regarded as subversive and illegal in the domestic and international politics of secular Turkey⁸⁴ (Çalış 1996:70; Davison 1968:133; Huntington 1996:179; Karpaz 1959:49-50).

⁸³ The reasons perhaps can be explained as follows: First, there had been an attitude problem between the Turks and Arabs, which was exacerbated by the anti-Turkish campaign of some Arabs during the First World War. This misperception was also related to the twin processes of state-formation and nation-building in Turkey and Arab countries at the end of the nineteenth century. While Kemalists in Turkey emphasized the significance of Islam in building relations between Turkey and the Arab world, conservative Arabs interpreted the Kemalist reforms in Turkey as a departure from Islam (Davison 1968:135; Huntington 1996:178-9). The abolition of the Caliphate was one of the most significant turning points in Turkey's relations with both the West and the Muslim-populated countries. Turkey suddenly ceased to be the leader and centre of Islam. Consequently, Turkey rather closed its doors to the rest of the Muslim populated world. This had two important consequences. Firstly, most of the Muslims living under Western colonial powers had looked to help from the Caliph, but now terminated these expectations with great frustration and disappointment (Çalış 1996:69; Davison 1968:129; Karpaz 1959:50). Secondly, it was an incentive for Western countries to reduce their ties with the Muslim populated countries, as this would encourage the Kemalists to modernise the country and renounce any claim on or interests in other areas inhabited by Muslims.

⁸⁴ Turkey participated in the Islamic Congress at Mecca organised in 1926 by the King Ibn Sa'ud to promote the well-being

Turkey's accession to the League of Nations on 18 July 1932 symbolized Turkey's approach to international organisations, reflecting its emphasis on international co-operation and keeping the status quo in the world for the sake of everlasting peace. The maintenance of peace by the League of Nations was the foundation of Kemalist foreign policy. Therefore Turkey was ready to accept and apply whatever the League of Nations proposed for world peace (Çalış 2000:44-54).

For security reasons, Kemalist Turkey did not remain totally isolated from the South West Asian countries seeking to establish closer relationships with Iraq and Iran.⁸⁵ The agreements made by Turkey were of considerable importance for the West, particularly Britain. The Kemalists' Sa'adabad Pact (1937) and the DP's Baghdad Pact (1955) objectives were almost

of the sacred places and the security of pilgrims but refused any discussion on political issues or any decisions relating to Islam. Although Turkey attended the Third Islamic Congress of Jerusalem in December 1931, her representative carefully adopted a cooler approach towards Islamic organisations. The Turkish Foreign minister made it clear that any external or internal policy that used Islam would be vigorously opposed by the Turkish Republic. While Kemalists approached Western countries with sympathy and even established friendly relations with them, there was also a considerable lack of enthusiasm towards other Muslim populated countries. This was a kind of reaction to the past, which meant that Arabs always reminded Turks of Islam and the Osmanlı struggles with the West (Çalış 1996:71-2; Huntington 1996:179).

⁸⁵ Turkey and Iraq signed the Sa'adabad Pact in July 1937 with the participation of Iran and Afghanistan. They were closely connected to each other with a determination to stand against changes of the status quo by force in the region. One of the motives for these security agreements for Turkey was the Kurdish insurgency on its eastern and southern borders during the 1920s and 1930s. By this pacts, Turkey intended to seal its borders against logistical support of Kurdish nationalists by external powers (Atay 1980:23; Çalış 1996:76).

similar. They emerged from a complete identity of interests between the two parties, Turkey and the West: Westernization and Western interests in the region respectively (Atay 1980:26-9; Çalış 1996:76-7).

Kemal and President Venizelos of Greece built up good relations during the 1930s. On 30 October 1930 a Neutrality, Reconciliation and Arbitration Agreement was signed by Turkey and Greece. A Balkan Pact was signed with Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia in Athens on 9 February 1934 and with Bulgaria in Salonika on 31 July 1938 (Sosyal 1989:391-419). Close relations emerged from their shared geopolitical concerns and interests. This relationship was one of the symbols of Turkey's Westernization policy (Çalış 1996:79-81).

When Turkey became a member of the League of Nations on 18 July 1932, the USSR opposed its membership of that organisation and the Soviet and Turkish paths separated from then onwards. The Turkish request relating to the Straits (İstanbul and Çanakkale boğazı, or the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) at the Montreux Conference on 20 July 1936 brought to the surface real geo-political differences and tensions between Turkey and the USSR (Çalış 1996:83-4; Sosyal 1989:397-419,493-518). The Soviet Union was unhappy with the outcome of the conference and retreated from its so-called "friendly" policy towards Turkey. The Soviets, with their geopolitical demands and communist ideology, became increasingly unfriendly towards Turkey. Kemal's Turkey had banned Marxist-Leninist ideas from the state. Turkey rejected the Soviet insistence on a pact for the defence of the Straits and turned her face towards the West, especially towards Britain, a move which was not welcomed by the Soviets. Many Turks regarded Britain as a leading member of Western civilization. Therefore good relations with the

UK on the road to Westernization were important⁸⁶ (Çalış 1996:85-6; Rubinstein 1960:206).

Mustafa Kemal's Westernizing ideas and reforms strongly shaped Turkish foreign policy during his lifetime and have continued to do so subsequently. This new approach in foreign policy has given Turkey international responsibilities as a nation-state, on the same footing as Western states. In order to succeed in this policy Turkey, if not completely cutting off her relations with Muslim populated countries, has definitely decreased them. This all had to be done for the creation of a Western or modern form and style of nation-state (Çalış 1996:89-90).

The development of Western life styles, behaviour and beliefs in the last two centuries of the Osmanlı State and the growing alienation of the Turks from their earlier culture created sociological problems which were the major issues in Turkish society in the Republican period. All the above, deliberate and intentional Westernization policies designed to transform Turkey into a Western-style society and State profoundly affected the Turkish peoples' lives and expectations. Two hundred years of intensive Westernization policies and practices during the late Osmanlı and the Republican periods had greatly affected Turkish perceptions of the West. Turkish people either experienced this in their own lives or read about Westernization and Western thought in

⁸⁶ Britain played an important role in Turkey's Westernization process. Britain helped Turkey during 1930s, as the United States did in the post-1945 period (Jentleson 2000:105-7; Rubinstein 1960:212-3,283). Kemal's Turkey expected help and advice from London. There were agreements on friendly relations and good neighbour lines between Turkey and Britain. Britain also helped Turkey to enter the League of Nations, at Montreux, and with the establishment of the Balkan and Sa'adabad Pacts of 1934. King Edward VIII visited Turkey in 1936. Economic relations also increased with Britain (Çalış 1996:86-7; Sosyal 1989:304-19).

their schools. There was a great deal of positive propaganda imposed by Turkish officials from the top in favour of Western countries, while other Muslim-populated countries were increasingly disdained, look down on, or rejected. This rejection of other Muslim-populated countries⁸⁷ and the near disregard for them in foreign policy strongly influenced Turkish popular consciousness and memory. After 1936 Soviet Russia was put into a similar category to that of the Muslim-populated countries, in accordance with the official practice of the Westernization policies. There was only one direction left: Westwards. The Turks had no choice but to look the West.

The intellectuals and élites of Turkey, who helped to change Turkish attitudes, understanding and opinions, further evaluated the decades-long practice of Westernization programmes by successive governments. When the time came to choose international bodies or institutions as Turkish governments have taken part in, most Turkish people decided without substantial hesitation to focus the West, despite the major differences in cultural, religious and mores. Far fewer decided to migrate to SWAC or North African countries. Turkish migrants integration into Western societies and present existences in the West was a product of rather complex influential reasons emerging out of internal and international relations combined with economic motives. It is possible that the Turkish State's policies on Westernization, religion, secularisation and democratisation alongside international relations between Turkey, other Muslim-populated countries and the West affected Turkish peoples' motivation to

⁸⁷ There were some exceptions, an example during the 1980s towards Arab countries particularly to Libya a number of construction firms went. However this happened as a result of Turkey resistance against western rejection of Turkey.

engage in further economic migration. The extensive need for qualified and skilled foreign labour in Western industrial countries created suitable an atmosphere for Turkish workers' decisions to migrate Western countries. In addition, Western countries helped Turkey to be seen and to see itself as an accepted member of "Western" countries' clubs by admitting it to some Western institutions and international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe and the Western European Union (WEU) (www.weu.int/).

The need of West European countries to fill gaps in their labour forces led to agreements between European 'core' and 'peripheral' countries. These labour recruitment agreements, which mostly took place between colonial (or imperial) powers and their former colonies, officially established the direct lines for workers' migration to Europe. These agreements and north-western Europe's economic needs played crucial roles as "pull" factors for international migrants. Among the "push" factors, on the other hand, the economic problems of labour-exporting countries were supplemented by the shared history, language, and policies of the various parties. This is particularly true for Turkey, as will become even clearer in the next chapters which deal with international labour migration.

Western countries made themselves more attractive to migrant workers during the 1950s and 1960s. The similarities between the parliamentary, judicial, educational and social systems of Turkey and Western countries were imperative factors in Turkey's increasing integration into the European economy and states system as well as Turkish migrants' easy assimilation or incorporation into West European host countries' economies and societies. As a result of

Turkey's Westernization policies, Turks were already familiar with Western civilization and considerable numbers of them wanted to become or to be called "European" or "civilized". This was believed and widely respected by Europhiles and Western-minded Turkish people. Numerous private Turkish students followed a similar line to official students in deciding to study in Western "civilized" countries. The author of this thesis has also experienced this personally in his own life, influenced by the Turkish governments' Westernization policies.

Traditional and religious Turkish and Islamic customs gave way to Western customs, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Congregation leaders restricted the wearing of religious costumes only to within religious buildings. The adoption of Western dress was, in many instances, forced upon Turkish society. The *turban* was replaced by the round hat, long beards almost disappeared, while moustaches were shortened. Wearing suits with ties became widespread as a compulsory uniform for officials and bureaucrats in public and official meetings. Despite some resistance, these new costumes became familiar in public as time passed by. These changes, if they did not penetrate deeply, at least changed outward appearances closer to European styles while widening the gap between Turkey and its eastern neighbours, as desired by the ruling officials.

These noticeable changes were greatly assisted by the usage of new measurement scales and names. The traditional names were replaced by those in use in Western countries; the "*arşın*" (a length measurement) gave way to "*santimetre*" (centimetre) while the "*okka*" (a weight measurement) gave way to the "*kilogram*", i.e. the metric system.

These changes were already observed among the elites and bureaucrats in Turkish society and in the

millet communities. When intellectuals and leading member of society came to power in the 1920s and 1930s the reforms and imitation of the West broadened, with an intensification of forced Westernization policies. The one-party regime implemented the reforms and official Westernization programmes without any substantial opposition. Turks were educated by Western-minded officers and secularised teachers while performing their national military service in the Turkish armed forces. In addition to this, the leading “elite” of the governing body of the RPP attempted to educate ordinary people, even villagers, through widely organized government cultural organs known as “*halkevleri*” (peoples’ houses) in the cities and as “*halk odalari*” (peoples’ rooms) in the villages and remote towns. There were enormous efforts to teach Westernization, even though many ordinary Turkish people did not accept or even tried to reject what it was being attempted to teach. However, these endeavours at least made Turkish people aware of the reforms and the new policies. Perhaps this is best exemplified by what had happened during the mass ‘educational’ period of early republican era (the 1920s and 1930s).

A government official gathered villagers and let them listen to live Western music and some classics. After the concert performance he asked an old villager: “How did you find concert?” He prelied: “Please excuse me my son! But I must admit that this town up today never experienced such a punishment.”

Villagers became aware of the West with either admiration or hatred because of the nature of the imposition of reforms and Westernization policies by the ruling elite. Perhaps hatred or dislike of ‘Westernization’ and its subsequent results came out not because of the change in cultural values which it represented but because of resentment of the coercive

enforcement of policies by Turkish governing bodies. Without proper explanation, information or debate, some officials and political party leaders forced the Turkish people to accept joining the EU, which has created similarly recalcitrant outcomes to those that occurred in the formative years of the Republic.

The secular-educated Turkish elite was fully aware of the West, Western norms and cultural values. Government officials alongside bureaucrats had to wear Western style customs (trousers, jackets, ties and hats) in official and informal meetings, with constant contact with their Western counterparts. The secular elite with the support of the ruling Western-minded people argued for a continuation of official Westernization through their publications, whether translations of Western literature or their own writing about the West and Western culture. As a result of these developments the ruling class became more closely involved with the West. The writers' audiences became Western sympathizers while they were trying to practice what they read in written literature and heard or saw in the elites' lives.

There were many respected and influential leading political, intellectual and religious figures in organised communities and spontaneous groups who either admired or hated the West. Those who enjoyed good relations and personal gains and respected the official aims with regard to involvement with the West emphasised the positive sides of the West, while others focused their arguments only on the negative and corrupt aspects of the West. Government officials and secular intellectuals concentrated on the benefits and necessity of involvement with the West. On the other hand, groups opposed to this one-sided propaganda emphasized only the corruption and conflicts in the Western world, which they regarded as inappropriate to Turkey and thought would affect it

unconstructively. The former position was argued mostly by the centre-right and centre-left parties, who were in power at the time. The far right, the extreme left and religious organisations and groups expressed the latter arguments. This division on attitudes to the West still persists. There are Europhile parties in Turkish politics: the *Anavatan Partisi* (ANAP, the Motherland Party, conservative); the *Doğru Yol Partisi* (DYP, the True Path Party, conservative); the *Demokratik Sol Parti* (DSP, Democratic Left Party, social-democratic) and the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (CHP, Republican Peoples' Party, leftist) support joining the EU. The parties having objections to or reservations about joining to the EU include: the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP, Nationalist Action Party, nationalist); the *Refah Partisi* (RP, Welfare Party, Islamist (banned)); the *Fazilet Partisi* (FP, Virtue Party, Islamist (now banned)); the *Saadet Partisi* (SP, Felicity Party, Islamist); the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AK Parti, Justice and Progress Party, Islamist and conservative); the *İşçi Partisi* (İP, Workers Party, socialist); the *Halkçı Demokratik Partisi* (HADEP, Democratic People's Party, Kurdish) and the *Türkiye Komünist Partisi* (TKP, Turkey Communist Party). A wide variety of views is reflected in the Turkish community both in Turkey and in Germany today. These perceptions effect the Turkish people's involvement with and attitudes to the West either positively or negatively.

Secular-minded Europhiles were dominant in later periods of the Osmanlı State and particularly during the formative years of the Turkish Republic. However, this one-sided propaganda was held in check somewhat by considerable visible or underground conservatism and religious extremism. This situation continued with minor interruptions until the 1950s. During the 1950s both sides were able to express their

views in controlled situations, which was interrupted by the military intervention in May 1960. Since then, regular 'checking and balancing' by military interventions has continued almost every 10 years up to today. This ambivalence towards Westernization has affected popular expectation and dreams. Secular-minded people in states of economic desperation sought their future, as they were told for years by secular intellectuals and officials, in the free and secular world, in Europe in general and in Germany in particular.

Many of those who are regarded as religious and political extremists according to Turkey's constitution and laws have fled to West either as migrant workers or as asylum-seekers who have been entitled to refugee status in most European countries, particularly when the Turkish military was in power. Therefore, the diversification of views and outlooks among the Turkish community in Europe in general, and in Germany in particular reflects these realities of Turkey and its international relations.

Since the nation-state building years of the 19th century, Turkish popular consciousness expressed disappointment at the Arab revolts supported by British and French imperialists against Osmanlı administration in the South West Asian countries. In fact, Turks never had serious troubles in living memory with Arabs except in the 1910s. While Turks defended the Arab lands and their freedom against Western imperialist powers, prominent Arab writers and leaders regarded the Turks as occupiers and as disrespectful towards Islamic rules. Since Osmanlı administration ceased in the area, troubles have continued for several decades, and the Turkish authorities have not wanted to get involved with these problems except for humanitarian reasons, regional security, peaceful and friendly relations with

neighbours, and international stabilization. On the other hand, Turkish policy makers kept a distance from the Arabs on any religiously or ethnically grounded issues, keeping relations with them restricted to mutually beneficial economic relations. These mutually beneficial relations with neighbours, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Soviet Union and the CIS (Central Asian Independent States), started to shift from a narrowly economic approach to a multi-dimensional one. This new search for alternative relations is the result of the EU's negative approach towards Turkish entry into the EU. These changes occurred during the late 1980s and 1990s. Probably this is best exemplified by recent migrations of Turks to these countries. This initial migrations will required some time to reach the same levels as those to Western European countries. This also reflects one important factor in international migration, if not in other areas: political and economic relations between states affect one way or another peoples' decisions on their final migration destination and the success of migrants' integration, even if their main motives for migration are economic.

The work carried out over more than five years in the preparation of and collection of data for this thesis suggests that the influence of centuries-long Westernization and official policies dramatically affected Turkish peoples' perceptions of the West. This influence was the result of many combined instruments, such as foreign peoples presence as instructors, teachers, military experts, and the influence of Western-educated Turkish and religious minority people, bureaucrats, secular-minded elites and military personnel in the Osmanlı period. This was intensified during the Republican period, as it will be explained in next chapter. All of this must have helped to prepare many Turks for successful migration

and adaptation to Western Europe in general and to Germany in particular.

CHAPTER 2

THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF TURKEY

DEMOCRATIZATION UNDER THE SINGLE PARTY REGIME

The Emergence of Political Opposition: The founding party of the new Turkish Republic was the continuation of a resistance group called *Anadolu ve Rumeli Mudafai Hukuk Cemiyeti* (the Defence of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia), which fought against the invasion of the European powers.⁸⁸ This group became the Republican People's Party (RPP) or *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* and it was formally founded on 11 September 1923. The RPP was the only party in power for 27 years in Turkish politics from 1923 to 1950 (Ahmad 1991:67; Karpas 1991:42-3).

The process of democratization in Turkey was affected by many internal as well as external factors. Considerable internal pressure existed to develop democratic movements all the time, but this was not accepted and respected by the authoritarian RPP regime. Therefore, although attempts to establish democratic ideas and desires were not unknown, democracy did not come easily. Turkish democracy became real not only with the rights of the Turkish nation being upheld against foreign invaders, but also with the establishment of the rights of the individual

⁸⁸ France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Greece invaded Turkey from the West and South, Soviet Russia from the East.

and different groups within the state against repressive regimes (Karabekir 1988:1077-9,1112).⁸⁹

Mustafa Kemal, the first president of Turkey, failed in his two attempts to foster an opposition party. The failure of these experiments actually reinforced the personal autocracy of President Mustafa Kemal and his Prime Minister İsmet İnönü (Lewis 1961:297). The first experiment was the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*) (PRP), which was formed by Rauf (Orbay) Bey on 17 November 1924. This was not regarded as a genuine political party by Mustafa Kemal. Members of parliament criticized particularly İsmet İnönü, the Prime Minister, and the autocratic system and policies which the RPP followed in 1924. There were four groups within the RPP with different viewpoints and opinions on the policies of the Republican governments. The PRP emerged out of the RPP in the National Assembly and had 30 deputies (Avşar 1998:36; Davison 1968:130; Erer 1966:127-31; Karpat 1966:47). During the high tension with Britain over whether the Mosul region should belong to Turkey or to Iraq, suddenly the so-called *Şeyh Said* incident⁹⁰ erupted on 13 February 1925. The chairman of the RPP stated in the Assembly that people who joined the opposition movement against the Republican system with the encouragement of internal and particularly external powers would be punished. The chairman supported his government's

⁸⁹ There was the national struggle (İstiklâl Harbi) the war of independence, against mentioned countries in footnote one, as well as internal personal and group rivalries between Turkish leaders for power and the very existence of the country.

⁹⁰ The term "incident" was coined by Fethi Okyar, the Prime Minister of the time. This insurgency has generally been regarded as a religiously motivated riot, but some have argued that it was in fact a nationalistically motivated rebellion against the Kemalist regime (Okyar 1980:366).

initiatives fully to suppress the agitation in the area. Any criticism and debate about the principles of the RPP were not acceptable -yet. The number of newspapers was decreased from fourteen to six by the İnönü government (Ahmad 1991:65-6; Davison 1968:131; Erer 154-9; Karpat 1966:47). So, the PRP was abolished, ostensibly as a result of conditions following the Kurdish *Şeyh Said* rebellion in southeast of Turkey in 1925. The RPP members accused some members of the PRP of having relations with the rebels and claimed that the party's programmes were open to misinterpretation by members of the public. The sixth article of the Party programme stated "the party respects any political ideas and religion", which was used as the core of the charges legitimizing the PRP's closure (Avşar 1998:37-8; Karpat 1966:47; Tunaya 1952:617). Ostensibly, the party was abolished because of its relationship with Islamic ideas. In fact, this was not the main reason for the closure (Dodd 1991:31-2). The leading PRP members had been among the commanders of the war of independence. This new party and its members made it bluntly clear that the RPP and its members were not the sole founders of the Republic. The PRP criticized many RPP policies and used the press to make its own policies known. The newspapers "*İstiklâl*", "*Son Telgraf*", "*Tevhidi Efkâr*", and "*Vatan*" vigorously supported the new party. In return, they were supported in the Assembly by the PRP, which in championed greater freedom of the press. Soon, the PRP was taken under strict government control. The Party was strong in the eastern regions and, after the repression of the *Şeyh Said* insurgency, members of the party were accused of taking part in or associating with the rebellion and of exploiting religious discontent against the Republic. The PRP was closed down by the decision of the

government on 5 June 1925 (Tunaya 1952:612-4,621-2; Erer 1966:126-59; Karpas 1966:48).

With the closure of the PRP, İnönü was able to work without any opposition either from the press or from any organized opposition party, whether in the Assembly or in the country at large. He was not criticized, and he wielded absolute power from 3 June 1925 to 12 August 1930. The failure of the first experiment in democratization (1924-1925) had resulted in an authoritarian one-party system and increased the personal power of both İsmet İnönü and Mustafa Kemal. The strength of any opposition was diminished by İnönü's careful scheming. Henceforth, the RPP could do whatever it wanted without opposition. Meanwhile, the RPP programme became the "official programme" of the Turkish Republic. Consequently, the RPP came to represent and embody the revolution, democracy and the state (Karpas 1966:49; Kazdal 1980:96-105). The personalistic nature of the Republican regime was perpetuated by İnönü after Atatürk's death in 1938. Nevertheless, this dictatorship was less violent than some of its European counterparts and there was some freedom of publication (Karpas 1966:138; Yetkin 1997:246). Hundreds or even thousands of people were executed, and tens of thousands were forcibly resettled away from their homelands, according to some histories of Kemal's regime (Ahmad 1993:58; Zürcher 1997:179).

According to the leaders, Kemal and İnönü, this first experience demonstrated to both internal and external pressure groups that the Turkish people were not yet ready for an opposition and a pluralistic democratic system. Because of this, the government did not apply the democratic principle of a multi-party system in Turkey'. There was very little criticism from the West over the closure of the PRP. In fact, Britain

used this opportunity for her own benefit and incorporated Mosul into Iraq.

The second experiment at a two-party system was the formation of the *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (the Free Republican Party or FRP) on 12 August 1930. Ali Fethi (Okyar)⁹¹ Bey was selected as the founder of the party by Mustafa Kemal.⁹² The party emerged within the RPP and its members were selected by Mustafa Kemal. Therefore, the FRP was even weaker in organization and in argument than the PRP. It did not emerge as a result of any substantial social requirements. The PRP had been founded as an authentic expression of opposition to Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü. The FRP was completely artificial and was not based on any popular movement or claim (Atay 1969:462; Çandır 2000:30-37; Karpaz 1966:65-66; Yetkin 1997:75-6).⁹³ It lasted only 101 days, from 12 August 1930 to 18 December 1930. Although the Party was brought into existence with the encouragement and guidance of Mustafa Kemal against İnönü and his government, it soon became a focus of all sorts of opposition to the Kemalist regime

⁹¹ Members of the Party were Ali Fethi (Okyar), Ağaoglu Ahmet (Ahmet Ağaoglu), Nuri Conker, Tahsin Uzer, Talat Sönmez, Dr. Reşit Galip (Baydur), Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul), Ali Haydar (Yuluğ), Süreyya İlmen Paşa, Rasim Öztekin, Nurettin Yücekök, Refik İsmail Kakmacı, Ali Galip, Senih Hızıroğlu, İbrahim Süreyya Yiğit and Makbule Atadan (Avşar 1998:52-65; Yetkin 1997:49-74).

⁹² Mustafa Kemal wrote to Fethi Bey: "Since my youth I have been in favour of a system in which honest individuals and political parties would express and debates freely ideas in the Assembly or before the nation for the benefit of the country ... consequently I consider it one of the bases of the Republic to have a new political party in the Assembly, which based on similar [anti-clerical] principles will debate freely the affairs of the nation." *Cumhuriyet*, August 12, 1930, quoted from Karpaz 1959:65 footnote:96.

⁹³ Nuri Conker, Prof. Ahmet Ağaoglu, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul and Makbule Hanım were other founders of the Free Party.

(Avşar 1998:52-3; Dodd 1991:28,31; Okyar 1980:429-30; Yetkin 1997:229-44).

There have been several different opinions on the real reasons for the FRP's formation. However, it seems that the party emerged to promote and express balanced rivalry between Kemal and İnönü. Mustafa Kemal had full authority to control democracy and govern the new state. In particular, the newspapers of the time stated that the formation of the party was the result of democratic and republican experimentation in Turkey on the path of Westernization, which would also require democratization (Avşar 1998:66-70; Okyar 1980:394-5). In principle, the constitution and the laws allowed formation of any kind of party. In practice, however, a party could be formed only if Mustafa Kemal desired or permitted it. The FRP was only one example of this (Okyar 1980:465-69,526). The FRP suffered in local elections and its total member of deputies numbered only 14, including Mustafa Kemal's sister Makbule Atadan. Ali Fethi Bey informed the Interior Ministry on 17 December 1930⁹⁴ that his party had become a sort of opposition party against Mustafa Kemal who was the President of Turkey, in spite of the fact that it was not his desire or intention to oppose either Kemal himself or his system, revolution and reforms. On the same day Fethi Bey felt obliged to dissolve his party (Çandır 2000:34-5; Dodd 1969:22-4; Erer 1966:160-95; Karpas 1966:67-8; Okyar 1980:377- Tunaya 1952:622-35). With the rapid formation and abolition of the FRP, İnönü was criticized both in the Assembly and in public. However, he emerged even stronger than before from this second attempt at democratization.

Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü stated, as in 1925, that this second multi-party system experiment

⁹⁴ 17 November 1930 Saturday (Erer 1966:191).

showed that the Turkish people were not yet ready to accept the competitive politics envisaged by the Atatürkist regime. For this reason some further measures needed to be taken. These included reforms in laws, language and teaching of Turkish history, and the establishment of People's Houses and People's Rooms (*Halkevleri ve halk odaları*) and similar measures.

These two experiments were trials of democracy as well as power struggles among the leaders. Mustafa Kemal wanted to avoid one-man domination of Turkish politics as well as to avert the emergence of İnönü as a potential rival against himself. According to İnönü and RPP hard-line members, these experiences suggest that Kemalist revolution needed a single party system in order to gain popular acceptance by the people and to move forward in accordance with the revolutionary requirements of Kemal's programme of Westernization (Davison 1968:137; Dilipak 1990:37,47-8; Dodd 1991:27-9,34). Nevertheless, these two experiments also involved the formation of other parties during the lifetime of Mustafa Kemal, such as *Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (the People's Republican Party), "*Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi*" (the Turkish Republic Labour and Peasant Party) and "*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*" (the National Development Party) (Karpas 1966:67; Tunaya 1952:634-45). This helped to demonstrate to outside observers that the RPP governments were attempting further democratization through the formation of new parties (Çandır 2000:35-7).

During the time of Kemal and İsmet, the old reactionary opposition was crushed. There was a new generation coming up through the secular and westernized schools that had never known any regime but the westernized Republic. A number of people had lost their lives for the sake of the new regime and its

system, both during the war of independence and during the revolutionary repressive establishment of Westernization in the Republic (Dilipak 1990:36; Lewis 1961:288,298).⁹⁵ However, popular opposition to the new regime continued in many parts of Turkey. The reasons for the emergence of opposition in the eastern provinces were mainly religious, while in the Western provinces they were mainly economic. The principles of Atatürk were not yet accepted by the rural population, or not as much as İnönü had expected. So, on the grounds that their 'political maturity was not high enough', İsmet did not promote a multi-party system (Karpas 1968:298-300).

On 11 November 1938, the day after Atatürk's death, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi or TGNA) unanimously voted to appoint İsmet İnönü, his lifelong friend and closest collaborator, as his natural and logical successor, as the Second President of Turkey. İnönü assumed the Presidency and leadership of the RPP, inheriting the same machinery of direction that the founder of the republic had been able to use. Soon after İnönü came to power Europe was engulfed by the Second World War.

The death of Kemal and the rise of a new generation with constitutional ideas of opposition to authoritarian government forced the RPP to rely more and more on simple repression. The difficulties of the Second World War years, opposition criticism, and foreign espionage and infiltration were other factors that led the government to adopt repressive measures, including martial law, strict control of the press and publications, and an extension of police powers and activities (Arcayürek 1983:29; Karabekir 1994:211-7).

⁹⁵ 9,000 and 500,000 respectively.

A *Basın Birliği* (Press Union) was instituted in 1938 for the purpose of controlling the press. Secularism and language reform were intensified. The Rightist group in the RPP acquired more control of the party. The *Şef* (leader) who was the permanent chairman of the party and president came to be idolized as the symbol of the state and nation. The war years necessitated further stern measures in the economic field which restricted personal freedom and placed the Party in absolute control of the country (Karpas 1966:74-6).

This new rigid and tightly controlled regime promoted new cultural, economic and political forces for the sake of its own survival and to justify its existence (Karpas 1966:74-5). From 1930 onwards state involvement in economy had steadily expanded. Private enterprise was not strong enough at the time to oppose such expansion. Laws relating to the state economy did not endanger any well-established bourgeoisie or entrepreneurial class through planning and nationalization of the economy. By 1945, statism had enveloped all the major fields of economy, either by way of new enterprises or by nationalization of existing ones (mines, forests, transportation) (Karpas 1966:86).

The position of the individual under statism appeared equivocal. In theory, private capital and enterprise were recognized. But in practice state economic activities expanded to restrict or even displace private enterprise. Social measures, protection of labour, unemployment agencies, insurance, social security and assistance were neglected until 1946. Statism was, in practice, "state capitalism" (Karpas 1966:87-8).

The war years' shortages drove up the prices of all necessary consumption items. Black-marketeering and hoarding imported goods flourished (Karpas

1966:90). The State imposed certain compulsory work obligations on certain people under the *Milli Korunma Kanunu* (National Defence Law), passed in 1940. This Law, enforced without the prescribed ordinance (*Kararname*), empowered the labour minister to require citizens to perform work for a given period every year. These measures caused widespread discontent among peasants and after 1945 served as a reason to criticize the Republican government. Statism and its multiple effects became one of the major issues in the political struggles after 1946 (Karpas 1966:91-3).

Historical and political events caused intense population movements, including an influx of 1,040,120 people between 1923 and 1954 from the Balkan countries to Turkey. These settled migrants played significant roles in the national politics of Turkey. They helped to break the closed circle of the traditionalist, isolationist Anatolian community, thus making it more receptive to new ideas and ideologies. The effect of group affiliation was felt more distinctly in politics at the local level first, at the national level later (Karpas 1966:96). This new mobile “Turkish” community in Turkey initiated and consistently contributed to internal as well as international migration in followed decades.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ These migrant groups were called “Turks” in the Balkan countries because of their religion or use of some Turkish in their home countries languages. They were called “muhacir” or “göçmen” (migrant) by local Turkish citizens in Turkey. These communities still exist as a part of diverse Turkish society today by preserving their own distinctive traditional identities and cultural mores, music and costumes from Balkan countries, as they also organised their own associations as the like “Mekadon ve Balkan Göçmenler Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği” (the Association of Macedonians and Balkan Immigrants Mutual Assistance and Collaborations). Most of these people arrived in Turkey as refugees. Today they are scattered all around Turkey and have considerable economic and political connections to their countries

After the Second World War, swift and sudden changes took place which ended single-party rule and set Turkey on the path to liberal parliamentary democracy. Turkey's workers and intellectuals had raised their expectations beyond the government's readiness to satisfy them. Urban workers wanted greatly increased wages and the right to strike, while their employers opposed concessions. In the countryside wealthy landlords' opposition limited the actual distribution of land as authorized by the new Land Reform Law. Intellectuals demanded far more extensive political and cultural freedom. Civil servants opposed any measures that threatened to limit their traditional privileged positions. These demands increased diversification in political activity, at first within the RPP and later outside it. The simultaneous rise of a popular and relatively independent press made it possible for the various discontented groups to express their views and to gain wide support throughout the country, even though freedom of the press was limited. There was also growing external pressure by the West. The influence of Western powers, especially the USA and Britain, pushed Turkey to take steps to become a more democratic state and join the ranks of the Western democracies (Davison 1968:148; Sarıbay 1991:119).

Considerable opposition existed to the RPP's autocratic rule, even within the party since Atatürk's death. Nevertheless, this had been subordinated to more pressing national needs during the war. Once peace returned in 1945, the RPP was split between conservative and more liberal groups, the former wishing to maintain their privileged positions as they were before, whereas the latter favoured the

of origin. These communities have been highly important in Turkey's external friendly relations between with the countries of origin.

modernisation of Turkey (Arcayürek 1983:39-40; Karpaz 1966:118-24).

The liberal groups within the party felt that further democratisation and liberalisation were essential if Turkey was to take its place among the other advanced nations as a democratic state (Sarıbay 1991:119). Four members of the RPP proposed a number of new legal reforms to which the Turkish government gave its formal approval at the United Nations. President İnönü stated on 19 May 1945 in Ankara "... the political system and the government of the people established by the Republican regime shall develop in all aspects and in every way, and as the conditions imposed by war disappear, democratic principles will gradually acquire a larger place in the political and cultural life of the country. The Grand National Assembly, our greatest democratic institution, will constantly develop the country in the direction of democracy" (Karpaz 1966:141). On 29 May 1945, on ratification of the budget, seven deputies⁹⁷ voted against the Prime Minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu, which surprised the party.⁹⁸ The time and the atmosphere seemed ready for a more democratic opening. Newspapers and people started to talk about the formation of an opposition party and possible names for it. Further members⁹⁹ resigned from the RPP, raising the total number of defections to ten

⁹⁷ Hikmet Bayur (Manisa), Recep Peker (Kütahya), Celal Bayar (İzmir), Emin Sazak (Eskişehir), Refik Koraltan (İçel), Adnan Menderes (Aydın) and Fuad Köprülü (Kars).

⁹⁸ İnönü and his friends met on the same evening and the next day, 30 May, the general secretary of the Party Memduh Şevket Esenal, and one day later the Trade Minister Celal Sait Siren and the Minister of Economy, Fuat Sirmen, resigned. The tension was really high and at one point the leader of the Assembly, Mazhar Germen, left his chairmanship to Abdülhalik Renda.

⁹⁹ Rıdvan Nafiz Ergüder (Manisa), Kasım Gülek (Bilecik), Kudsi Tecer (Urfa) resigned from the executive body of the RPP.

(Erer 1966:199-203; Karpas 1966:137-40; Lewis 1961:298).

The Emergence of An Opposition Party: Mahmut Celal Bayar,¹⁰⁰ Prof. Dr. Fuad Köprülü,¹⁰¹ Adnan Menderes¹⁰² and Refik Koraltan¹⁰³ were the key founders of the opposition party. Except for Köprülü, they were prominent and experienced members of the parliamentary group of the RPP. On 7 June 1945, the four rebel leaders presented a joint memorandum proposing certain changes: All anti-democratic laws and rules as well as some articles of the RPP principles should be amended or abrogated altogether for an inauguration of a fully democratic regime. Government was also to be subjected to popular control, and elections were to be made free. However, the proposal was rejected after seven hours of

¹⁰⁰ He had been Prime Minister during 1937-39, Finance Minister, deputy for İzmir, and a banker and economist who had played an important part in the War of Independence. He had born in Umurbey village of Gemlik in 16 May 1883. He worked in Ziraat Bankası (the Agricultural Bank) and the Deutsche Bank and was founder of İş Bankası (the Business Bank).

¹⁰¹ Deputy for Kars, a distinguished scholar and historian and an outstanding figure in the intellectual life of Turkey.

¹⁰² A deputy from Aydın, a lawyer and a cotton-planter. He was born in one of Aydın's suburbs called Sarayı Mahallesi in 1889. He had a big farm called "Çakırbeyli" inherited from his family. The farm was initially 70 million square metres but it was reduced in 1945 to 2,450,000 square metre. He was the leading cotton planter in the region. He knew villagers and village life, and claimed he would work for them when he was in power. He studied in İttihad ve Terakki Okulu (the United and Progressive Party's school) and at the American College in İzmir. His family upbringing was Eastern but his education came from the West, which affected his entire life. Menderes became an orphan when he was very young. He was the leader of the Free Republican Party in the province of Aydın in 1930. In May 1931 he became a deputy of the RPP from Aydın. Menderes wanted some changes in organization of the party and argued his ideas within the RPP.

¹⁰³ Deputy for İçel, a lawyer with extensive experience as a judge and as a provincial governor.

discussion on 12 June 1945, by a vote that was unanimous except for the four signatories of the memorandum (Erer 1966:203-5; Karpaz 1966:145; Tunaya 1952:648). The Four brought their proposal before the full Assembly on 15 August 1945, when the United Nations Charter came up for parliamentary ratification. Menderes stated that *'Turkey, by signing the Charter, had definitely committed itself to practice genuine democracy'* (Dilipak 1990:89-90). Falih Rifkî Atay requested in the official newspaper of the RPP, *Ulus* (the Nation), that Menderes and Köprülü should be punished because of their behaviour and the arguments they had precipitated in the party (Erer 1966:214-7; Lewis 1961:299).

The four then took the radical step of appealing to the public. Ahmet Emin Yalman, editor of the newspaper *Vatan* (the Homeland), opened its columns to the rebels. The rebels published their articles criticizing the 'totalitarian' and 'dictatorial' line that the government and ruling party were following and proclaiming their own belief in democracy in September 1945 (Karpaz 1966:145-9).¹⁰⁴ Political tension was extremely high. On 21 September 1945, at a secret meeting of the RPP, Adnan Menderes and Fuad Köprülü were expelled from the party. Menderes and Köprülü argued that they could understand their own expulsion from the RPP under the circumstances of undemocratic behaviour of and by the present RPP members. They declared that they had worked to increase democratic understanding, genuine

¹⁰⁴ On 6 September 1945 by Fuad Köprülü as "Yalancının Mumu" (The liar's candle). On 11-12 September "Sırça Köşkte Oturanlar" (the Occupiers of fragile kiosks), on 13 September by Adnan Menderes as "Başbakanın Demeci Münasebetiyle" (Regarding the Prime Minister's statement). On 16 September by Mehmet Ali Aybar as "Üniformalı ve üniformasız rejimler" (The regimes with or without uniforms) in the newspaper *Vatan* (Erer 1966:214-8).

democracy and law for Turkish people. The rebels made it clear that they would continue to work for their aims in the assembly and in the press. Refik Koraltan defended Menderes and Köprülü by writing in the *Vatan* that *'my three colleagues and I have done nothing but work for the strengthening of the foundations of national sovereignty and the principles of the party. It is not us who have forsaken these principles; it is those who decided to expel our two colleagues'*. The party then expelled Refik Koraltan on 27 November 1945 by a vote of 280 to 1. Celal Bayar resigned his membership of the Assembly on 26 September 1945. On 3 December 1945, in solidarity with his three colleagues, he resigned from the RPP (Erer 1966:220-27; Karpas 1966:146-7; Sarıbay 1991:121; Tunaya 1952:648-9).

President İnönü stated in the Assembly, on 1 November 1945, that "Turkey's system is not a dictatorship, which is not appropriate to the character of the Turks. Turkey lacks an opposition party against the Governing party. The laws should be amended so that those who differ from their colleagues, instead of working as a clique or faction, can declare their convictions and programmes and function openly as a party. This is the right road for the development of our political life; and this is the more constructive way forward and the political maturity of the nation. We shall strive with all our strength to ensure that differences of political opinion do not lead to enmity between our compatriots" (Erer 1966:224; Lewis 1961:300; Tunaya 1952:647). İnönü recommended important changes: single, direct election, by secret ballot; the repeal of related laws restricting the constitutional liberties of the citizen, the press, and associations; and the curbing of the power of the police. If one thing was certain, it was that the RPP's credibility among citizens of Turkey was decreasing.

İnönü decided just in time to demonstrate both internally and externally that it was time to change and democratise Turkey.¹⁰⁵ At the same time, the United States and the Western powers started to press neutral countries to decide whether they would accept the democratic system or face the consequences of potential isolation or intervention by “democratic” countries. The pressure of Western countries helped İnönü to decide on further democratisation in Turkey.

The liberalization which started in 1945 aimed at establishing a parliamentary multi-party democracy on the Western model. It was a step aimed at achieving political Westernization. The actual establishment of a multi-party regime was the product of the joint activity of the RPP, the DP and the NP (Karpas 1966:331).

The 1 November 1945 statement quoted above was made by İnönü just in time for joining the Western Club. The pressure of Soviet territorial demands on Turkey was one of the reinforcements on Turkey's decision to democratize its system and join the

¹⁰⁵ “I (İnönü) had a position (president) during that period. I must stress the fact that my role was markedly different from Atatürk’s. I opened the way to democracy but did not choose the people [who engaged in politics]. I gave everybody an equal chance. The multi-party experiment was met with hesitation not only by those accustomed to rule under a one-party system but also by honest patriots who feared, on the basis of past experience, that the reactionary forces would prevent the country’s progress. I, the spokesman for those supporting the new experiment, was encouraged to initiate the democratic experiment, which was the purpose of [Atatürk’s] reform, by the following consideration: the belief that our nation had achieved an inner (structural) strength based on the (lessons) drawn from the democratic experiments in the past twenty-five years. In my estimation, the time was ripe for trusting the safeguarding of the republican regime and the reform to the nation through a free political life. This new [democratic] way of life would strengthen the Turkish nation internally and gain it the respect of the outside world for being a civilized [medeni] society [civilization and democracy]” (İnönü 1968:315-6).

West.¹⁰⁶ İnönü wanted to be recognised as the president who worked for genuine democracy. His statement to the Assembly was a signal to the opposition to form a new party. The President's desire for an opposition was realized on 7 January 1946, when the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*) or (DP)¹⁰⁷ was registered in Ankara. Its founders were the four RPP rebels, who were soon to be joined by others.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, the DP lacked a clear manifesto for the elections. The Party was not sure where it stood in the political spectrum. However, it got a room in the Assembly building on 16 January 1946 and the *Yeni Asır* newspaper came out in support of the DP (Erer 1966:228-9,233; Karpat 1966:150-51; Tunaya 1952:646-7).

The Democrats regarded the formation of the DP as a turning point in Turkish democratic history. The Party envisaged that laws restricting private rights and freedoms should be amended in the Constitution. The election system was to be changed for a realisation of security of *'halkın arzusu'* (people's

¹⁰⁶ "A Kurdish People's Republic, with its capital in Mahabad, was proclaimed in Western Azerbaijan and the Communists intensified their efforts to kindle an irredentist movement among the Kurdish tribes of northern Iraq and Eastern Turkey. This hastened the deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations. The Soviet Government had terminated its 1925 treaty of friendship with Turkey in March 1945, and applied pressure for a revision of the Montreux Convention that would accord it military control over the Straits. The Soviet Union also demanded the return of Kars and Ardahan, provinces ceded to Turkey in 1918. Soviet pressure on Turkey sharpened, and by late 1946 Bulgarian and Greek Communists were actively stirring up trouble along Turkey's exposed frontier. These activities were instrumental in the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947." (Rubinstain 1960:206).

¹⁰⁷ Ahmet Emin Yalman suggested the name of the Party as "Demokrat Parti".

¹⁰⁸ The first resignation from the RPP and transfer to the DP was an İzmir deputy Celal Tunca.

desires) and *'milli irade'* (national will). The presidency of the Republic and the party chairpersonship were to be separated. These criteria were highly important for the progress of democracy. The DP warned the RPP that if they did not make the changes that the DP suggested, an undesirable situation could ensue. The Democrats criticized the RPP Government's policy on repression and the continuing restrictions on freedom of the individuals. Despite the fact that the RPP Governments suppressed religious-oriented policies and people, they were regarded by Democrats¹⁰⁹ as the Party that encouraged "*irtica*" (Islamist revivals), and were blamed for failing to gain membership of international bodies such as NATO (Burçak 1998:41; Çandır 2000:75-6; Karpata 1966:154-5; Tunaya 1952:649-53).

The DP's tasks as a political opposition party were not made any easier by the governing RPP. On 26 April 1946 the congress of the RPP, with the purpose of catching the new party before it was ready for a free and fair electoral contest, decided to bring forward the date of the elections which had previously been announced by İnönü for 1947. The general elections were to be held on 21 July 1946 and municipal elections were to be held on 1 May 1946 instead of September 1946 (Davison 1968:148; Dilipak 1990:98-9; Erer 1966:238-308; Karpata 1966:160).

There were only seven opposition deputies in the Assembly on 31 May 1946.¹¹⁰ The RPP had changed the election system, and some amendments of communal organisation and provincial administration were passed on 5 and 11 June 1946. The Democrats set out to build their own national organisation. The DP had organised itself in only 33 cities by 16 June

¹⁰⁹ Süleyman Uruç (Elazığ) and Reşat Güçlü (Seyhan).

¹¹⁰ Celal Bayar, Menderes, Koraltan, Köprülü, Cemil Tunca, Emin Sazak and Hikmet Bayur.

1946, but it announced its decision to participate in the 1946 elections because of the tremendous groundswell of support that arose in response to their call (Erer 1966:272-3; Karpaz 1966:152-9; Shaw & Shaw 1977:402-3). The DP organization was hardly able to match that of the RPP, which had an organic connection with the government and reached the people directly through its control of the People's Houses and People's Rooms (Turan 1980:30-36).

Some of the RPP members wanted to suppress the new party from the very beginning. İnönü defended its opposition and right to organise and pushed through amendments to the election laws to assure secrecy of the ballot. However, the Democrats found this would not be sufficient, since the government still controlled the election apparatus, ballot counting, the press and radio. Local public officials were also working as agents of the Republicans. The Democrats were under intense pressure by the RPP and the Government in the run up to the election (Dilipak 1990:102-3,106).

The National Election of 1946: Turkey experienced its first real election campaign in 1946, and there was a great deal of popular enthusiasm and participation. The Democrats quickly attracted the support of all the discontented groups in the country. Many of these groups were unable to agree with each other, particularly those people who complained about the continued inflation and the innumerable cases of bureaucratic tyranny and blundering that had taken place during the 23 years of RPP autocratic rule. *Ağas* (Notables) were not happy, people were not free to exercise their faith freely, villagers did not have enough arable land for farming, and minorities were not happy because of *Varlık Vergisi* (the Wealth Tax or the Capital Levy). The Democrats lacked time to develop a systematic program of their own beyond

simply promising to do better. They were helped by the support of Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (Çandır 2000:75; Davison 1968:147; Karpas 1966:166,169).¹¹¹

The DP decided to contest the general election but to boycott the municipal elections. On the July 21, 1946 the RPP won a landslide victory, gaining 395 seats in the Grand National Assembly compared with only 66 for the Democrats and 4 for independent candidates (Erer 1966:340). Nevertheless, the DP had surprising degrees of success in big cities such as İstanbul, where it won 18 out of 27 seats.¹¹² The RPP reaped the rewards of years of propaganda in the countryside as well as the longstanding tax concessions given to the rural population. There were a number of allegations of misuse of funds and official fraud during and after the election of 21 July. The DP continuously argued for an honest election, free of fear, to restore 'real national will'. The DP claimed that the election of 21 July 1946 was not democratic. There was government tyranny all over Turkey, local officials were used as the RPP agents in the towns, and people were persecuted if they did not accept

¹¹¹ Marshal Fevzi Çakmak (12.January.1876 – 10.April.1950) was born in İstanbul. He was the first Army Chief of Staff of new Turkish Republic. He fought in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Dardanelles and Palestine. He worked as the Minister of National Defense, and became a member of parliament representing Kozan province on 17 April 1920. He left politics and continued in the army until he was retired on 12 January 1944. He became independent deputy from İstanbul in 1946 and one of the founders of the Millet Partisi (Nation Party) on 20 July 1948. Çakmak became honourable president of the party. He was one of the last living heroes of the War of Independence, joined the DP because of anger over the government's decision to retire him in 1944 after 23 years of service, to give the army a younger and more energetic command. Çakmak was accepted to be a candidate for the DP because of the encouragement and strong support of university youth (Dilipak 1990:105; GKATSEBY 1987:130).

¹¹² For the full details of ballot result of İstanbul see (Erer 1966:319-21).

what the RPP authorities requested from them (Erer 1966:322-39; Şahingiray 1954:377-8; Karpat 1966:163-4).

The Coming of Democracy: Following the 21 July 1946 election, İnönü was re-elected to the Presidency, against Fevzi Çakmak, by 388 votes to 59 on 5 August 1946. The new Chairperson of the Grand National Assembly was General Kazım Karabekir Paşa, who defeated Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk by 379 votes to 58. Recep Peker, who was regarded as representing the authoritarian wing of the party, on 7 August 1946 formed the new RPP cabinet. The programme of the new Government was no different from that of the previous one. Peker renewed powers of control on 20 September, with amendments to the press law and penal code to stop criticism against abuses in the election by invoking martial law.

The RPP was more than just a political organisation for many of its members. It was a religion, their lives, the nation, and many of them used their positions to alter the election results, notwithstanding İnönü's orders to the contrary. Despite the DP accusations against the RPP Government, the latter adopted some rules and laws which helped the democratization of Turkey. On 19 September 1946 they amended the press law. All formalities were eased for an establishment of a newspaper. As a result, opposition voices were able to reach the people. Turkey now had a parliamentary opposition and an independent opposition press, which played important roles in the progress of democratization up to the next general election.

The struggle was a harsh one. Some constructive changes occurred through the rise of new and more liberal elements within the RPP itself. The DP continued to fight against the RPP for a democratic election. The Democrats now settled down to building

up their programme and organisation to compete more successfully in the next elections, scheduled for 1950. The DP leaders, Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar, stated in the Assembly on 2 July 1948 that judicial guarantees should be provided for free elections. There were a number of meetings and demonstrations organised by the DP in many different parts of Turkey during May, June and July 1948. As a result of this pressure from the DP, the election law was changed on 16 February 1950 (Kılçık 1991:301-12; Tunaya 1952:658-9).

It was a difficult four years, with the very existence of the opposition being under constant threat of suppression by the more authoritarian groups in the RPP. Recep Peker led those who strongly disliked the opposition's existence, yet he also introduced many liberal measures in attempts to steal the latter's thunder (Çandır 2000:79; Dilipak 1990:82; Tunaya 1952:579).

In addition, to stabilise economy and bring lower prices, wartime import restrictions were mostly lifted and much of the hard currency amassed during the war by sales of chrome and manganese was used to import capital and civilian consumer goods. The Turkish Lira (TL) was devalued on 7 September 1946, from a rate of 100 guruş (1TL) to 280 guruş (2.80TL) to the dollar, to fulfil the arrangements of the Bretton Woods international conference¹¹³ (Karpas 1966:172; Shaw & Shaw 1977:403). This resulted in a general price rise that alarmed and distressed the public. A number of the RPP partisans became rich in a short time through using the party machine and their influence. Merchants were making fortunes, and most of the imports were of luxury goods, which the nation

¹¹³ The conference stabilised and regularised currencies in the post-war Western world.

could ill afford in view of the need to develop its economy. Therefore, the RPP was regarded as an "individuals' party", whereas the DP was supported mostly by people suppressed under the RPP tyranny, and so the DP came to be seen as the "peoples' party" (Dilipak 1990:110-13; Erer 1966:359; Karpas 1966:170). This gave the DP an opportunity to enhance its reputation with attacks on the government's new economic policies. In the absence of a tradition of responsible opposition, the DP sometimes sought political advantage regardless of the actual issues. So relations between government and opposition deteriorated. Mutual accusations and recriminations in the Assembly and in the press continued. December 1946 was a particularly difficult month both for the RPP and the DP. On 5 December the Government renewed Martial Law for a further six months. Two deputies of the DP were ejected from membership of the Assembly by the vote of the RPP. On 14 December 1946, during the discussion of budget of 1947, Adnan Menderes criticised the Government's budget plan and Peker counter-attacked by calling Menderes a "syckopat" (psychopath) and "marazi" (mentally ill). Unfair criticisms by Peker led the DP deputies to boycott the Assembly. It took 14 days and a number of negotiations between leaders to persuade the DP deputies to return to the Assembly by 28 December 1946 (Erer 1966:371-3; Karpas 1966:170-74; Şahingiray 1954:377).

During this period the DP's first congress was held on 7 January 1947 in Ankara. There was overwhelming enthusiasm among the members of the DP. They elected their governing body and Celal Bayar became the leader of the Party by winning 541 of the 548 votes cast. The RPP had difficulty in accepting the opposition party and its congress. There were secret meetings within the RPP to try to stop the

DP's developments in many parts of the country. Prof. Dr. Kenan Öner (the DP's İstanbul Leader) accused the Education Minister, Hasan Ali Yücel, of supporting communist activities. Yücel took libel action against Öner, claiming that he had lied and that he had to be punished. But Yücel was found guilty and Education Ministry documents were found to have been burned. There were also demonstrations and small-scale riots. Several newspapers were suspended on 1 April 1947¹¹⁴ (Dilipak 1990:125-8; Erer 1966:401,407-9,424-9,451-2).

İnönü started to intervene in the situation as a kind of umpire in June 1947. He met jointly and separately with the premier and the DP leaders, for an exchange of opinions and grievances. İnönü met with Bayar 5 times, on 17, 19, 21, 23 and 27 June 1947 and on 7 July 1947. This produced the "*12 Temmuz Beyannemesi*" (July 12, Multi-Party Declaration), an extremely important milestone on the road towards democratisation in Turkey. İnönü's declaration stated that "*in the multi-party state, the President should be above politics, a non-partisan head of state, with equal duties to both parties*" (Çandır 2000:79; Dilipak 1990:87; Erer 1966:436-9; Karpat 1966:191-2). During these conversations, the government had accused the DP of sedition, while the DP had accused the government or some of its agents of oppression. İnönü found the first charge baseless, the second exaggerated. In any case, he had obtained assurances from both sides of good democratic behaviour. This declaration was a guarantee for the DP that they would not be suppressed by the

¹¹⁴ Tasvir (the Description) and Demokrasi (the Democracy) in İstanbul, Kuvvet (the Power) in Ankara, Yeni Asır (the New Century) and Demokrat İzmir (the Democrat İzmir) newspapers in İzmir.

Government. İnönü's action helped smooth the functioning of parliamentary government.

At the first DP general congress, some of the hard-line members and liberals started to disagree on the party's soft policy and on its similarities with the RPP's policies. In due course an opposition group emerged within the opposition party. At first the DP İstanbul branch leader, Prof. Dr. Kenan Öner, resigned stating that the DP had become a mere 'balance party' against the RPP and was not doing what it should be doing as an opposition party. He found the DP opposition too soft towards the RPP. Soon Öner was followed by others. Sadık Aldoğan¹¹⁵ and four of his friends¹¹⁶ were expelled from the Party on 19 March 1948. The next day Hazım Bozca resigned in protest and the number expellees rapidly increased.¹¹⁷ There were accusations by members of both parties that the DP and the RPP were working together behind the scenes. On 21 April 1948 a new group¹¹⁸ was formed which issued a declaration that they would not accept the dictation of the party founders. They were called the "*Müstakil Demokratlar Grubu*" (the Independent Democrats Group). This group united with the *Öz Demokratlar Partisi* (the Core Democrats Party) and with the *Millet Partisi* (the Nation Party or NP). On 20 July

¹¹⁵ Sadık Aldoğan was expelled from the Assembly for 15 days because of his strong opposition to the extension of Martial Law for a further 6 months on 20 May 1947.

¹¹⁶ Retired General Sadık Aldoğan, Necati Erdem, Dr. Mithat Sakaroğlu, Osman Nuri Köni and Ahmet Kemal Silivrili (Erer 1966:459; Karpaz 1966:216; Tunaya 1952:655).

¹¹⁷ Yusuf Kemal Tengirsenk, Emin Sazak, Enis Akaygen, Ahmet Oğuz, Hasan Dinçer and Ahmet Tahtakılıç (Erer 1966:460; Karpaz 1966:216; Tunaya 1952:655).

¹¹⁸ Ali Rıza Kırsever (Çanakkale), Asım Gürsü (Muğla), Ahmet Çınar (Burdur), Behcet Gökmen (Çanakkale), Bahaddin Öğütmen (Edirne), Fethi Erimcağ (Edirne), Haydar Aslan (İçel), Mehmet Öktem (Edirne), Şahin Lacin (Afyon) and Mehmet Askor (Afyon).

1948, *Millet Partisi* was formally constituted and headed by *Yusuf Hikmet Bayur*. The honorary President of the party was Fevzi Çakmak.¹¹⁹ The NP pushed the DP to adopt a rational party programme. The NP advocated Islam and criticized the DP and the RPP for not having a programme for the country's Muslim citizens. Following the NP's criticisms, the DP adopted policies favourable to practising Muslims¹²⁰ (Dilipak 1990:132-3; Tunaya 1952:656-7).

Some of the RPP members were against Recep Peker's policy. Peker wanted to learn who were the opponents to his policy within his party. On 26 August 1947 he assembled members of the party and insisted on a vote of confidence. Although he got 303 votes out of 334, 34 members¹²¹ declared that they were against Peker. The vote indicated that the ruling party was no longer united. On 3 September 1947, 6 ministers resigned, and on the next day, when the Prime Minister asked the party for authority to reconstruct

¹¹⁹ General secretary of the party was Ahmet Tahtakılıç, members were Enis Akaygen, Kenan Öner, Dr. Mustafa Kentli, Osman Bölükbaşı, Osman Nuri Köni, Tekin Erer and Sadık Aldoğan (Dilipak 1990:131; Erer 1966:466).

¹²⁰ The DP government closed the NP on 27 January 1954. The reason given for the closure was that the party was hiding secret aims to establish a religious-based state.

¹²¹ The 35 deputies were: 1- Ali Fuad Cebesoy, 2- Tahsin Banguoğlu, 3- Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, 4- Dr. Fahri Kurtuluş, 5- Prof. Nihat Erim, 6- İsmail Rüştü Aksal, 7- Vedat Dicleli, 8- Cavit Oral, 9- Said Odyak, 10- Muhtar Ertan, 11- Nazif Ergin, 12- Mahmut Nedim Gündüzalp, 13- Sinan Tekelioğlu, 14- Kasım Gülek, 15- Tezer Taşkıran, 16- Celal Sait Siren, 17- Hasan Şükrü Adal, 18- Kasım Ener, 19- Avni Refik Bekman, 20- Muhsin Adil Binal, 21- Şevket Raşit Hatiboğlu, 22- İhsan Hamit Tigrel, 23- Cevat Dursunoğlu, 24- Hilmi Öztarhan, 25- Ali Kemal Yiğitoğlu, 26- Sedat Çumralı, 27- Suut Kemal Yetkin, 28- Dr. Abdurrahman Melek, 29- Hilmi Hakkıoğlu, 30- Osman Ağan, 31- Kamil Kitapçı, 32- Bekir Kaleli, 33- Vehbi Sarıdal, 34- Memduh Şevket Esendal. They included İnönü among number, so they were called "Otuzbeşliler", (the thirty five).

the cabinet, the number of dissenters rose to 47, with the number of abstentions rising to nearly 100. Recep Peker's second cabinet, faced by determined opposition inside as well as outside the party, lasted only few days. Finally, President İnönü, with his new connections, particularly with the US,¹²² sought to support the liberalization of the regime regardless of the consequences for his own party. He felt that he had gained enough support internally and externally to force Peker to resign (Ahmad 1993:102-110; Karpat 1966:197-201).¹²³

Hasan Saka, who had been the Foreign Minister in Peker's cabinet, succeeded Peker. When the new cabinet program was under discussion in the Assembly, there were discussions on a single party system.¹²⁴ On 18 June 1948, however, a new Government program was ratified by 308 votes for to 40 against. Saka's new government continued in power until 16 January 1949 and worked to establish a true democratic system with equal treatment for all parties in return for respect for the basic institutions and ideals of the Republic. The tensions eased for a while in Turkey. Bayar and the opposition were happy with the new situation that was emerging (Erer 1966:465).

Hasan Saka resigned on 15 January 1949.¹²⁵ This came along with the encouragement of the

¹²² İnönü realized that, without democratization, his country would not be able to enter the Western club. He stated this on 29 May 1939, at the fifth Party Congress.

¹²³ In 1936, under Recep Peker, the RPP became less liberal and more collective. Atatürk forced him to resign before because of his policy (Özalp & Özalp 1992:63-4).

¹²⁴ Chiefism was suggested as a continuation of the single party system, one man domination, namely İnönü, as a permanent and unchangeable leader.

¹²⁵ From 9 September 1947 to 9 June 1948 was the first and from 10 June 1948 to 16 January 1949 was the second Saka cabinets.

otuzbeşliler. Professor Şemseddin Günaltay formed a new cabinet. In his Government (16 January 1949 – 22 May 1950) the liberal group within the RPP occupied an important position (Erer 1966:483-4). The new cabinet program was discussed on 24 January 1949. Behçet Kemal Çağlar¹²⁶ declared that he had resigned from his party and from his seat in the Assembly. He also criticized the RPP governments as being unsuccessful (Karpas 1966:230-35).

The press began to enjoy greater freedom of expression and criticism with the end of the martial law in December 1947. The cabinet of Prof. Şemseddin Günaltay announced a new policy on 23 January 1949: 'We shall take the rules of the Western democracies as our model... Freedom of conscience is sacred to us ...'. The next day the Prime Minister told the Assembly: 'I shall work sincerely to establish democracy... For the future of our country, this is the only method that I, as an historian, can be sure of... Demagogy leads to dissolution or dictatorship' (Karpas 1966:229-42; Lewis 1961:303).

In 1945, after the relaxation of censorship, a number of leftist publications appeared. The daily newspaper *Tan*, under the editorship of Zekeriya Sertel, and the pro-Soviet journals, the weekly *Görüşler* (Views) and the daily *Yeni Dünya* (New World), appeared on the streets. According to Lewis, however, pro-Russian sentiments had never attracted the Turks. Turkey raised Soviet hackles when it presented territorial demands in the Straits and in the north-eastern parts of Turkey. In December 1945, leftist newspapers and bookshops were attacked. Few Turks had sympathy for the Communists in Turkey. Turkey turned its back on the Russians and looked for

¹²⁶ Behçet Kemal Çağlar was a poet and writer and, an influential personality in the RPP.

friends in the Western world. Turkey started flirting with the US when it could not see sufficient interest from the UK, France and Germany (Armaoğlu 1988:47-8; Koçak 1991:17-9; Lewis 1961:303).

A number of new parties were formed in 1946, including some left-wing parties, but none of them was successful. They included the Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi*), founded 20 June 1946 and led by a veteran Communist. The party was closed on 1 December 1946. The party leader was arrested. Pro-Communist newspapers and unions were banned. Other parties were established in the later 1940s.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ The new parties were Milli Kalkınma Partisi (the National Development Party) 18 June 1945, Sosyal Adalet Partisi (the Social Justice Party) 28 February 1946, Liberal Demokrat Parti (the Liberal Democrat Party) 11 March 1946, Çiftçi ve Köylü Partisi (the Farmers' and Peasants' Party) 24 April 1946, Türk Sosyal Demokrat Partisi (the Turkish Social Democrat Party) 26 April 1946, Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi (the Turkish Socialist Party) 14 May 1946, Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Partisi (the Turkish Workers and Farmers Party) 17 June 1946, Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi (the Turkish Socialist Labour and Peasant Party) 20 June 1946, Yalnız Vatan İçin Partisi (the Only for the Fatherland Party) 21 June 1946, Arıtma ve Koruma Partisi (the Cleaning and Preserving Party) 26 June 1946, İslam Koruma Partisi (the Party for the Defence of Islam) 19 July 1946 – 12 September 1946, Yurt Görevi Partisi (the Fatherland Duty Party) 15 August 1946, İdealist Parti (the Idealist Party) 10 January 1947, Türk Muhafazakar Partisi (the Turkish Conservative Party) 8 July 1947, Türkiye Yükselme Partisi (the Turkish Progressive Party) 3 July 1948, Millet Partisi (the Nation Party) 20 July 1948, Öz Demokrat Partisi (the True Democrat Party) 8 August 1948- 5 July 1949, Serbest Demokrat Partisi (the Free Democrat Party) 9 August 1948, Müstakil Türk Sosyalist Partisi (the Independent Turkish Socialist Party) 9 September 1949, Toprak Emlak ve Serbest Teşebbüs Partisi (the Land, Building Owners and Free Enterprise Party) 30 September 1949, Müstakiller Birliği Partisi (the Union of Independents Party) 5 April 1950. See for the full list of the parties established from 1814 to 1952 in Erer 1966; Karpas 1966; Tunaya 1952 which is added to the appendix.

The Government enjoyed general support while repression of Communist activities and ideas continued. However, the new and potent force of public opinion forced the Government not to restrict the freedom of the press (Dilipak 1990:136-7; Lewis 1961:303-4; Shaw & Shaw 1977:403).

The Democrats' Struggle For Survival: Towards the end of the 1940s the RPP was also liberalised. Gradually, the People's Houses (*Halk evleri*) were re-invented as cultural centres for general public use rather than as party centres.¹²⁸ Although İnönü remained formally the RPP party chairman, actual direction was turned over to the vice-chairman, to begin the process of separating the party from the presidential office. The RPP council, formerly restricted to the close associates of the president and the Prime Minister, now was elected by (and from among) all members, and it in turn elected the secretary general as well as the Central Executive Committee. Delegates to the RPP conventions were now chosen by local organisations instead of by the central secretariat. Divisions between conservatives and liberals in the party continued, but, as public opinion became more important, the popular representatives' influence grew. For the first time the RPP began to act as if it had to win popular approval to retain its ruling position, rather than simply being the passive agent of an autocratic president (Dilipak 1990:139; Karpas 1966:230-40,349-86). This was the

¹²⁸ In 1946 there were 4,521; in 1950 there was a total of 478 People's Houses and 4,322 People's Rooms. People's Rooms were established in villages and towns. They had the following branches of activity: language and literature, fine arts, drama, sports, social assistance, adult education, library and publication, village welfare, museum and cultural exhibits. On November 26, 1951 they became the property of the Treasury (Karpas 1966:381 footnote:81).

result of opposition and rivalries within the Party as well as the existence of the DP.

On the other hand, the existence of the Nation Party and the liberalisation of the RPP finally forced the DP to define its political programme. The new political situation in Turkey pressed the government to turn the election machinery over to the judiciary, demanded increased political and economic freedom, and called for the use of American assistance to help raise living standards rather than build up the armed forces. For the realization of above situation the RPP installed the new Şemseddin Günaltay government in 1949. The new government promised free elections, optional classes on religion in elementary schools (4th and 5th years, for 2 hours per week), ten-month-long religious courses, *İmam-Hatip Okulları* (School for Muslim Priests), creation of a *İlahiyat Fakültesi* (Faculty of Divinity) in Ankara, encouragement of private enterprise, tax reforms, and economic projects to help the masses. Some of these policies applied by the RPP had been advocated for some time by the opposition parties (Dodd 1969:45; Karpat 1966:280-3; Shaw & Shaw 1977:404).

The Westernization programme intensified with the encouragement of the West during 1948-50. The Turkish Foreign Minister attended the opening of NATO on 15 - 16 March 1948 and gained the favour of the organization. Turkey joined OEEC on 16 April 1948. In July 1948 Turkey and the USA made an agreement on trade relations. The Marshall Plan (ERP) organiser in Europe, Averell Harriman, stated that "Turkey's natural resources are important not only for Turkey but America and all Europe." During this intensive external relations Turkey hosted several officials of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Turkey formally recognised Israel on 28 March 1948. On 8 August 1949 Turkey joined to the Council

of Europe (Dilipak 1990:141-2,150).¹²⁹ The West supported the Turkish government policies in order to bring Turkey on their side for better use in their own interests. The RPP Governments continued previous policies of Westernization and hence pursued democratization on the Western model.

All these steps were taken to satisfy both internal and external pressures.¹³⁰ Turkey had already decided the direction of her policy since the late Osmanlı periods and Atatürk's time. However, having been alienated and antagonized by Soviet Russia, Turkey now turned her face totally towards the West. The rest of this chapter will examine the Turkish democratization process and developments under the Democrats during the 1950s.

DEMOCRATIZATION UNDER THE DEMOCRATS

The Elections of 1950: Liberalization was continued for the many political reasons mentioned above. The new laws relating to elections limited the Government's ability to suppress the opposition and

¹²⁹ \$61,700,000 American aid was received by Turkey through the Marshall Plan by 1 September 1949.

¹³⁰ "American military and economic aid profoundly affected Turkey's whole political life. It played a considerable part in shaping political parties' views on foreign affairs. It was indirectly responsible for the government's efforts to re-adjust the political system to democracy... Close relations with the English-speaking world also prompted some suggestions that the Turkish multi-party system be based on the model of the English-speaking world, namely, a political system based on two major political parties which would successively hold government office" (Karpas 1966:337). Similar argument was made by the RPP leader Deniz Baykal in 1999 election campaign. He wanted stabilise "democratic western" Turkey as in the present example and the system in use in British politics (two major parties) in order to exclude extremists (and of course their voices and arguments) from the parliament.

enabled all parties to campaign on diverse issues. The RPP promised to modify the rigours of statism, stimulate private enterprise, increase agricultural credit, encourage foreign capital, provide tax reforms, and limit inflation. It also offered to create a Senate to curb the majority in the Assembly and to eliminate the six principles of Kemalism from the Constitution, though they were to remain part of the party's own objectives. The RPP now became one of three competing political parties and tried to offer what the masses wanted: more schools, credit, farm equipment, seed and water in the countryside; houses, roads, telephones, and electricity in the towns. The Democrats continued to concentrate on criticizing the RPP's totalitarianism. In addition, they demanded an end to government monopolies, encouragement of private enterprise, a balanced budget, and tax reduction, in order to solve the nation's economic problems. They also promised to make the Assembly, the executive, and the judiciary equal, on the American model, to establish a more liberal democracy. The NP continued to stress a more conservative and religious approach, though its campaign for free enterprise had largely been taken over by the Democrats. The Democrats declared that they would not participate in any election unless the existing election law was changed. The Günaltay government presented a new election law on 17 December 1949. The DP was happy with it and regarded it as a victory. Menderes stated "*this is the Sakarya Battle of democracy*"¹³¹ (Dilipak 1990:150; Tunaya 1952:661). It was, indeed, a milestone on the road to Turkish democracy process.

¹³¹ The Sakarya Battle was won against the Greeks during the War of Independence. With the battle Turkish retreat was stopped and Turkish advance started again. Therefore this battle was the turning point of the Turks.

The election contest of 1950 was far more regular and secure than that of 1946. There was no interference with the opposition, enabling the Democrats in particular to organise in the villages for the first time and receive support from all those who had built up grievances during the long years of RPP autocratic rule. Peasants wanted more land, landowners hoped for fewer restrictions, workers demanded more welfare laws and higher wages, employers wanted more freedom from government control, and intellectuals demanded full freedom. All saw what they wanted to see in the Democratic platform. The new election law passed in the Assembly on 17 December 1949 helped to end of the RPP rule and allowed the coming to power of the DP (Karpas 1966:241).

The election of 14 May 1950 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the DP opposition over the government. The results of the elections astonished even the Democrats. With 89.3 per cent of the voters going to the polls, Democratic candidates received 53.3 per cent of the vote, the RPP only 39.9 per cent, the Nation Party 3.0 per cent and various independents 3.8 per cent. Under the electoral system in use, the majority party received all the seats in each province. The Democrats won 86.2 per cent of the seats (396) to only 12.9 per cent (68) for the RPP. Independents won 7 seats while the NP gained only 1 seat (Karpas 1966:241; Sarıbay 1991:121).¹³²

¹³² Different numbers were given for the deputies of the parties' number. Tunaya wrote in his book that the number given to him by the TGNA general secretary (Katibi) Refet Sezen was 411. However, he stated that the number was 410 (Tunaya 1952:660). Sarıbay wrote in his article as the DP got 434, the RPP 52. However, these numbers should be adjusted after election of September 16, 1951 to: the DP 411, the RPP 61, the Independents 12, the NP 1, and 2 vacant. See for further information Karpas 1966:241 esp. footnote 78.

Adnan Menderes formed the new Government on 22 May 1950. The cabinet consisted of politicians, bureaucrats and academics. They were respected persons in their fields, with some exceptions. They were aiming to work hard “*halk yararına halk için*” (for the benefit of people). They started to amend the laws relating to one-party rule. They established an even closer relationship with press than the RPP (Arcayürek 1983:45; Davison 1968:149; Erer 1966:523-4).

The victory of the DP has been attributed to many factors, including American and Western European influence, better organization, and even a bad harvest in 1949, but the main reason seems to have been simply the accumulated frustrations and hostilities of 27 years of RPP rule. However, the Western powers’ economic and political influence¹³³ on Turkey’s internal and external relations would not have been lessened if the RPP rule had continued, because of the increasingly close relationship with the West. The national orientation towards the West and the democratization requirements of the Western countries from non-democratic countries were among the factors behind Turkish democratization during the RPP and the DP governments (Karpas 1966:240-42; Yetkin 1983:225-41; Tunaya 1952:661-2). Whatever the cause had been, it was a revolution in Turkish political life. The party that had won the nation's independence and guided its destinies without opposition for a quarter-century had been voted out of office, and it turned over its power without real protest. As a matter of fact, a few of its die-hard members still hoped to retain office, perhaps through

¹³³ Through the UN charters, the Truman Doctrine and the European Recovery Plan (the Marshall Plan).

army intervention.¹³⁴ İnönü used his great prestige to make certain that this did not happen at the time. He insisted on accepting the 'will of the people' and thus establishing the basis for the kind of democratic regime that he and Atatürk had long hoped for. Power had changed hands peacefully, according to the 'national will', as the Democrats said. This was democracy in form and spirit and the culmination of an era of reforms and achievements (Apuhan 1996:92-3).

The RPP had not expected such a big defeat. However, this was a momentous event, without any precedent in the history of the country and the region. It bore remarkable testimony to the constructive work of the RPP regime and to the political maturing of the Turkish people under its aegis. Whether they wanted it or not, the electoral defeat of the RPP was its greatest achievement, "a second revolution", complementing and completing the earlier revolutions out of which the Party itself had sprung on the road to democracy (Arcayürek 1983:63-4; Burçak 1998:45; Sarıbay 1991:122-3).

The political revolution of 1950 gave expression to the fact that Turkish society had changed considerably. The new deputies in the new assembly consisted of professional men, lawyers, and businessmen. The percentage of deputies with official, bureaucratic or military backgrounds was much reduced (Davison 1968:150). The DP now was going to show how democracy could be exercised. They had

¹³⁴ Although it was difficult to find the authentic document. However, certain rumors of some army officers for an intervention and they offered their services to İnönü to enable him to stay in power and continue Atatürk's principle and complete the revolution and reforms. It seems İnönü preserved this connections with some army officers throughout years. And he did not hesitate when the time risen to use it (İnönü 1968:314-7; Karpaz 1966:242)

worked for it so long, and now it was their turn to practice it. They had to make good the weaknesses of 27 years of RPP autocratic rule. So, did they do what they looked and hoped for, as they had argued since 1946 while they were in opposition against the RPP governments?

The Democrats After the 1950: By 1950, the RPP had become much more liberal than it was previously. In opposition, it had greater opportunity to develop this new side of its personality, especially after 1954, when the DP governments became more authoritarian - indeed, as the RPP used to be.

The RPP criticized the DP on several counts: "1- The DP Government's repression was no different than dictatorial rule. 2- The political situation was not suitable for the growth or survival of opposition parties. 3- The Government established a system to give jobs to its partisans. 4- Citizens of Turkey were in danger under the DP's understanding of democracy, justice and order. 5- Election laws were made unjustly for the DP. 6- The Government did not debate foreign policy issues in the Assembly and took crucial decisions without consulting opposition parties" (Tunaya 1952:566-7).

By contrast with the RPP's newfound liberalism, the DP became more authoritarian. The style of its authoritarianism was not exactly Atatürkist (Sarıbay 1991:123-4). The DP initiatives were encouraged not by the intelligentsia but by other middle and upper-class elements, the landowners, business entrepreneurs and merchants. They did not seek blatantly to impose their class domination on the lowly, the poorer peasants and workers. They worked with them, wooing them with promises, partly kept, of economic betterment, greater religious freedom and a lighter and more responsive administration. In their use of landowners, richer peasants and entrepreneurs

of various kinds, they seemed to find a leadership that at local levels could really speak to the uneducated masses. They did not preach and try to force the masses into new ways obnoxious to them. There is no evidence to suppose that peasant or workers had developed antagonisms towards the more prosperous elements of the DP (Çandır 2000:75; Sarıbay 1991:124). In this respect they reaped the benefits of the populism of the Atatürk era, the refusal to countenance any division of society along socio-economic lines, which limited the dissemination of leftist doctrines. The DP's authoritarianism was directed towards its political opponents as they learned from the RPP governments. The RPP criticized the DP's autocratic exercise of power and did not see as 'normal' what they had done in the past 27 years of rule (Tunaya 1952:566-7). One similarity between the DP and the RPP was their disinclination to tolerate internal and external criticism. Both parties practised what they had experienced. The legacy of the single-party period continued to affect the orientation of the DP hierarchy, just as the RPP was affected by legacies of the late Osmanlı periods' parties (Arcayürek 1983:62-3; Dilipak 1990:172; Sarıbay 1991:127). Despite the fact that Turkish officials adopted Western institutions and democracy under pressure from the Western powers, the West did not seriously monitor what happened in Turkey. Western countries did not criticize either party's tendencies towards single party rule in Turkey so long as the outcomes served their interests.

The Democrat Era (1950-1960): On May 29, 1950, the new Assembly elected Celal Bayar as the third President of Turkey with 387 votes, against 66 for İnönü. Adnan Menderes was confirmed as Prime Minister, and Fuad Köprülü as the Foreign Minister. The three leaders represented respectively the old

guard civil servants, the new middle class, and the intellectuals. There was a sufficient majority in the Assembly to achieve all the Democrats' promises and, with strong American economic and military support, the new government seemed to have a promising future. Real power and leadership went to the Prime Minister, Menderes, instead of to the President, thus presaging a regime in which the government would, indeed, appear to be held responsible to the people through their representatives. Menderes formed his first cabinet, which was in favour of the party's Westernization programme. However, the achievement of real democracy and Westernization was not quite that simple. Three major problems rose to bedevil the government and create tremendous hostility between the DP and the RPP. The DP eventually became the same kind of autocracy that it had so strongly criticized in the past (Dilipak 1990:172). The Democrats promised rapid economic growth accompanied and mainly achieved by a relaxation of the stringent controls of the etatist policies of the past and by encouragement of private enterprise. The DP also sought to gain influence among the ever-lessening group of religious conservatives. The "religious revival" gave Turkish youth an idea of their faith by providing them with historical perspective as well as spiritual guidance in a period of rapid change. Government supports for religion soon became a political issue for the RPP. The Government policy provided the RPP with an emotional appeal and brought accusations of abandonment of the secularist principles of the Republic, even though in practice the policies of the two parties on religion did not differ fundamentally from one another (Shaw & Shaw 1977:409; Dilipak 1990:160; Sarıbay 1991:124-5).

Another problem in the end that destroyed the Democratic regime and threatened to disrupt the entire progression of Turkey was the limited understanding of democracy and political freedom. Both parties, the DP and the RPP, really did not understand how to oppose one another responsibly or to accept opposition tolerantly. The opposition used provocation while the Government resorted to repression. The result was often harsh RPP criticism of the DP government's economic and religious policies, to which the Democrats became excessively sensitive and responded by suppressing the opposition (Arcayürek 1983:67-9; Çandır 2000:83).

The DP moved to satisfy rural areas and less developed regions with new roads, irrigation, electricity, buildings, schools, and hospitals in the smaller towns and villages, while the big cities struggled vainly to keep up with their rapidly rising populations. Land distribution increased from 389,212 acres given to 8,359 families in 1949 to an average of 2 million acres distributed to 45,000 families yearly until 1956, and then about 1.3 million acres yearly until 1960. Farmers benefited from 50,000 tractors distributed annually, a tremendous expansion of credit co-operatives, and a vast rural electrification program. Most city workers, shopkeepers, small factory owners, providers of services, and other residents of the growing towns also were enjoying much higher standards of living than before, and they appreciated what they received. Inflation and shortages antagonized the intellectuals¹³⁵ and civil

¹³⁵ The University Law of 1946 had organised the universities according to the German system. In the system with a small number of institutes and professorial chairs and many assistants forced to serve under professors with low rates of pay for many years until vacancies arose. Since there were no retirement laws and pensions were poor in comparison with salaries, few left their

servants with relatively fixed incomes, but the masses had "never had it so good" and the government prospered. New roads were built throughout the country. The road network grew from 47,480 km in 1950 to 61,542 km in 1960, and the asphalt road network rose to 6,880 km. Concrete bridges rose from 606 to 1542. The total numbers of motor vehicles rose from 32,564 to 114,208. There were 28,599 cars, 15,782 with private number plates, taxis 10,508 official cars 2,309, trucks 30,250 and motorbikes 6,671, in Turkey at the beginning of 1956 (Arcayürek 1983:65; Dilipak 1991:215). An American expert's report stated that "if Turkey would build roads, the economy could rapidly expand", and the Menderes Government acted accordingly. They built roads and bridges. Railways were modernized. New factories were established, and air connections were intensified (Arcayürek 1983:65-7). The prosperity among the people made it possible for Turkish people to visit and learn about other cities as well as other countries. Western products abounded in the markets. Consequently, Turks started to learn about Westerners once again through their products. Along with the Western products, Western influence started to appear among the rural citizens of Turkey.

The entrance of Turkey to NATO further affected Turkish relations with the West. Relations between Turkey and America got closer than ever before. The United States generally supported the Menderes governments. New foreign credits were received and the national debt increased (Arcayürek 1983:176-8). There were some deputies who were not happy with the way that Menderes ran the Government, which

chairs until they died. With unhappy and poorly paid junior faculty members forming factions in consequence, many of them turned to politics. The DP Government knew their strength, thus they changed the Law and tried to stop their entrance to politics.

they regarded as a “dictatorship” and as “single man government” (Arcayürek 1983:263-4; Dilipak 1990:196-8).

The year of 1955 was full of international political comings and goings in Ankara. Menderes visited Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. There were Turkish trade and cultural agreements with Italy, Germany and Bulgaria. The Baghdad pact was signed with several Muslim-populated countries, with the encouragement of the US and Britain. There was an agreement with Greece on cleaning the Meriç River. Turkey turned her face towards the West and largely ignored most Arab countries and Russia. The expanded relations with the West were the result of Turkey’s previous Westernization and democratization policies as well as the Western powers’ interests in Turkey.

Turkey’s internal affairs affected her external relations. The opposition increased the intensity of its criticism and the government suppressed all kinds of opposition. Criticism increased within the DP as well as outside. Menderes started to feel that he had to ‘nationalize’ his foreign policy in the second half of the 1950s. Consequently, during the last quarter of the 1950s Menderes’ erstwhile Western friends started to follow a cooler policy towards his government and his expectations were not realized. In Salonica on the September 6, 1955 Atatürk’s former home was bombed. This incident created a lot of unrest in İstanbul; Greek speaking Turkish citizens’ properties were attacked and the government tried to stop this by arresting 2,135 people. The DP Government was criticized in both Turkey and Greece. The Interior Minister, Dr. Namık Gedik, resigned. The government made an effort to show its protection over non-Turkish speaking citizens by arresting those who might be responsible for the incident. However, this helped the government to dominate its opponents. Riots erupted

as a result of the deteriorating economic conditions of the people (Burçak 1998:313-24; Karpas 1966:422).

Foreign investments in Turkey were welcomed by the government as a means of promoting development in Turkey, but the opposition regarded this as the DP government offering Turkey too cheaply to foreigners. Cihad Baban and the Minister of Finance Nedim Ökmen resigned from the DP. Academics resigned from their posts because of government attitudes towards academics.¹³⁶ The Oppositions presented a joint memorandum to the government on 4 September 1957¹³⁷ (Burçak 1998:448-51). The political tumult once again was very intense. The political parties seized upon any incident or development and exploited it for their own political advantage without thinking about the consequences of their behaviour. The governing party was presenting foreign investment as good and necessary for economy, while the RPP presented it completely to the contrary. Foreign aid, Government agreements with foreign countries, and the joining of international and regional bodies were interpreted both positively and negatively, depending on whether the commentator were in government or in opposition.

The Election of 1957: As a result of massive investments, an economic boom took place during the 1951-1953. The resultant social well-being greatly favoured the DP and it easily won the 1954 election.

¹³⁶ Turan Feyzioğlu, Assoc. Prof. Muammer Aksoy, Assoc. Prof. Aydın Yalçın, Assoc. Prof. Münci Kapani and Research Assistant Şerif Mardin.

¹³⁷ These were: 1- The Parliament will work as composer of new assembly and within 6 months they will decide which regime will be followed after this, the assembly will be dissolved. 2- Proportional system will be accepted. 3- The Senate system will be accepted. 4- The right to strike will be accepted. 5- All rights and freedoms will be under guarantee of the constitutional law (Dilipak 1990:227).

However, the DP overlooked the consolidation of the multi-party system and democracy which it had aimed for so long. The difficulties started after the election and grew as time went on. The Assembly controlled by the Democrats dissolved itself on 11 September 1957, after having voted to hold new the elections on October 27, 1957. The DP was well prepared for this well timed election.

Table 1: Turkish general election results for the Assembly, 1946-1961.

Party	1946	1950	1954	1957	1961
RPP Votes		3,165,096	3,675,000	4,758,000	3,724,752
% of vote		39.9	34.8	40.6	36.7
Seats	395	68	31	186	173
DP & JP* Vot.		4,242,831	5,314,000	4,407,000	3,527,435*
% of vote		53.3	56.6	47.3	34.8*
Seats	64	396	505	424	158*
NP Votes	-	240,209	-	-	-
% of vote		3.1	-	-	-
Seats		1	5	4	-
FP Votes	-	-	-	4	-
Independents	-	258,698		-	-
Seats		7	1		
NTP Votes	-	-	-	-	1,391,934
% of vote					13.7
Seats					65
RPNP Votes	-	-	434,085	-	1,415,390
% of vote			4.8		14.0
Seats			-		54
Total Registered		8,905,576	10,262,063	11,500,000	12,924,395
Number v.		7,953,055	9,095,617	9,140,000	10,522,716
Per cent v.		89.3	88.6	79.4	81.0
Total Seats	459	487	542	610	610
Source: Burçak 1998:40-49,190-214,502; Hale 1994:343; Karpat 1966:241,429; Shaw&Shaw 1977:405-6.					

*JP (Justice Party) was a major successor to the DP.

The election took place in a rather tense atmosphere. İnönü's and the RPP's past records were attacked by the DP. The DP emerged victorious with 47.3 per cent of the votes. The RPP got 40.6, with 7.0

per cent for the RNP and 3.85 for the FP. The DP got a higher percentage of the seats than their share of the popular vote warranted because of the district representation rule, 70 per cent (424 seats out of 610), while the RPP increased to 29 per cent (186 seats) and the NP to 6.¹³⁸ The FP failed to win a single seat and soon merged with the RPP (Burçak 1998:475-507; Çandır 2000:85-6; Dodd 1969,47; Lewis 1961:288).

Figure 2: Turkish general election results for the Assembly, 1946-1961.



*The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA).

The election results only contributed to further political tumult. The RPP, thirsty for victory, stepped up the violence and frequency of its attacks on Menderes and his associates. The government retaliated by continued acts of repression. Violence mounted in and out of the Assembly. İnönü was attacked in May 1959 by a pro-Democratic mob while travelling in the countryside and again on his return to İstanbul. More incidents followed, with the government forbidding the press from publishing

¹³⁸ According to Burçak the parties received seats in the parliament as DP 408, RPP 173, NP 4 and FP 4 (Burçak 1998:502).

news of these incidents. The economic situation worsened. The government's insistence on continued industrialization and rapid capital improvement added to the inflation and brought the nation to the edge of international bankruptcy (Burçak 1998:614-5; Dilipak 1990:242; Shaw & Shaw 1977:412). While the economic situation was getting worse internally, there were political successes in foreign policy, but these gave little relief to the DP.¹³⁹

Furthermore, in 1960 the government was forced to accept an economic-stabilization program to reduce inflation and restore monetary order. With the help of the IMF a new program was worked out. It involved severe restrictions on deficit financing and credit expansion, devaluation of the Turkish lira, consolidation of the public debt, an end to price controls, and a more rational program of internal investment. For a while inflation was reduced, the budget and foreign trade again were in surplus, and the crisis seemed to be over. But neither the government nor the opposition was satisfied. The Democrats' basic philosophy remained strongly expansionist, and they soon attempted to evade the programme that had been forced upon them, particularly since reduced capital expenditures were causing discontent among their supporters both in the countryside and the towns. The RPP also was unhappy with a situation that threatened to deprive it of the electoral victory for which it had aimed for so long, and it sought out new ways of opposing the government.

¹³⁹ There was an agreement on Cyprus on 11 February 1959 in Zurich. On 17 February 1959 Menderes' air flight crashed in London but he survived and signed the Agreement on Cyprus in hospital. NATO's ballistic missiles were stationed in Turkey. The Baghdad Pact transformed into the CENTO and Ankara became headquarter. Trade relations resumed with Germany.

The Economic, Social and Political Situation During the RPP and DP Eras: Turkey was a country of 855,000 km squares (300,000 square miles), larger than the combined area of Great Britain and France. Its main primary resources were land, agriculture and timber. Nearly three-fourths of the population, scattered across the country in villages and in towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants each, were engaged in agricultural pursuits. The agricultural product had grown but much of this gain was cancelled out by population increase. The 1923 census recorded 12,475,000, inhabitants the 1927 census reported 13,648,000, the 1940 census recorded 17,723,000, the 1960 census counted 27,755,000, and in 1965 there were 31,391,000 (Çelebi 2000:73). From 1950 to 1960 the population growth rate was nearly three per cent a year. In 1966 the government embarked on a wide-ranging birth control program (Davison 1968:164; Türkeş 1996:62).¹⁴⁰

The Second World War had had profound effects on Turkey's domestic, political and economic situation. Turkey's severe economic strains, and the increased scale and severity of government intervention, as in many other states in wartime, made the Government more authoritarian in political and economic life. The National Defence Law approved on 18 January 1940 gave the government extensive emergency economic powers. A second five-year plan was launched in 1939. The high rate of military expenditure and the shortage of raw materials adversely affected even agricultural production (Lewis 1961:290). The situation was particularly rough for those who lived in rural areas. Merchants who dealt with exports gained more than other working people in wartime.

¹⁴⁰ Alparslan Türkeş was against birth control program.

Turkish products with a high demand in the West were sold at inflated international prices. Chrome exports brought in large amounts of hard currency. High levels of government expenditure and shortages of essential commodities led to considerable internal inflationary pressure. The international trade of Turkey fell, and the cost of living index rose to over three times its 1938 level by 1943. Some articles, such as shoes, were over five times more expensive. Merchants, black marketers and brokers made great fortunes and profits, and the absence of effective tax assessment and collection exempted them from taxation or control by the government. Those on fixed incomes suffered (Lewis 1961:291).

The Government decided on emergency fiscal measures, including a capital levy. Such a levy, in a country going through an economic and financial crisis, was both normal and justifiable as a means of collecting revenue and as an instrument of control over the national economy. The state was faced with greatly increased military expenditures despite its neutrality. In this situation and because of inadequate tax revenues, a capital levy (Davison 1968:146; Erdemir 1999:194)¹⁴¹ was imposed and approved by the Assembly on 11 November 1942, and came into force next day.

There were two groups who made particularly large profits from the war. One was the large farmers, who profited enormously from the rise in agricultural prices. The second was the merchants and middlemen of İstanbul, who exploited both the high value of Turkish exports and the desperate shortage of necessary imports. The farmers consisted almost entirely of Muslim Turks; the merchants were

¹⁴¹ See detail further information on Cizye or Capital tax Erdemir 1999:191-200.

largely members of the three minority communities the Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. The main beneficiaries from the war were the minorities; while they got richer, most member of the nation got poorer (Karabekir 1994,139-145; Lewis 1961:291).

In June 1943 it was announced that the capital levy would be wound up by 31 July, and that persons who had not paid by that date would be deported to labour camps. The Prime Minister, in a speech to the RPP congress on 15 June 1943 said: “105 million Turkish liras out of the 270 millions of tax has been collected so far. This has mostly been paid by members of the minorities and foreigners, but this is reasonable since they had all the real estate and sources of wealth in their hands”. On 15 March 1944 a law was passed in the Assembly releasing all the defaulters still detained and cancelling all amounts still unpaid. The receipts from the tax amounted to 314,920,940 Turkish liras (£28 million). This was 74.11 per cent of the total amount demanded. This tax has been criticized by some scholars, for the “nationalistic” and rather tough application of the tax. However, they note that some European countries had done the same or even more severe examples of the kind (Lewis 1961:293-5; Yetkin 1983:203-15).

Turkey was caught in dilemmas and political conflicts, having to choose between fascist, communist, etatist, or liberal democratic orientations for a system to follow. The course of the Second World War drew Turkey closer to the liberal democratic West, whether willingly or unwillingly. Turkey adopted a policy of abandoning all alignments other than those related to Westernization. This Westernization policy was chosen and pursued by the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a continuation of previous Osmanlı Westernization drives (Lewis 1961:296). The

successors of Mustafa Kemal followed on the same path towards the West. However, there were other internal and external factors driving politicians to continue the same policy. The policy was the requirement of the time, Turkey's location, and the desires of the Turkish governing elites. In short, these were geo-strategic, geo-cultural, geo-economic, geo-political and contemporary age requirements of Turkey (Davutoğlu 2001:10-15). Governments used internal matters to achieve their foreign policy goals from time to time. In May 1944 demonstrations by students in Ankara led to the investigation by the police of pan-Turanian groups, who were accused of holding fascist and racist ideas. Students and some officers were accused of aspiring to overthrow the regime and the Constitution, and to establish a government that would bring Turkey into the war on the side of Germany. After the speech of President İsmet İnönü on the 19 May 1944 in Ankara, arrests of pro-German nationalists and pan-Turanians were started (Turgut 1995:34). The trial and condemnation of the pan-Turanians in September 1944 was also an obvious attempt to placate the Soviet Union. However, it failed in its purpose, as it did not stop the presentation of a series of demands by Russia from Turkey over certain Turkish territories. Similar attempts were made by the DP Governments to placate Western countries. Some people believe that incidents of this sort were prepared from time to time in order to manipulate internal as well as external situations and fears.

Turkey was not left alone to remain neutral in her highly crucial strategic location. There were pressures by both Westerners and Easterners in order to get Turkey on their side. Soviet Russia tried to establish so-called "friendly relations" with Turkey in order to include her in its bloc. The United States, with the

encouragement of the United Kingdom, supported Turkey during the Second World War and after, first against Germany then against the USSR. The pressure of expectations of Westerners affected the decision of Turkish rulers to democratize Turkey. Consequently, further Westernization took place. While economic relations developed between Turkey and the Western countries, political ties also increased. Turkey had a relatively good period under the DP governments and enjoyed good relations with Western creditors (Gürün 1994:93-96).

Years of Westernization and democratization had influenced Turkish popular opinion as well as expectations. Economic, politic, social and cultural relations with the West affected popular opinions of the West positively. Nevertheless, the governments' intensive work to gain the Turkish people a Western identity was not welcomed or accepted by everyone. The official policies of the Republican and Democrat governments were decisive factors in popular decisions to move Westwards, i.e. in the direction already chosen by the State. The following pages will examine the economic and social motives of Turkish migration with a brief study of Turkey's economic situation.

Conclusion: The Western-style parliamentary system was chosen for the new Turkish Republic polity which affected the destiny of the country and its relations with neighbouring countries. Mustafa Kemal and his Western-minded friends' policies were codified under the six principles (Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Revolutionism and Secularism) known as 'Kemalism' or 'Atatürkçülük' which managed to take control of the new state (Aydemir 1968:33-8; Atatürk 1987:910-32; Kinross 1978:429-40).

Traditional 'balanced policy' of the Osmanlı administration in international relations leaned

towards the West with the realisation of the new Turkish Republic in a Westernized mode, replacing centuries-old institutions with Western counterparts. Legislative gaps were filled by borrowing laws from European countries, without making substantial changes. A number of religious establishments were eliminated in the course of further secularisation in social mores, education and laws. It was believed that the only means of survival lay in acceptance of contemporary Western secular civilization (Avşar 1998:36; Ceylan Eylül II, III 1991:149-366,13-400; Yetkin 1983:137-40). In the course of its Westernization policy, Turkish political life experienced the formation of new political parties representing various position in the political spectrum. The new world order in post-war years affected politicians' decisions on further democratization of the Turkish political system and on joining the West (Çalış 1996:44-5,69-75; Erer 1966:127-59,228-33). The arrival in power by the Democrat Party in the May 1950 election was a sign of the successful achievement of a multi-party system. This opened the way for very impressive economic and political developments, particularly in the first term of the Democratic era. A number of economic and political international ties were established between Turkey and Europe which indoctrinated Turkish people in Western styles of life and cultural norms (Davison 1968:10-11; Karpat 1959:150-51; Rubinstain 1960:206; Tunaya 1952:612,646-7,657).

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKEY'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS SINCE THE 1960s

This chapter will deal with the long and tangled story of Turkish political and economic transformation history since the 1960s. It is divided into three sections. The first tries to elaborate the effects of domestic political changes and on (the) Turkish (perception tendency of) democratization. The second part assesses the effects of economic changes on the overall trends in Turkish politics during the period concerned. The continuities and re-orientations within the bilateral and multilateral trade and commercial relations of Turkey will also be briefly reviewed in relation to democratization and political changes. The final section provides an overall conclusion to the previous two sections, with some tentative suggestions as to what kinds of challenges Turkey might face in the forthcoming decades, in the light of its historical democratization experiences and their possible consequences.

THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY

Transitional Stages: International developments had enormous effects on the Turkish structural political and economic changes which affected Turkish politics. The country's geographical location and its economic, social and political relations with European countries affected certain groups of the political elite (bureaucrats, army officers) as well as ordinary Turkish peoples' perceptions of Europe, and consequently democratization.

Since the start of the struggle for multi-party politics in Turkey in the post-1945 period under the pressure of the West, Turkish policy-makers have diversified Euro-Turkish relations in various fields. There were direct and indirect correlations between Turkish democratization and European socio-economic and socio-political developments.

The diverse Turkish community's interests were not adequately represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly by the political parties and government policies on economic, cultural and social issues. These were some of the major factors in the changes of political upheaval experiences of the post-1960s Turkey.

The 1950 election paved the way for the emergence of a more liberal market economy and for considerable freedom of political expression via newly formed political parties during the 1950s. The interaction between rural and urban areas was increased by newly constructed roads and telecommunications.

1960s: Freedom and Democracy Under the Turkish Military: Some thirty-eight officers intervened against the Menderes administration in order to restore law and order and “the institutional dignity of the military” on 27 May 1960. A provocative intelligentsia tried to influence both the “radical” and “moderate” wings of the military junta members to turn this military revolution into an institutional revolution. The new governing body, the *Milli Birlik Komitesi* (the National Unity Committee, MBK), appointed the rector of İstanbul University, professor Sıddık Sami Onar, to head a commission to prepare new state and social institutions, with a new constitution, new laws, and a new electoral system. The new constitution paved the way for a more liberal atmosphere for formation of political parties and the fuller representation of Turkey's varied communities in the

Turkish parliament (Hale 1994:119-52; Özbudun 2000:8,24-5).¹⁴² However, the elimination of the “radicals” from the junta and of their opinions from the military administration became a seed for the creation of extreme groups in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Such occurrences led to extremely violent political clashes and social disturbances, which eventually generated outflows of political refugees from Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s.

The 1961 constitution altered previous laws and regulations. Explicit guarantees were made on freedom of thought, expression, association and publication, social and economic rights. Article 18 of the new constitution made it easier for a Turkish citizen to travel to foreign countries and to see the outside world (www.geocities.com/cumhuriyetdevrimi/1961.html).

The first half of the 1960s witnessed six coalition governments. In the second half of the 1960s Turkey experienced for the first time ideological struggles between the extreme left and the extreme right. Left-wing university students associated with the *Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (TIP, the Turkish Workers' Party). Left-wing literature was available on every street corner of the cities, alongside right-wing literature ([www.showtvnet.com/belgesel:12 Mart Belgeseli](http://www.showtvnet.com/belgesel:12MartBelgeseli)).¹⁴³

Political fractions reflected societal changes which were directly affected by developments in the outside world and produced explosive atmospheres in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Every extreme group formed its

¹⁴² For a detailed analysis of the Turkish military's involvement in Turkish politics, up to the early 1990s, see: William Hale *Turkish Politics and the Military*, London and New York, Routledge 1994.

¹⁴³ A well documented TV programme (10 episodes) was produced based on interviews with the political figures who witnessed and took part in the Turkish political evolution, during the 1960s and the early 1970s.

own association and organisation within the universities and among workers. Public opinion became divided, leaning towards the Eastern or the Western blocs, particularly after Turkey's disputes with Washington over Cyprus in 1964. There were anti-American demonstrations and attacks on American citizens (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel:12 *Mart Belgeseli*). The *Türkiye İşçi Sendikası* (with the Turkish acronym Türk-İş, the Confederation of the Workers Union of Turkey) leaned towards the rightist parties, most notably the *Adalet Partisi* (AP, the Justice Party), while the *Devrimci İşçi Sendika Kurumu* (with the Turkish acronym DİSK, the Confederation of Unions of Revolutionary Workers) affiliated with the leftist TİP.¹⁴⁴

Industrial expansion increased consumerism among the working class people, while high inflation limited the destitute parts of society to meeting their most basic needs for survival. The labour force grew fast as a result of high birth rates (25 per thousand during the 1960s) and migration off the land, and an ever-increasing unemployment rate became both unavoidable and unmanageable. Governments experienced difficulty in providing adequate educational opportunities for all the students who wanted to study, nor were there enough jobs for all graduate new comers to the labour market. Political discontent was not assuaged by the *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* (TBMM, the Turkish Grand National Assembly), in which the extreme left was only represented by the TİP's 14 members. Thus, the struggle for political and economic expression spilled into the streets, universities and factories, through students' and workers' criminal activities in the form of kidnappings and bombings, while workers went on

¹⁴⁴ Henceforth Türk-İş, DİSK and TİP.

endless strikes. Anti-secularist so-called “Islamists” demanded the rejection of Kemalism and the de-secularisation of the state while the extreme right “defended” the “Turkish” state against the harmful effects of the leftists and the anti-secularists, whom they regarded as “green communists” ([www.showtvnet.com/belgesel:12 Mart Belgeseli](http://www.showtvnet.com/belgesel:12_Mart_Belgeseli)).

The 1970s: the Military Memorandum, Political and Social Instability: There were also different ideological groups in the military who wanted to seize power for the establishment of their own political and ideological system. The initial attempt at intervention by the leftist groups on 9 March 1971 was counter-balanced by the conservative Kemalist officers’ memorandum on 12 March 1971. Accordingly, most of the leftist organisations were suspended or closed by the newly appointed government, which carried out the reforms requested by the senior military. The *Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* (DEVGENÇ, the Turkish acronym for the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey) and the TIP were closed. Nevertheless, new terrorist groups emerged day by day such as the *Türk Halkının Kurtuluş Ordusu* (THKO, the Turkish People’s Liberation Army) in April 1971. Terrorism rose sky-high in the following months, so the military-backed government arrested members of the intelligentsia, especially leftist intellectuals, and extreme leftist or rightist activists. There were violent clashes between leftists and rightists, and between secular and anti-secular groups. The *Milli Türk Talebe Birliği* (the National Turkish Student Union) boycotted lectures and classes in the universities and clashes took place between students and the police force. On 17-19 July 1968 leftist students protested against the arrival of American 6th Fleet ships in İstanbul. A student died in the clashes. The rector of the Middle East Technical

University (ODTÜ) was visited by the recently appointed American ambassador, whose car was burned by leftist students in Ankara. The students involved were expelled from the university. On 16 February 1969, 30,000 leftists clashed with rightists in İstanbul, leaving 2 people dead and 114 injured. The DİSK organised simultaneous rallies in Ankara, İstanbul and Kocaeli on 15 June 1970. On 16 June, as a result of clashes between the DİSK and the polis force, one police officer and three DİSK members died with a number of them injured. On 4 May 1971 the *Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu* kidnapped 4 American Air force soldiers. As a result of new clashes in the ODTÜ, 3 students died and 9 were injured. A number of banks were robbed. The Israeli consul was kidnapped in İstanbul on 17 May 1971 and was found dead on 23 May 1971. 11 cities were under the martial law. Leftist guerrillas were hunted by the security forces in rural areas in May 1971. There were kidnappings by the THKPC on 24 January 1972.

The elections of the 1970s did not produce strong governments but rather a series of coalition governments. Ideological terrorism revived between leftist and rightist groups in 1974. In May 1974 an Amnesty Bill was passed, as would recur under several subsequent Ecevit governments, releasing hundreds of political prisoners (mostly leftist militants). Leftist extremists formed the *Devrimci Sol* (DEVSOL, the Revolutionary Left) and the *Devrimci Yol* (DEVYOL) (the Revolutionary Way), which engaged in violence against the rightist *Bozkurtlar* (the Grey Wolves).

The 1961 constitution stressed the state's secular character and the strengthening of its relations with the western world. It also provided greater freedom of assembly and the establishment of hundreds of leftist, rightist and religious ideological organizations and

associations. These political and social establishments started to pursue their interests through either political parties or secret organisations. Necmettin Erbakan¹⁴⁵ used this opportunity to establish two successive parties, the *Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP, the National Order Party) and the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP, the National Salvation Party) in the early 1970s. However, regardless of popular preferences, Westernization policies continued to be pursued during the Cold War era, as they had been in the previous decades. In fact, no one dared to challenge or propose alternatives to the Westernization policy during these years. Whoever attempted to alter this fundamental policy was either politically eliminated or forced to shut up by the powers –that- be. The Turkish Workers Party (TİP) and Erbakan’s pro-Islamic MNP experienced this type of closure in July 1971 (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel/default.asp?product=archive/belgesel/12_mart/12mart7.asf).

Politics became a rather tricky business during the 1970s in Turkey. Politicians constantly changed their political stances and alliances, and did not deal effectively with the country’s economic crises. Political assassinations and communal disturbances increased dramatically throughout the country. The killing of innocent people (at least 20 per day on average) became ordinary news in the daily newspapers. Turkey was driven towards an anarchic and chaotic political and economic situation by the internal socio-political unrest, exacerbated by external supplies of arms, training and ideological materials.¹⁴⁶

Erbakan’s National Salvation Party (MSP) took up or focused on religious issues, while Türkeş’s *Milliyetçi*

¹⁴⁵ Erbakan was/is a mechanical engineering professor who had completed his PhD in Aachen in Germany.

¹⁴⁶ What Iraq has become since the American invasion from March 2003 up to January 2008 was similar to the 1970s Turkey.

Hareket Partisi (MHP, the Nationalist Movement Party) exploited nationalistic sentiments, to gain popular support. The MSP and the CHP were, or rather seemed to be, against capitalism, Zionism, and consequently the West. Erbakan always argued for unity among the “Muslim states”. While Ecevit favoured collaboration with socialist states and Third World countries, Türkeş argued for closer relations between Central Asian Turks and Turkey. However, there were no real steps forward to achieve such daydreams, other than their inconclusive ideological debates. There were provocative actions for violent confrontations in mostly of the politically and culturally sensitive parts of Turkey during the political meetings or burial ceremonies of a member of one or another ideological group. In the end an MSP rally in Konya and demonstrations within it, alongside terrorist activities and social unrest throughout Turkey, were used as an excuse for a coup by military officers on 12 September 1980.

The 1980s: Military Intervention and the Flight of Political Refugees to Europe: For the third time in two decades (1960, 1971 and 1980) a military junta seized power in Turkey on 12 September 1980. The Junta restored law and order within the country, in accordance with its constitutional responsibility under the military constitution of 1961 (Articles 110 and 111).¹⁴⁷ The junta announced that international

¹⁴⁷ “118 B. The National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of National Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army (Navy and the Air Force and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie), under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic. Depending on the particulars of the agenda, Ministers and other persons concerned may be invited to meetings of the Council and their views heard. The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with

treaties and alignments would be respected and that new constructive relations would be established with the West (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel_12_Eylül_Belgeseli).¹⁴⁸ The leaders, while keeping their promises and obeying international rules, also resisted becoming a satellite of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Independent policies were followed on the Cyprus issue and SWAC problems. Other than in economic matters, Turkey managed to avoid direct interference in its domestic affairs by the outside world, which also influenced the destination of Turkish labour migration (Liel 2001:219-33).

According to the statement of General Kenan Evren (the leader of the military junta of 1980) on Ankara radio at 1pm on 12 September, the military intervention was carried out because "... the Turkish armed forces were forced to take over the state administration with the aim of safeguarding the unity of the country and the nation and the rights and freedoms of the people, ensuring the security of life and property and the happiness and prosperity of the people, ensuring the prevalence of law and order – in other words, restoring state authority in an impartial manner." (Ahmad 1993:181). The military junta,

regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society. The agenda of the National Security Councils will be drawn up by the President of the Republic taking into account the proposals of the Prime Minister and the Chief of the General Staff." (www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/anayas_aeng.uc?p1=118).

¹⁴⁸ Another well documented series of TV programmes (*12 Eylül Belgeseli*) (9 episodes) was produced based on interviews with the political, military and intellectual figures who witnessed and took part in the Turkish political evolution, during the 1970s and 1980s.

which was called the *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi* (the National Security Council, MGK), stayed in power until November 1983 under the Bülent Ulusu¹⁴⁹ government which governed Turkey from 20 September 1980 to 13 December 1983. The *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi* issued a number of decrees which suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament, closed down all the existing political parties, detained party leaders, and suspended virtually all professional associations and confederations of trade unions. Everything in Turkey was changed except foreign policy and Özal's economic stabilization programme. The interim government was free to implement any policy it chose without having to face any overt opposition against it. Inflation was brought down by cutting back on consumption and public spending, holding down wages, increasing exports, and postponing repayments on external debts which amounted \$18 billion ([www.showtvnet.com/belgesel/12 Eylül Belgesi](http://www.showtvnet.com/belgesel/12EylülBelgesi/)).

The Search for Political Identity and Its Effects on Democratization Since the 1980s: The members of rightwing, leftwing and religious organisations were under intense scrutiny and close checks by the military regime. The junta altered 44 articles in relation to martial law and 267 new laws were accepted within a very short time to allow the administration to pursue any action. The military regime did not differentiate between the treatment of leftist, rightist or religious groups. The prosecution of MSP members (anti-secularists) continued for 250

¹⁴⁹ Bülent Ulusu was an admiral and the commander of the navy who took part during the formation of the original junta. He was retired due to his age by the Demirel government on 31 August 1980, just 12 days earlier than the coup. The junta placated Ulusu for his contribution for the plot as making him the prime minister in the interim government.

days. No one was convicted. A total of 587 MHP members *bozkurtlar* ('grey wolves') were prosecuted over 6 years. Against leftist groups, a total of 1,243 individual prosecutions were completed in 11 years. A number of people were sentenced to death and were executed. The junta tried to keep a balance between the right and the left in executions. People had to face military prosecution under martial law, precipitating a growing flight out of the country, mainly to European countries. The military junta kept thousands of people in custody for up to 90-day periods, during which they were beaten, intimidated and then released, in most cases, without being charged. The use of torture was widespread and became almost systematic, with a number of suspects and prisoners dying in suspicious circumstances. The regime never denied the existence of torture as a means of policing the country. Many people were detained, while many found ways to flee the country for neighbouring and European countries (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel_12_Eylül_Belgeseli).

After the military coup of 1980, 30,000 Turkish citizens applied for asylum in European countries. Germany announced that 90 per cent its asylum seekers were arriving from Turkey (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel_12_Eylül_Belgeseli). There were genuine and understandable reasons for Turkish citizens to seek asylum in Europe in general and in Germany in particular. Existing Turkish communities played crucial roles in attracting further Turkish in flows, whether as genuine political asylum seekers or as potential migrant workers who merely used the asylum system to achieve their ultimate aims. With the help of the Turkish émigré communities in other European countries, they were able to organise themselves in order to support their respective conservative, religious, nationalist and socialist

groups not only in their host countries but also in Turkey. Germany was the prime destination for asylum seekers from Turkey because of the prior existence of a considerable Turkish community in that country. Indeed, Germany received more asylum seekers than any other European country. The new arrivals were important to the new shape of the Turkish community and German society. Recently migrated Turkish people had already had considerable experience of how to organise themselves and how to deal with other hostile and friendly groups. Those experiences were easily transferred into Germany. Educated intellectuals, artisans and entrepreneurs flourished and greatly helped to change not only the Turkish émigré community but also their hosts to create a multi-cultural, multi-ideological and multi-ethnic society.

Turkish migrants' experiences of discrimination and segregation forced them to form a number of religious, cultural, political societies and associations in order to help meet each other's needs and protect themselves from the harmful effects of other groups or their host countries' extremist activities. Such closed circle formations assisted émigré involvement in their mother country's culture and politics and protected their security. However this slowed down the migrants' search and need for full integration into their host country. Religious, secularist, nationalist and socialist organizations not surprisingly proliferated in European countries in general, in Germany in particular. Money transfers and considerable donations from legal or illegal organisations are clearly visible in Turkey's politics. This was well publicised by the mass Turkish media (www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/126473.asp; www.atilim.org/sinif/td1/3.htm).

As long as Turkish migrants continue to feel that they are being discriminated against and segregated by German governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) new Turkish political formations and continuous involvement with their mother country are likely in the coming years. After four decades of Turkish migrants' existence in Germany, they are still regarded by Germans as '*gastarbeiter*' and as Turkish citizens who require visas to remain in Germany. Such attitudes will reinforce and perpetuate Turkish misperceptions of Germany and lend support to Turkish extremists in Turkey and in other parts of the world. Those humiliated, segregated and discriminated against because of their skin colour, ethnic origin, nationality, sexual orientation or preference, religious belief or political stance will always find ways to express themselves, which may not always be desirable for the host country or for the wider world, as has also happened in Turkey itself.

Politically Oriented Migration Prospects: People's political perceptions may not be completely involved in their decisions concerning migration. However, many Turkish socialist writers and thinkers moved to countries in which they thought they would be more secure than in their own country. For example, Nazım Hikmet, a prominent leftist thinker and a poet, fled to Moscow. Particularly after the military intervention of 1980, a number of socialist, nationalist and religious thinkers and writers as well as criminals left the country for neighbouring and European countries. This helped to change the existing Turkish émigré communities' educational backgrounds. Most of these people transferred their skills and/or academic ability to their host countries' languages. So, in a way, they helped to enhance their host countries' multi-national or multi-cultural existence. Ethnic writings and

cultures began to flourish alongside ethnic entrepreneurship in different economic sectors in major European cities.

A second dimension of intellectuals and skilled peoples' migration occurred as a result of persistent economic disparities and the restriction on freedom of expression and writing. These academics and entrepreneurs looked for their own better futures in countries freer and more stable than their own. Therefore, large numbers of skilled and newly wealthy Turks migrated to the West during the 1980s and 1990s. High Turkish taxation levels and increased output forced Turkish companies to seek more business-friendly environments and countries. In fact, such searches paved the way for a flow of skilled labour to these areas. The number of contracting firms engaged in activities in the SWAC increased from 113 to more than 310 between 1981 and 1988 Iraq (Liel 2001:118; www.mfa.gov.tr). Turkish contractors also extended their activities to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), East-Central and South-Eastern Europe, and Asia, due to the mounting economic problems and political instabilities in the SWAC and North Africa during the later 1980s and the 1990s. Turkish companies have undertaken important work in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Central Asian Republics, Germany, Pakistan and the Far East. Turkey's proximity to major markets has facilitated the provision of workers, technicians and construction materials, which will be also used by Turkish and other international firms in Iraq's reconstruction (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/df/03.htm). Turkish contracting services abroad have gained about 3 percent of the volume of international contracting work, in over 40 countries and 950 projects, worth over 45 billion US dollars. Most importantly, these Turkish contracting companies

provide employment opportunities for tens of thousands of Turkish and non-Turkish persons in the work they undertake.¹⁵⁰ This mass migration of human capital and economic resources could have amounted to a serious drain on Turkish culture and on the Turkish economy in the long-run. Nevertheless, thanks to the enormous and under-employed human capital reserves which developed rapidly within Turkey, the loss was/will be largely replaced.

Turkish national identity was always pluralist in character, due to the country's history. There were/are a number of different communities which have contributed to the formation of the existing Turkish community. This diversity has been a source of both

¹⁵⁰ "The total contract value of construction projects undertaken in the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States exceeded 12 billion US dollars. Approximately an 8 billion US dollar portion of these projects are still continuing. The number of projects undertaken by more than 40 Turkish companies in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Estonia and Latvia is around 350 projects. Libya had a share of 35 per cent, the Russian Federation 23 per cent, Saudi Arabia 13 per cent, the Central Asian Republics 11 per cent, Iraq 4 per cent and the other countries 14 per cent share in the projects undertaken by Turkish contractors abroad between 1974-1998. Works, however, received from the Russian Federation has reached the biggest share with the ratio of [from 23 per cent to] 40 per cent in the period from the beginning of 1990 [up to 2003]. The construction sector has suffered a period of hardship [after 2000] due to the economic crisis in the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States and along with the stagnation in Turkish domestic market. The focus of attention is on a search for new foreign markets with the objective of eliminating the stagnation in foreign contracting services. In fact, various works have been undertaken by Turkish companies in countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan and Chile as a result of recognition and promotion activities carried out in Africa, South American and Southeast European regions. And as a result of work development activities in the Far East, Turkish contractors succeeded in undertaking works in Indonesia, Malaise and Thailand" during the last few years (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupdf/03.htm).

strength and weakness for Turkey, depending on the internal expectations and the external pressures built up from time to time. Diverse ethnic, cultural, religious and political identities have been present in Turkey. Therefore, small extreme political, cultural or ethnic parties have always existed, and their respective views have created conflicts and disturbances between themselves and the authorities. However, the majority of the mainstream parties have never made accommodations to those extremists in their policies and therefore the minority movements have remained sources of potential problems. Turkish governments have always pursued pragmatic and realistic policies, according to demands of the region and the wider world, mostly the West. Perhaps one type of these extremists can be identified as religious fundamentalists (*Kaplançılar* (as called in Turkey because of its leader name (Metin Kaplan) and its followers) seeking an 'Islamic' identification of the state as they announced their proclamation of a *Hilafet Devleti* (an Islamic caliphate state) in Köln (Cologne) in Germany (Der Spiegel 40/2003:82-90; www.turkischweb.com/seite46.htm).¹⁵¹ Another group who have used Mustafa Kemal's name for their own cause and existence opened a number of the *Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği* (ADD, Atatürkist Ideological Associations) in a total 17 major German cities. The organisation opened offices in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland and Norway (www.turkischweb.com/GesellPolitik/seite47.htm; www.ataturk.de/Avrupa-ADD/avrupa-add.htm). This group has sought a militantly secularist entity

¹⁵¹ For a detailed analysis of German protection of Turkey originated terrorists and militants in Germany see Necip Hablemitoğlu www.turkischweb.com/seite46.htm; *Alman Vakıfları ve Bergama Dosyası*, Otopsi Yayınevi İstanbul 2001; "Alman İstihbaratı ve Kaplançılar", *Yeni Hayat*, 5 (56) pp.3-7, 1999.

involving complete exclusion of religion from public life. There are also ultra-nationalist as well as Marxist-Leninist groups in Turkish politics, expressing different opinions and concepts of freedom, who have opened branches in European major cities. Nevertheless, all sides want to use alignments and cooperation with their European counterparts in accordance with their own perceptions and ideals, for the pragmatic implementation of their policies in their mother country as well as in their host country. In the end, most of these Turkish extremists sought and easily found European hosts for their aims and ideologies, as well as for themselves. The freedom of movement of terrorist organisations as well as people within the EU has created further attractions for those terrorists and their supporters and sympathisers. Considering the recent (the late 19th and early 20th century) historical experiences, this situation is not new and is unlikely to end soon.

International political developments in the SWAC and the Balkans have also had an influence on Turkish political experiences. Turkey had to deal with several influxes of Iraqi and Iranian refugees during the 1980s by allowing them to take refuge on Turkish soil. However, Turkish humanitarian assistance soon turned into an open-ended commitment, as the Iraqis and Iranians refused to return home, while Western European countries were chary of assisting in their settlement. Turkey received enormous numbers of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq before, during and after the 1991 Gulf War. This unexpected immigration proved that the Turkish involvement in the conflict was costly to Turkey. About 750,000 Kurdish, Arab and Turcoman (*Türkmen*) refugees ended up on the Turkish border in the aftermath of the international coalition's 'incomplete' victory against the Saddam Hussein regime in February 1991 (Robins

1996:115). The Turkish government of the day resisted the massive influx of refugees for fear of the demographic and economic implications of their possible semi-permanent residence. Turkey did not want to repeat the mistake it had made during the 1980s. Turkey tried to overcome such massive influx of refugees with humanitarian needs without adequate international (particularly Western) assistance. Nevertheless, the Turkish authorities were intensely and unjustly criticised by the Western media for their handling of this refugee issue. As was pointed out by a prominent western scholar, Philip Robins, “the news reporting of the event as a whole helped to enforce popular cultural stereotypes in Western Europe about Turkey and the Turks. Turkey’s reluctance to allow the Iraqi Kurdish refugees to come down from the mountain ridges reinforced a view of Turks as heartless and brutal, underpinned by historical images of Ottoman repression. The images of the Turks perpetuated in popular Western culture, through films like *Lawrence of Arabia* and *Midnight Express*, were confirmed.” (Robins 1996:115-116). On the other hand, Turkey tried at least to stop further refugee flows from Iraq by agreeing to an increased US military presence on its territory, at Incirlik air base in Adana. This Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) was established in northern Iraq in order to check the movement of Iraqi forces above the 36th parallel. The Turkish authorities hoped that this umbrella over northern Iraq might help to avoid significant refugee flows in any disturbances or conflict between the Saddam regime and the north Iraqi Kurds (Barkey 1996:72).

Moreover, such problems did not emanate only from the SWAC. More than a quarter of a million Turks migrated to Turkey under the pressure of the Zhivkov regime in Bulgaria, while substantial numbers of

Muslims (by no means all of whom were ethnic Turks) migrated to Turkey from Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia, Kosovo and Yugoslav Macedonia. Turkey had to deal with international problems of this sort, which also created economic and social disturbances for itself. It seems Turkey will continue to generate migration flows predominantly to Western countries, as well as to other parts of the world. On the other hand, Turkey cannot avoid receiving substantial continued flows of refugees, whether as legal or illegal migrants, across its borders. Therefore, Turkey potentially will be both a migrant receiver and a migrant exporting country, located at one of the most vital crossroads of the world. These migrations and migrants' political stands and views were introduced in to Turkish politics.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON TURKISH POLITICS

The International Political Climate and the Structuring Turkish International Economy: In order to understand Turkish international economic policies and their effect on politics which has taken place since the 1960s, one has to extend the scope of the study to the formative decades of the Turkish Republic. Turkey's political and security arrangements were and still are closely linked to the present Turkish economy. There have been considerable elements of continuity and discontinuity within the Turkish economy, reflecting its geo-strategic, geo-political and geo-cultural location as well as rapidly changing technological developments and communication improvements within the region as well as in the wider world during the time was concerned. As a result of the neutrality policy which followed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and the lack of private capital and investments, the Turkish authorities had

to pursue a statist economic policy for structural and industrial investments for rapid development of the newly established state over the next three decades.

In the post-1945 world, the new Turkish leaders decided to take part within the Western world. However, to achieve this task was not so easy. The Turks have sacrificed and suffered economically, politically and culturally in order to overcome the understandable reluctance of the Western powers to accept Turkey within their economic institutions. Turkey's strategic location at the crossroads between three continents, and its proximity to the world's most vital and lucrative natural resources situated in very flammable cultural and religious locations, put the country under immense pressure from the intense rivalries of the superpowers. The territorial demands and the perceived ideological (communist) threat posed by the Soviet Union forced Turkey towards the Western alliance. The only way for Turkey to overcome any potential attack by the Soviet bloc was to gain Western support. This was achieved only after Turkish heroism, commitment and loyalty had been proven during the Korean War, when Turkey was accepted by the Western powers into NATO in February 1952.

Turkey pursued liberal market-economy policies in accordance with its security and political ties with the Western democracies during the 1950s. Private investments flourished in the newly-emerging so-called *Küçük Amerika* ('small America') during the first half of the 1950s. However, foreign aid was necessary in order to sustain steady growth for the ailing economy during the last quarter of the 1950s, which was not given by the West. As long as the Menderes governments did not adequately serve Western interests, economic mechanisms were used to bring Turkey into line. The CHP's provocative actions

fuelled tense socio-economic and political situations which created an exceptional opportunity for some 38 ambitious officers in the military to seize power on 27 May 1960 in order to restore Turkish policies to what they saw fit within the structure of domestic and international requirements. The Turkish military carefully balanced and adjusted the Turkish political system as they saw fit. The parliamentary system began to function under intense pressure from the military and within five years six successive weak coalition governments had been formed.

Turkish political-economy had an influence on westernization and democratization of Turkish politics particularly evident in the 1970s and 1980s. Without any doubt, micro- and macro-level economic factors played crucial roles in democratization and westernization of the decisions of Turkish citizens. National and international economic and political factors were also directed to a certain degree by the bilateral and multilateral agreements and relations of Turkey. A fuller treatment of the subject concerned would require an extended group study over a long period of time and the resources to carry it out.

Decision Years: the 1960s: Within this context, bilateral agreements were signed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, pre-dominantly with European countries. The very first labour agreement was signed between the military junta and Germany on 30 October 1961. This was the first major official step in Turkey's labour exporting experience. Similar agreements were signed throughout the decade with the United Kingdom in 1961; with Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium in 1964; with France in 1965; with Sweden in 1967; with Australia in 1968; with Switzerland in 1971; and with Denmark in 1973 (Beeley 1983:26; Rist 1978:90).

By the mid-1960s the Turkish economy had changed from a mainly agrarian to a mainly industrial one. New factories were being opened, mostly in the cities. The introduction of machinery into agricultural cultivation reduced the need for unskilled labour in rural areas. Therefore, large numbers of farmers and peasants headed to the cities for their futures and fortunes in recently opened industrial sectors. Although industry was developing quite respectably, it could not keep up with the speed of population increase and rural mass migration into urban areas. Consequently the available industrial sector was not able to offer enough jobs for the growing numbers of unemployed. Thus, the above-mentioned labour agreements were an obvious way to seek a solution to the country's unemployment problem, at least for the time being (Beeley 1983:25-31; OECD August 1976:34; Yücel 1987:121-2; Kolinsky 2000:11-25). The mass migrations from rural to urban areas created housing, educational and infrastructural problems with mushrooming shantytowns around the cities. This situation increased socio-economic, cultural and political challenges and difficulties for the local and national authorities, particularly in the Aegean and Marmara regions of Turkey.

The relatively calm situation of the early-1960s was dramatically changed by the Cyprus crisis in 1964. The Turks were disappointed with the American understanding of the Cyprus issue and American ignorance of the harassment of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots. Serious clashes of economic and political interests became obvious between Turkey and the United States during 1964. The leakage of the content of President Johnson's letter, which was eventually published by the İstanbul daily *Hürriyet* on 13 January 1966, was a turning point in Turkish

public perceptions of the United States.¹⁵² Attempts were made to establish an economic alternative to the West by improving economic relations with and obtaining financial aid from the Soviet Union (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupc/default.htm).

During the second half of the 1960s there were public demands for greater freedom of action in foreign policy toward the Third World and neighbouring Arab states. After that, Turkish leaders pursued a more 'patriotic' stance and the West was no longer allowed to interfere in the development of Turkey's relations with Muslim countries and the USSR. Considerable numbers of official visits took place between Turkey and Arab nations during the second half of the 1960s.¹⁵³ These visits had an influence on Turkish economic and political relations in the years ahead. Similar trends had been observed in relations between Turkey and other European countries during the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s. As a result of increased political and economic relations, expanded political changes occurred during the 1960s and 1970s.

A new institution was created under the name of the *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* (the State Planning Organisation, DPT) on 30 September 1960. The

¹⁵² The President of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson, sent this letter to the Turkish prime minister İsmet İnönü on 5 June 1964. The letter's undiplomatically written content stated that in the event of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, the NATO might not support Turkey against a Soviet attack.

¹⁵³ Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba in March 1965, Saudi King Feisal in August 1965, Iraqi president Abd-al Salam Arif in February 1967, and Jordan's King Hussein in September 1967 came to Turkey; Turkish prime minister Süleyman Demirel visited Iraq in November 1967, Turkey's president Cevdet Sunay went to Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iraq in January – April 1968, and Morocco's King Hassan came to Turkey in April 1968. High profile relations were established with Jordan, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, and Kuwait in the early 1970s.

Organization was an advisory body, with the prime minister as its chairman. The economy was to be guided by the First Five Year Plan (1963-1967). The Turkish economy grew 7 per cent per annum during the 1960s (Balkır & Williams 1993:10-25).

Increasing industrial development was reflected in social transformation of Turkish society. Class-based movements began to flourish in the 1960s, starting with the *Türkiye İşçi Konfederasyonu* (Türk-İş, the Confederation of Workers' Union of Turkey), and the *Devrimci İşçi Sendika Konfederasyonu* (DİSK, the Confederal Union of Revolutionary Workers) established in 1963. These organisations assisted their members' struggles against the national authorities and employers on legal and economic matters. However, there were political and ideological divisions, rivalries and hostilities between these unions. The development of this conflictual environment eventually led to a number of violent clashes and crimes between Türk-İş and DİSK members. Many of these organisations' personnel eventually fled to Western European countries to escape prosecution by the military regime during the early 1980s. Despite all the politically motivated violent rivalries and social unrest, Turkish industry began producing cars, radios, refrigerators, iron etc., which previously were imported. Public and private investment increased modestly. The rate of economic expansion was insufficient to accommodate the ever-growing numbers of workers available to industry at the time. Nevertheless consumerism increased dramatically as industrial workers started to earn enough money to finance their new consumer habits. European products were available to those who could afford to pay for them.

Economic Independence Struggles During the 1970s: Almost a decade after the first labour

agreement and official labour exports, an Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol was signed between Turkey and the EC in Brussels on 23 November 1970. This protocol proposed the gradual implementation of free movement of Turkish labour among the EC member states. Article 36 envisaged 'Freedom of movement for workers between Member States of the Community and Turkey shall be secured by progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 12 of the Agreement of Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-second year after the entry into force of that Agreement.' (OJ No L361/32).¹⁵⁴

Although Turkey secured the gradual implementation of freedom of movement for Turkish migrant workers in the EC countries, the major EC countries nevertheless stopped labour recruitment from Turkey as a result of the 1970s oil crises and internal problems of their own. Moreover, the 1970s oil crises drew Turkey closer to the Arab world. In addition to the oil crisis of 1973-74, the US embargo on Turkey in 1974-78 put Turkey in a difficult situation.¹⁵⁵ The Turkish economy came very close to total collapse because of severe and enduring shortages of fuel, power and necessary imports in the second half of the 1970s. Turkey had to pay much more for its crude petroleum imports than it received in export earnings from its main oil suppliers, Iraq,

¹⁵⁴ See for full text and debates on the issue in *European Communities* 1978:600-603; OJ No L361/6970; OJ No L361/32; *MMTD* 28.8.1980:779-80; *MMTD* 3.9.1980:813,816-7; *MMTD* 3.9.1980:828-30; *DMTD* 25.1.1982:153-55; *DMTD* 11.10.1983:168.

¹⁵⁵ The United States imposed a military embargo on 1 July 1974 until 1978 as a result of the first Ecevit government's (26.01.1974 - 17.11.1974) freeing of Afyankarahisar's farmers to restart cultivating poppies, against the United States's wishes, in March 1974 and the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus during July-August 1974.

Libya, Iran and Saudi Arabia (Liel 2001:68-72; OECD June 1987:21).

The second and the third Ecevit governments between 1977 and 1979 pursued more independent Third Worldist policies than previous Turkish governments. Probably with such a stance in mind, Ecevit refused to apply to join the EC as a full member of the community when Greece applied in 1978. In retrospect, it can be seen that Turkey missed its best opportunity for entry into the EC, at a time when the Cold War was still inducing Western countries to establish the closest possible ties with Mediterranean countries as allies against the Soviet bloc, before the growth of Western Islamophobia. The same government signed an agreement with Libya on cooperation in industry, agriculture, tourism, transportation, and technology, as well as the employment of Turkish workers, in May 1978 (Liel 2001:78 ftnt:28). Turkey had difficulty in finding hard currency to pay for its imports from Libya. So the Turkish government paid in Turkish Lira what Libya was supposed to pay to Turkish migrants in Libya (Liel 2001:90). The Turkish authorities thus discovered another way in which Turkish migrants could be useful to the Turkish economy.

One of the turning points in the Turkish economy was an agreement in June 1978 with the USSR. Soviet oil was to be paid for with Turkish export commodities, which rescued Turkey from the need to pay with hard currency. Similar agreements were signed with Iran in July and Iraq in August 1978. So, alongside politics in the region, oil deals dictated the direction of Turkish goods as well as labour exports (Liel 2001:79-100).

Particularly in the second half of the 1970s, fuel shortages disrupted the normal course of life throughout Turkey. Even the limited fuel supplies did

not reach the places where they could best serve the economy as a whole. Economic growth slowed down, unemployment rose, and the education, health, and transportation systems almost came to a halt. Social unrest and domestic terror became unmanageable by weak coalition governments (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel/).

The 1970s' political anarchy and constant weak coalitions further weakened economic stability in the country. Despite the expansionist policies, the economy was never able to absorb the growing pool of labour, therefore unemployment continued to rise. Graduates from high schools were particularly vulnerable and desperate to find jobs. Many of these educated youths joined the ranks of the radical and extreme rightist or leftist groups, which were targeted by the military regime in the following years. Those who managed to escape to European countries became the seed-beds of educated, skilled personnel and the militants of Turkish diaspora communities during the 1980s and 1990s. Political, social and cultural organisations and associations began to mushrooming among Turkish communities in European major cities in this period.

As is widely known, the *kemer sıkma* 'belt-tightening' policies were started as a compromise with the IMF and other international lenders who provided Turkey with short-term loans at high interest rates during the 1970s-1980s' economic crises. DİSK and Türk-İş trade union workers (44,000-100,000) went on endless strikes, in which the Turkish economy lost 7.7 million working days, which further escalated during the economic recession in 1979 (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel/). Ordinary Turkish people as well as governing bodies were desperate to find ways out of this miserable situation. Their hopes were kept alive by some positive signals and grounds for economic

betterment. The growing Turkish companies started to undertake a number of construction projects in the Arab world, whose turnover reached \$9.4 billion in the late 1980s (Liel 2001:180).

New Challenges, Opportunities and Reflections on Policies: the 1980s: Süleyman Demirel sought to satisfy the IMF's and TÜSİAD's (*Türk Sanayii ve İş Adamları Derneği*, Turkish Industrial Business people Association) demands by appointing Turgut Özal as Turkey's principal economic architect, whose economic proposals were hard to swallow. The *Yirmidört Ocak Kararları* (January the 24 measures) were announced in order to make radical changes in the Turkish economy. The Turkish Lira was devaluated over 30 per cent against the US dollar. The new economy was to be based on the export rather than the home market. The prices of all commodities and consumer items rose dramatically. The country was opened to foreign investors. Özal requested some time for the full implementation and benefits of his measures, a stance on which the military regime supported him during the following years (www.showtvnet.com/belgesel/:12 Eylül belgeseli).

Turkish governments concentrated on infrastructural investments, energy needs, roads and communications and building new dams during the 1980s. Lack of private capital forced the state-owned enterprises to continue to play crucial roles in the economy. Nevertheless, there were some private initiatives in manufacturing, and some quickly profitable enterprises were launched. The domestic economy was opened up to the forces of the world market, forcing hitherto protected home grown businesses to compete with other firms. Özal expected that competition would force industrialists to become more efficient and fit in a competitive liberal-market economy. As a result of this, consumers gained access

to cheaper and higher-quality goods. The 1980s export-oriented strategy was aided by international developments, such as the Iraq-Iran war, and some of the Balkan countries also offered lucrative markets for Turkish goods. However, the very unequal distribution of income continued. The share of workers' wages in the country's GNP declined sharply from 36 per cent in 1977 to 21 in 1983 and then to 18 in 1987. Unemployment rose to 15 per cent throughout the decade (www.die.gov.tr/). Wages in the industrial sector were found to be high relative to productivity and there were attempts to reduce them. Many industrial plants were working well below of their capacity, creating unemployment and a large of pool surplus labour for employers to exploit.

Nevertheless, there were some positive developments as foreign exchange was available and imports of foreign consumer goods were possible. Exports rose from \$2.3 billion in 1979 to \$11.7 billion in 1988. The average annual rate of growth GDP was 4.6 per cent between 1980 and 1988. The United States, Germany and the IMF supported Turkey with loans to the tune of \$13 billion, reflecting their international interests in the region (www.die.gov.tr/; Liel 2001:118).

Economic Alternatives to the West and Turkey's Relations With the Muslim World During the 1980s: In the early 1980s relations between Turkey and the Muslim countries were greatly expanded. The main economic trends during the 1970s led to a favourable situation for ambitious development plans in the oil producing Arab countries. On the other hand, considerable economic stagnation and decline was observed in Western nations. This had the effect of diverting Turkish human resources and entrepreneurship toward the oil producing nations. The economic slump in the West almost stopped

Turkish migration to Europe and affected unfavourably the flow of Western foreign aid to Turkey, while, the flow of migrants' remittances dwindled. Turkey had to find new sources of foreign currency revenues for its balance of payments. The oil producers were the only realistic possibility during the 1980s, because only they seemed able to absorb Turkish export goods, labourers and know-how in growing quantities (Beeley 1983:25,27; OECD April 1983:16; Liel 2001:118).

At least 20 Turkish companies gained contracts totalling \$1,650 million for construction work in several Arab countries. Half of the construction work was in Libya, building or repairing harbours, roads, factories, and apartment buildings, while the rest operated in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq by constructing factories and mosques. "By 1981 the total number of such companies had reached 113 (including 68 in Libya, 19 in Saudi Arabia, and 13 in Iraq). The number grew to 232 in 1982 (including 98 in Libya, 79 in Saudi Arabia, and 35 in Iraq) and to 283 in 1983 (including 109 in Saudi Arabia and 105 in Libya). The total dollar value of these companies' contracts had reached nearly \$13 billion in 1982 (\$8.2 billion in Libya, \$3.3 billion in Saudi Arabia, and nearly \$1 billion in Iraq). This sphere of activity expanded further. In 1988 there was an overall contract value of almost \$17 billion: \$9.4 billion in Libya, \$5 billion in Saudi Arabia, and \$2 billion in Iraq" (Liel 2001:118; OECD June 1987:21; www.mfa.gov.tr).

The number of Turkish labourers and operating Turkish companies rose dramatically in the SWAC countries. Thus, Turkey enjoyed increasing remittances, which was much needed on foreign currency transfers from those sources. As Liel claimed (2001:118) that migrant workers' remittances transfers financed nearly a third of Turkey's oil bill in

1981 and 1982. Turkey's oil needs and imports regime were decisive factors in the 1970s and 1980s exports. In order to pay for oil imports, Turkey had to export to the oil suppliers. The intensifying interactions between Turkey and its oil suppliers, notably the Arab world, were supported by Turkish society and culture. This was probably one of the crucial factors in building up a new national identity and the emergence of Islamist sentiments during the 1980s.

The Iran-Iraq War opened new commercial opportunities for Turkey and played an important role in the rapid expansion of its export sector, and the total Turkish exports to both countries rose from \$5 billion in 1981 to \$12 billion in 1988 (Liel 2001:119). Iran and Iraq became the jewels in the crown of Turkish exports to the Muslim world. Turkey also improved its trade balance with other Muslim nations, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Of course this reflected closer bilateral relations as well as increased Turkish migration to these countries.

Turkey participated in Islamic conferences for economic and political benefits rather than for religious reasons. Oil-producing countries, notably Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Libya, played important roles in this. Turkey has needed to rally widespread support for its position on Cyprus since the mid-1980s. Turkey increased its efforts to gain support for Turkish Cypriots and its diplomatic manoeuvres on behalf of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. However, Turkey was unable to find adequate responses to its calls for support.

On the other hand, Turkey's relations with the SWAC during the 1980s involved a complete transformation in the balance of power between them. The Iraq-Iran war reversed the situation in the SWAC and beyond, for Turkey. Iraq, Iran and Libya were

finding it difficult to pay for essential Turkish exports. Offering greater amounts of oil rather than cash increased the quantities of fuel supplied to Turkey, which actually did not need as much as was offered. Those three nations' cumulative debt to Turkey grew to \$5 billion by the late 1980s. This economic situation was reflected in politics between countries and peoples. Some Turkish firms which were operating in these three countries had to declare bankruptcy. Hunger strikes by Turkish workers strained political relations with these countries. Libya's debts to Turkish firms are still causing problems between Turkey and Libya. Such issues were raised during the controversial visit to Libya by the Turkish prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in October 1996 (Zaman 7 Ekim 1996:1; www.turkey.org/news/t101096.htm). Nevertheless, Turkey, freed of oil needs, started to pursue more independent policies towards Arab and Western countries during the 1980s (arsiv.zaman.com.tr/1996/10/07/index.html).

The Turkish Economy Since 1990: Even though numerous incompetent politicians came to power in Turkey, the country's strategic importance assisted Turkey's international arrangements and alliances. Perhaps, this was an influential factor in persuading the George Bush (senior) and Bill Clinton administrations to put a high premium on preserving the US links with Turkey.

Özal's special relations with George Bush senior during the (first) 1991 Gulf War changed Turkish influence in the region as well as in the United States. However, the Turkish economy suffered as a result of the 1991 Gulf War and promises of economic assistance were not fully kept by the West. The influx of Kurdish and Arab refugees from Iraq became a heavy burden on the Turkish economy. Refugees'

humanitarian needs put the Turkish authorities in a difficult economic and political situation.

Current Overview of Turkish Economy: The main contribution to the Turkish GDP (Gross Domestic Product) comes from the services sector. In the year 2000, services accounted for some 57 per cent of the GDP. Tourism is the fastest growing service sector in Turkey and has become the leading branch of the service sector. In 2000, the number of tourists reached 10.2 million, while the forecast is that by the year 2020 the number of tourists visiting Turkey each year will reach some 40 million. Turkey used to be an agricultural society until recent decades. Perhaps, this is still partly true if one considers that 50 per cent of the Turkish workforce is still employed in agriculture. However, from 1980 to 1998, the share of agricultural products in exports declined from 57 to 10 per cent, while industrial exports rose from 36 to 88 per cent, definitely signalling a shift from an agrarian to an industrial economy (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/df/02.htm). The Turkish economy has a number of significant advantages, including a very young population, very low labour costs (some 25 per cent of the labour costs that are the norm in Germany), proficient human capital and a strategic/pivotal location between Western Europe, Asia and the countries of the SWAC. Turkey is a peace-maker in all that concerns economic links with Central Asia, in exploitation of linguistic similarity and geographic proximity. In 2001, total exports from Turkey amounted to some \$32.8 billion dollars which increased to \$100 billion dollars in 2007. In the same year, imports into Turkey amounted to some 39.1 billion dollars. The total volume of exports had been only \$2.9 billion in 1980. The average annual increase in exports, 1980-98, was 14 per cent. The main export component in 2001 was the textile industry with some 31.4 per cent, followed by the

automobile industry which contributed some 7.5 per cent. The main import component is machinery and equipment at 26.9 per cent, followed by the import of various types of fuel, at 20.8 per cent. Turkey's main trading partners are the countries of the EU. In 2001, in excess of 51 per cent of exports went to the EU, and exports to the United States and Russian Federation amounted to some 10 per cent. In 2001, most imports, around 44.6 per cent, were from the EU countries, and only about 8 per cent from the United States. The main natural resources in Turkey are its chrome, copper, sulphur and coal deposits. Turkey has rich water resources which can be used for peaceful projects for the SWAC. The Turkish economy benefits from membership of a number of international organizations, including, among others - NATO, OECD and the IMF. However, Turkey's per capita GDP in the year 2000 was almost US\$ 3,000, significantly lower than the average for the developed West. Analysis of the main indices for Turkey shows extremely high rates of inflation compared to the rates accepted in the West. Despite the recent decrease in inflation, the annual rate of inflation is still around 30 per cent per annum. The inflation rate was decreased under 10 per cent in 2007. The exchange rate is also problematic, as, for instance, over the course of the year 2000, the Turkish Lira more than halved in value against the dollar (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/default.htm). Nevertheless, the GNP grew by 5.2 per cent in the 1981 – 1990 period and by 4.4 per cent in the 1991- 1998 period, a record among OECD countries (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupd/df/01.htm).¹⁵⁶

The PKK/KADEK Terrorist Organization and Its Connection With the Turkish Politics and the EU

¹⁵⁶ See further information in [www.die.gov.tr/ ENGLISH/SONIST /GSMH/ gsmh.html](http://www.die.gov.tr/ENGLISH/SONIST/GSMH/gsmh.html).

Policies: Article 68 of the constitution states "... the statutes and programmes, as well as the activities, of political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime. ...” Political parties and associations are not permitted to claim the existence on Turkey’s territory of minorities that are distinguished by differences in their national or religious culture, confession, ethnicity or language. They are not permitted to pursue the goal of creating minority groups on Turkish territory, to avoid disrupting the integrity of the nation by caring for, developing and propagating languages and cultures other than Turkish (www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/anayasaeng.maddeler?p3=68). Therefore, the so-called ‘Kurdish issue’ according to constitution of Turkey is a national problem as a potential source of danger for the ‘indivisible unity of the state and its territory’, and the PKK/KADEK’s claims are seen as a separatist threat to Turkey.

The so-called ‘Kurdish struggle’, namely a pro-Kurdish terrorism, has come a long way since 1973, when Abdullah Öcalan first organised a Marxist-Leninist student group at the University of Ankara that later called itself the PKK (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* or since 16 April 2002 KADEK (the Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan)).¹⁵⁷ Since 1984 its terrorist members’ criminal activities have caused the deaths of more than 30,000 civilians and soldiers, creating an

¹⁵⁷ news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1934120.stm

unbridgeable abyss between Turkey and this terrorist organisation. Turkish governments carried out a campaign of destruction of sparsely inhabited villages in the southeast with the aim of denying the PKK support bases. However, this process created a large population movement into the cities of the south and the southeast of Turkey. The cities became over populated due to the swelling numbers of newly arrivals, and coping with the new situation became more difficult (Barkey 1996:69). The 1960s and 1970s' migration from rural to urban areas had already created shantytowns around the cities. These shantytowns now received new migrants as a result of compulsory relocation and resettlement policies and the fears engendered by repression.

Öcalan's dream, an independent Marxist-Leninist 'Kurdish' state, was supported by Greece, Syria and some western European capitals against Turkish territorial integrity. Turkey condemned and criticised Belgium and the Netherlands for allowing the so-called 'the Kurdish Parliament in Exile' to gather for meetings and organisations. Turkey placed the Netherlands on its red list, which meant Turkey's arms purchases from it would be halted, and economic and political relations would be minimised. For the same reason political relations were strained with Austria, Russia, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway (Olson 1996:99). After realising the impossibility of establishing such a Marxist-Leninist Kurdish entity, Öcalan began to argue for autonomy or a federated solution within the region. Öcalan and his supporters tried to obtain European public support for their criminal activities as an 'authentic cultural and ethnic struggle' against the Turkish 'tyranny'. The PKK partly succeeded by gaining lavish support against Turkey from some traditionally Turkophobic

European media.¹⁵⁸ European capitals became the focus of debate on Turkey's 'Kurdish problem'. Turkish governments seemed ill prepared to resist the increasingly well organized and professional publicity machine in support of Kurdish aspirations in European countries against the Turkish security forces' measures in the southeast of Turkey (Robins 1996:114). The so-called "Kurdish parliament in exile" was established in Europe in 1995 and is located in Brussels at present.¹⁵⁹ Among of its delegates there were six Turkish parliamentarians who were member of the *Halkın Emekçi Partisi* (HEP, the Peoples' Labour Party),¹⁶⁰ which was banned by the

¹⁵⁸ The names of such media and their writings in Germany can be obtained from Orhan Gökçe's study: *Das Bild der Türken in der deutschen Presse, Eine Inhaltsanalyse (the Picture of Turks in German Press) der Berichterstattung zum Besuch des türkischen Ministerpräsidenten Turgut Özal im Herbst 1984 in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Beiträge Zur Deutschen Philologie, Band 64, W.Schmitz verlag in Giessen.*

¹⁵⁹ "The TV-magazine *Mediterraneo* recently showed a documentary on the Kurdish Parliament in exile. The Parliament is located in Brussels (Belgium), but its presence (I imagine for diplomatic reasons) is only tolerated and no distinctive signs must appear outside of the building. A huge vertical flag is displayed in the main room where the Parliament meets in official sessions. A coat-of-arms is also hanging on the wall near the entrance (but inside the building, therefore not supposed to be seen from the outside). Ivan Sache, 25 April 1999" www.hampshireflag.co.uk/world-flags/allflags/krd-kp.html.

¹⁶⁰ The same people formed the *Demokrasi Partisi* (DEP, the Democracy Party) as a successor of the HEP in May 1993 which was banned again in 1994. Once again, the name of the party was changed as the *Halkın Demokrasi Partisi* (HADEP, the Democracy Party of People) which was formed on 11 May 1994. The Constitutional Court outlawed the HADEP permanently for aiding the terrorist PKK organisation and carrying out activities challenging the state on 14 March 2003. Forty-six HADEP members including its founders have been banned from becoming a member, founder, administrator or inspector of any political party for five years.

Constitutional Court in 1993 (ourworld. compuserve. com/homepages/syillik/index.html).¹⁶¹ Turgut Özal attempted to eliminate PKK' terrorist activities through negotiations by or with people who were sympathetic the PKK in political parties such as the DEP. Özal was aware of some political figures' involvement with the PKK and tried to use them for Turkey's security and integrity purposes. President Özal knew that some member states of the EU saw the PKK insurgencies as a 'nationalistic struggle of ethnic Kurds' in Turkey.

Some EU countries feel the need to criticise Turkey's human rights record due to the considerable presence of Kurdish populations in their own major cities, alongside other domestic considerations. Large numbers of ethnic Kurds who are Turkish citizens live in European Union countries (more than half in Germany). Robin (1996:117) suggested that the ethnic Kurdish population in Europe could be up to four hundred thousands by 1996. However, to estimate the exact figure of the ethnic Kurdish population originated from Turkey is difficult. If the numbers of Turkish citizens originated from the east and the southeast regions of Turkey are assumed as ethnic Kurdish, then, the estimation might be around one million at present. Germany has been forced by domestic critics to suspend arms deliveries to Turkey. However, this caused a popular outcry among the ethnic Turkish population in Germany. PKK activities have flourished by demonstrating, organising rallies, attacking Turkish citizens' houses and shops, collecting forced donations and so on. A mass rally was organised by ethnic Turkish and Kurdish migrants to protest against German policies towards Turkey. The

¹⁶¹ Leyla Zana, Sedat Yurttaş, Ahmet Türk, Hatip Dicle, Sırrı Sakık, Mahmut Alınak, Selim Sadak and Orhan Doğan (Muller 1996:188).

growing migrants' pressure and economic needs forced Germany to withdraw its demands on 'not to use German weapons by the Turkish security forces against 'Kurdish rebellions' in Turkey'. This development demonstrated the potential capabilities of the domestic Turkish lobby (Barkey 1996:76). The growing presence of Kurdish interest groups and diasporas accentuated the problems and pressure on Turkey. A number of former refugees became writers, intellectuals or entrepreneurs, who are continuously exploiting the so-called "Kurdish issue" for their own economic gain or social purposes in European countries. The position of large groups of ethnic Turkish and Kurdish migrants is thus threatened by the relatively small numbers of PKK members. Turkish citizens' businesses are attacked, and their homes and shops are violated. The PKK has been very successful in organising and mobilising Kurdish and Turkish sympathizers for their cause using forceful methods. Despite the German governments ban on the organization there, the PKK has staged large demonstrations, collects and extorts funds and recruits fighters for the 'front' in Turkey. With escalation of international conflict, the Kurdish/PKK issue has increasingly become more of a domestic problem for the German authorities. To resolve this problem requires cooperation and collaboration with the Turkish authorities, but so far in most cases Germany has failed to deliver. The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, dispatched a high-ranking intelligence advisor, Heinrich Lummer, to meet with the PKK head, Abdullah Öcalan, in Damascus in Syria on 25 November 1995.¹⁶²

¹⁶² "The visit by the official from the office for the Protection of the Constitution came in the immediate aftermath of a similar visit by a member of the German parliament. Reuters, 25

The PKK smuggled humans and drugs into and out of Turkey. “The PKK operatives tried to ensconce themselves along the road from Lataqiya in Syria to Samandağ, a village in the Amanos mountains in Hatay. This is a road used heavily by smugglers and drug traffickers, which the PKK hoped to exploit to their advantage.” (Olson 1996:89). The PKK has exploited the religious and ethnic differences, and attempted to ingratiate itself with the local population by purchasing food provisions at prices substantially higher than the market (Olson 1996:89). Indigenous populations were forced to buy PKK commodities in order to support the PKK. Apparently, the Germans were concerned that PKK demonstrations, political activities and drug trafficking were creating disorders and disturbances in Germany, and requested Öcalan to stop such activities (Hablemitoğlu 1999:3-7). Öcalan requested that Germany recognise the PKK as a legitimate entity and that it stop characterizing PKK as a terrorist organisation; then, such actions might be stopped (Olson 1996:91).¹⁶³

The PKK enjoyed the support of a number of European social democratic parties and was well represented in the European Parliament. They were sympathetic to the cause of ‘Kurdish’ human rights and political struggles. Terrorist attacks on Turkish citizens intensified during 1997 and 1998 in south-

November 1995. Both of these visits have infuriated Turkey.” (Barkey 1996:77; Olson 1996:91; *Hürriyet* 25/26 November 1995).

¹⁶³ There were demonstrations in support of the creation of a Kurdish entity in Düsseldorf on 1 April 1995. The demonstration criticised the German policy of selling German military hardware to Turkey, which was in use by the Turkish security forces against the PKK terrorists. Germany asked the Turkish authorities not to use German military goods against “the Kurdish guerrillas”. However, a counter demonstration took place against Germany’s requirement and restored German-Turkish relations (Robin 1996:124).

eastern Turkey and the Turkish state retaliated repeatedly on Turkish and Iraqi territory. The Turkish authorities had had enough and decided to apply pressure on terrorism-supporting countries, beginning with Syria. In October 1998 Turkey demanded that Syria cease its assistance to the PKK, and its recognition of the organisation and its supporters as terrorists, and extradite Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey (Olsen 1996:86-92). Turkey concentrated its troops on its border with Syria and the situation became tense. Egypt and Iran acted as mediators. On 20 October 1998 an agreement was signed between Turkey and Syria in Adana. Syria admitted that Öcalan was living on its territory, declared that it now regarded the PKK as a terrorist organisation, and expressed its willingness to set up a joint security apparatus to check PKK activities in Syria and Lebanon (Liel 2001:233-38).

Abdullah Öcalan left Syria for Moscow in early December 1998 and asked the USSR for political asylum. The Turkish government demanded his extradition to Turkey. The Soviet government denied his asylum application and Öcalan found himself detained in Rome by the Italian authorities ((*Milliyet* 16.02.1999; *Hürriyet* 16.02.1996). Italy was under pressure from Turkish public opinion on the one hand, and from Italian legal responsibilities and PKK threats of violence on the other. Turkey boycotted Italian goods and the relations between two countries immediately became very tense. Germany also wanted to question Öcalan but prudently desisted from making a formal extradition request due to its serious concern at the number of Turkish and PKK disturbances within the country (Liel 2001:236).

Thus, Öcalan became a hot potato. No one in Europe wanted either to host him or to hand over him to Turkey. Öcalan moved from one capital to another

until on 2 February 1999 “in tansit” he was flown from Greece to Nairobi in Kenya (Milliyet 16.02.1999; Hürriyet 16.02.1996).¹⁶⁴ In the end, he was abducted by Turkish security forces from his hideout in Kenya and brought to Turkish justice, with the assistance of Turkish (MIT), Israeli (Mossad) and US (CIA) secret agencies (www.milliyet .com.tr/ 1999/02/16/ siyaset /siy0. html; New York Times: 17,18,20 February 1999).

After the capture of the terrorist leader in Kenya in February 1999, Europe experienced Kurdish extremists’ activities. In Europe the PKK and its supporters felt betrayed by their host countries. Simultaneous organised protests disturbances were carried out throughout European capitals (New York Times 18-20 February 1999). There were protests outside a number of Greek and Israeli embassies.¹⁶⁵ Kurds were fully aware of the Greeks’ involvement with the PKK (as they had been protected and trained by the Greek military for guerrilla warfare against Turkey) and their inadequate efforts to hide their leader, Öcalan. Öcalan was sentenced to death by a Turkish court. However, the death penalty was changed to a life sentence thanks to the Copenhagen criteria which required an amendment of Turkey’s

¹⁶⁴ In Europe the Kurds felt betrayed – especially by Greece. Indeed, it seems the Greeks could have handled the entire affair much better than they did. While Öcalan was still “in transit” at the Athens airport, it was decided to move him to northern Greece and then put him on a flight to Nairobi. For two weeks Öcalan was sequestered at the residence of the Greek ambassador, George Kostoulas, while the Greeks were trying to find a refuge for him anywhere but in their own land (www.kurdistan.org (the American Kurdish Information Network). For a detailed daily account of the abduction of Öcalan see Milliyet 16.02.1996 (www.milliyet.com.tr/ 1999/02/16/siyaset/siy0.html).

¹⁶⁵ The PKK members attacked the Israeli Consulate in Berlin on 17 February 1996. The Israeli guards killed Ahmet Acar, Sema Alp and Mustafa Kurt.

capital punishment laws. He is currently serving his life sentence in prison.¹⁶⁶

The Turkish south-eastern provinces, where most ethnically Kurdish Turkish citizens live, are among the poorest and least developed areas of Turkey. This reflects the uneven economic and political development which has created a sharp contrast between Turkey's affluent west and backward east. Thus, at the heart of the terrorist movements lie exploitation of economic and cultural grievances of local inhabitants. In fact ethnic Turks, Arab and Kurds are equally poor and deprived in this part of Turkey. Probably some parts of western Turkey are even poorer than this part. Nevertheless, any wrongdoing or minor disturbance in the region is immediately publicised by the mass media as evidence of Kurdish disadvantage and Turkish oppression.

The PKK exploited all the socio-economic problems, unemployment issues, absence of proper education, and the communal disturbances, as the so-called the chief defender of the 'Kurdish issue'. As a result of the more serious and brutal methods used by the PKK terrorists against civilian populations and the Turkish security forces, the Turkish forces retaliated against the terrorists by forcing the inhabitants of the region to migrate to the cities in the south and the southeast Turkey. Often the forced relocation of villagers followed by the destruction of their former dwellings places in southeast Turkey led to the migration of most of the inhabitants of a number of villages, towns and cities to the western part of Turkey (Robins 1996:116). However, PKK militants' harassments

¹⁶⁶ "Turkey today formally commuted the death sentence of Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish rebel leader, to life in prison. Two months ago, Parliament abolished capital punishment as part of Turkey's bid to join the European Union. Turkey has not executed anyone since 1984." (New York Times 4 October 2002).

continued within the suburbs and shantytowns of the major cities of western Turkey. In the absence of adequate schooling and consequently good education and skills, the inhabitants of this area have suffered the most among the low wage earners in Turkey. The PKK's attempt to create communal disturbances between ethnic Turks and Kurds partly succeeded among these vulnerable peoples. It is suggested that more than 2 million people in the southeast have been displaced due to the village burnings and evacuations. The Turkish Human Rights Association stated that at least 1,360 villages had been destroyed by 1995 (Robins 1996:130fnt.12).¹⁶⁷ Mostly unemployed, low-educated, rural and southeast Turkey originated shantytowns' inhabitants had difficulty to adapt themselves to urban industrial life-styles. Therefore, they were the source of socio-economic, political and cultural challenges for the local and national municipal, social and security authorities. Some parties (such as the *Halkın Emekçi Partisi* (HEP, the Peoples' Labour Party), the *Demokrasi Partisi* (DEP, the Democracy Party), the *İşçi Partisi* (İP, the Workers' Party), the *Saadet Partisi* or *Fazilet Partisi* (SP or FP, the Virtue or Felicity Party) in Turkish politics tried to use these people to gain political advantage rather than to meet their economic, cultural and social needs. Nevertheless, the political exploitation of these people was not limited to the above political parties and the PKK. These people were also used by the pro-PKK intelligentsia, journalists, academics and scholars in both Turkey and Europe. In particular, former refugees enjoyed relative freedom to publish and received considerable lavish support from western intellectuals to say

¹⁶⁷ Muller (1996:182) suggests that the number of villages as 2,667 and displaced people were 311,000.

whatever they liked about the PKK and so-called 'Kurdish struggle', and the 'Turkish oppression' in European journals and books.¹⁶⁸

The inhabitants of shantytowns became the prime targets of the PKK and human smugglers. Multifaceted benefits played crucial roles in this migration flow to West European countries. One of the main beneficiaries of this migration has been the PKK/KADEK, which remains an issue to be tackled by European countries. When in 1974 the European countries stopped official recruitment of migrant labour to their countries, the only ways left for Turkish citizens to gain admission to Europe were the asylum-seeking system and family unification procedures. This system was used by the PKK terrorist organisation for smuggling people, by buying their hopes of 'becoming rich and having a good life' in Europe (www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-816275,00.html).¹⁶⁹ The charge per person to be

¹⁶⁸ One sided pro-PKK writings by Gülistan Gürbey, Aram Nigogosian, Michael Gunter, Hamit Bozarslan, Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu and Mark Muller can be found in Robert Olsen's book entitled *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s Its impact on Turkey and the SWAC*. The best organised and most effective pro-Kurdish organisation was/is the PKK/KADEK. Political wing of the PKK/KADEK was/is the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) and the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE). There were a number of PKK solidarity and information centres in Athens, Copenhagen, Madrid, Paris, London and Brussels. In 1995 MED-TV station was established in Brussels, and it was licensed in London to broadcast to Turkey (Robin 1996:121-22).

¹⁶⁹ Oliver Letwin, the shadow home secretary, stated that "This [British refugee system and the handling of refugees in Britain] is extremely disturbing. I've been saying for 18 months that the complete administrative chaos in our asylum system offers a secure route to disappearance to anyone with terrorist links." A senior immigration officer described the service and asylum system as "a mess". He said "monitoring those entering Britain was difficult as details had been held on three incompatible computer

smuggled to any European country has been approximately £5,000. When these people settle down, they have to continue to pay the PKK by monthly instalments as soon as they open a business or find a job. PKK representatives come and collect monthly 'donations' to the organisation which brought them to Europe. Whoever refuses to pay will be harassed and threatened with death by the organisation. Most of these smuggled so-called refugees have struggled to adapt their life style to their host countries' urbanised life-styles. While they had had difficulties in Turkey, these people faced even more serious challenges and difficulties to cope with European culture and traditions. Without proper education, language and necessary skills for white-collar jobs some may be able to find jobs, in either extremely low paid unskilled-jobs without proper protection and insurance or in illegal jobs as drug dealers.¹⁷⁰

The second group of beneficiaries of such migration has been the migrants themselves. These migrants wanted to migrate for a better place to live and stable life. However, what they found in European countries has disappointed many of them. Nevertheless, it was too late to return to home, while they had already spent their life-long savings to pay the people smugglers. Only a few have managed to establish small-family businesses, such as kebab and take-away shops.

systems until last month." on 14 September 2003 (www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,176-816275,00.html).

¹⁷⁰ In the last two years (October 2001-September 2003) the author of this thesis experienced such matters as an interpreter in various official and unofficial interpretations and interviews with Turkish speaking asylum seekers. Many of these people works in their compatriots' family businesses for a room and food only. Whereas others gets money for their contribution as a cheap labour their employers only less than a pound for per hour.

The third category of beneficiaries of this migration was those EU member states who needed a cheap, mobile, low-skilled young labour force for the dirty jobs in their economies. On the one hand, they were able to purchase their labour supply, on the other they used these migration flows and people in their domestic and international politics, particularly during the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey. These people have been used as a bargaining chip by the European parliament against Turkey to delay Turkey's accession to the EU. The EU has told Turkey that reforms in its penal code needs to be inserted to soften some of the restrictions on freedom of speech. The Turkish authorities became paranoid about any request regarding the Kurdish issue, which has been immediately associated with the PKK. Therefore, in the minds of the ethnic Turks and in the political arena of the EU, most of the Kurdish problems became rigid and extreme issues. The PKK's terrorist activities and reactionary Turkish security forces have been responsible for such a development (Barkey 1996:71).

Probably the last beneficiary of such migration is Turkey and the Turkish authorities, who have reduced the unemployment rate slightly while receiving migrants' remittances for the ailing Turkish economy. Nevertheless, a young economically useful and mobile labour force was lost for the benefit of European countries. Turkey also faced unnecessary international political pressure for its bad record of Human Rights abuse.

Human trafficking, drug and weapon smuggling continue to occur and the security and immigration authorities are fully aware of what is happening. These people are under intense scrutiny by the security organisations and occasional arrests are made (observer.guardian.co.uk/asylum/

story/0,1084,963347,00.html). The organisation has smuggled not only individuals but whole villages and towns from eastern Turkey for the PKK's economic and political benefit. Pre-prepared statements have been available to those asylum seekers who testify and claim that they were persecuted by the Turkish security forces due to their links with or support for the PKK, some of which were accepted according to the credibility of their story without proper hard evidence.¹⁷¹ A number of asylum-seekers gained refugee status and those officials whom I have contacted personally as an interpreter in different services acknowledge this harsh reality. Because of the economic and political benefits for the individuals and agencies involved, this still continues.

The terrorist organisations, solicitors, barristers, interpreters, housing and legal agencies alongside numerous sections of society are benefiting from these asylum seekers, who are also used by the European Union's small countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and the Scandinavian countries) as an excuse to delay Turkey's accession to the EU.

Turkey-EU Relations: Despite the Turkish authorities' endless efforts and restless preparations

¹⁷¹ See appendices on the author's personal involvement as an interpreter and bilingual support worker in courts, with solicitors, for the health service, for the Welsh refugee council and for the education department in Swansea. Former refugees' statements are being used by a number of present refugees. All the inhabitants of M. Koyunlu's village from Kahramanmaras migrated to Haringey suburb in London using similar stories for their asylum statements. Mr Koyunlu was granted refugee status due to his connection to and support for the PKK. However, our private discussions of his story and the rest of his villagers' stories predominantly related to economic matters rather than political issues. He used for his statement the name of the PKK which he paid for usage the name as well as transfers from Turkey to Britain. The names of individual asylum seekers might change but their story and smugglers are always the same.

to join the EU as a full member, and Turkey's unrelenting self-identification as a "Western" state, the EU has continuously frustrated and failed Turkish expectations. The unreliability and reluctance of some member states of the EU might force the Turks to reconsider their Western policy. The Turks are fully aware of Turkey's place within the diverse conscious perceptions of Westerners. The imminent accession of some former Soviet (East European) satellites countries has also frustrated the Turks.

The complex and awkward relations between Turkey and the European Community (EC) began with the application of the former to become a member of the community in July 1959. The Community's response to the Turkish application in July 1959 suggested the establishment of an association until Turkey's circumstances permitted its full accession. The consequent negotiations between the Parties resulted in the signature of the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963 in Ankara. This agreement, which entered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EC through the establishment in three phases of a customs union which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between the EC and Turkey (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/relations.htm).

The Association Agreement envisaged the progressive establishment of a Customs Union which would bring the EC and Turkey closer together in economic and trade matters. Under the First Financial Protocol, which covered the period 1963-1970, the Community provided Turkey with loans worth 175 million ECU. The EC granted trade concessions under the form of tariff quotas were not effective as it was expected. The EC's share in Turkish imports rose from 29 per cent in 1963 to 42 per cent in 1972 (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab/relations.htm).

The Ankara Agreement envisaged the free circulation of goods, persons, services and capital between the Contracting parties. However, the EC excluded Turkey from EC decision-making mechanisms and precluded Turkey from recourse to the ECJ for dispute settlement. The Customs Union that was to be established between the parties went much further than the abolition of tariff and quantitative barriers to trade between the parties and the application of a Common External Tariff to imports from third countries, and envisaged harmonisation with EC policies in virtually every field relating to the internal market. Finally, the Çiller government signed a Customs Union agreement with the EU on 25 March 1995. This came to force on 1 January 1996 (www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/customunion.htm). However, the advent of Erbakan's coalition government in 1996-97 strained relations with the increasingly Islamophobic West.

Turkish EU Prospects: Despite Turkey's endless efforts to achieve eventual accession to the EU, the attainment of this goal seems very remote. Turkey's political ties with the European Union will probably be re-considered in the near future. Alternative economic and political options will be sought in the meantime, perhaps with India and the Far Eastern countries, while Turkey's relations with the EU could be reduced to a steady standby situation. Turkey will continue to take part in European security arrangements as long as the Europeans remain willing to include the Turks in their organisations. If future European security arrangements were to exclude Turkey, this might open way for other security arrangements within the region. The future of Turkey-EU relations is still an area of uncertainty. For more than four decades relations have proved to be difficult, with the unwillingness of the European countries to

agree to Turkey's accession to the EU. The endless requirements of the EU seem never to be achieved by the Turkish authorities. On the other hand, in order to avoid unacceptable budgetary expenditures on Turkey, the EU would have to alter many of its internal structures and policies in relation to agricultural and regional policies. Free movement of Turkish labour within the EC, according to the agreements made between Turkey and the EC, could have been implemented a long time ago. However, this will almost certainly be delayed for the foreseeable future, due to increasing unemployment rates and hostility towards non-European foreigners in the EU.

The EU dimension has provided institutional western identification for Turks. Nevertheless, this did not change fundamentally conscious or unconscious Western and Eastern elite perceptions of Turkey's 'Western identity'. Given Turkey's pro-Western and secular-democratic orientation and policies, the easterners, (Iranians and Arabs first and foremost) perceive Turkey as a 'Westoxicated' regime, or as a corrupted Eastern country (Aras 2002:4). On the other hand, Western elites recognise Turkey as a SWAC country. It seems that Turkey is in limbo, in neither the East nor the West, but it preserves its unique place at the crossroads where the continents and cultures meet.

Turkey's Prospects for the Future: Nevertheless, Turkey will continue to try to protect its citizens' rights to work, reside and free movement in the EU. Turkish migrants' social, cultural, economic and political rights will be defended as long as a large Turkish minority remains in the European Union countries. There have been parliamentary initiatives to deal with these issues and similar attempts will be made in future. The existing Turkish minority in the EU will continue to grow and eventually they could

provide peaceful bridges between Turkey and their host countries.¹⁷²

Political and economic relations with the former Soviet states will be economically and politically decisive in the Black Sea and Transcaucasus regions. Turkey will most likely seek further improvements in economic and political co-operation with these areas. Turkey will most probably be an important influential regional ally for any power which might have interests in the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the SWAC, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and Central Asia. The Turkish interests are most likely grow in these areas. Similar trends were observed during the 1990s and it will not be surprising to see such developments continuing in the next decade or so.

One can expect growing prospects in the future if present economic and political relations between Turkey and Russia are continued. Even Turko-Russian relations became clearer when the Blue-pipeline project (*Mavi Akım Projesi*) was completed in 2003. Turkey is now buying its 60 per cent of its natural gas needs from Russia. Moreover, economic ties are modestly increasing, even though they are still limited relative to overall Turkish import and export statistics. If Russia were to succeed in fully liberalising its economy and establishing a stable liberal democracy, Turkey would be one of the neighbouring countries to benefit the most from such a development. Turkey's capacity and opportunities for expanding existing trade and investment within the

¹⁷² The parliamentary debates regarding on Turkish migrants in Europe and their problems can be accessed in the records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) as follows: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (TBMMTD) 10.4.1985:69-70; TBMMTD 15.12.1985:535-6; Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD) 15.12.1985:544; MMTD 22.12.1986:165-7; MMTD 22.12.1986:202-3; MMTD 14.4.1987:139-41; MMTD 27.4.1989:13-5; MMTD 22.12.1989:479-80; MMTD 22.2.1995:398-9.

region might help to establish a stable and non-confrontational relationship with a more prosperous Russia. It would be unlikely, however, if Russia were to turn inwards or to try to restore its former dominance over the CIS and the region. This would create serious challenges for Turkish policy-makers as well as for the Russians. However, it is highly likely that Turkish relations with Russia will be peaceful and constructive as long as Russia positively and reciprocally responds to it.

Perhaps the SWAC was the cradle of civilisation, but it has also been the source of many potential international conflicts. Religious and ethnic rivalries in the SWAC have proven to be difficult to overcome since the dissolution of the Osmanlı State domination in the region. The present situation provides serious challenges for Turkey as a peace mediator and balancing power between the conflicting sides in this particularly troubled region of the world. However, if a peace could be accomplished within the SWAC, probably the Turks would be the nation most pleased in the region. Nevertheless, it seems that problems between Israel and its neighbours will continue to exist and Turkey will continue to play its traditional role in the region, as in recent decades. On the other hand, the water shortages of the SWAC might force the affected countries to cooperate at Turkey's expense. However, this could be difficult to realise. Probably, the water issue will be counterbalanced by other matters in the region such as terrorism, the Kurdish issue, trade relations, territorial disputes, and lucrative oil and gas reserves. In the SWAC, as elsewhere, international politics is not a zero-sum game, and the fact is that if Turkey's SWAC neighbours could overcome their differences Turkey would gain from this outcome.

The American-led invasion of Iraq during 2003 has affected the power balance between Iraq and Iran. The eventual establishment of a pro-Western proxy government in Iraq might help to trigger the reformist groups in Iran to make further demands for liberalisation of policies and the establishment of liberal-market economy. Initial signs of such developments were experienced in June 2003. The authoritarian regime of Iran would be eventually be forced to be transformed by domestic pressure groups' demands which would be supported externally by the international community, notably the United States and the West European countries. Turkey would welcome such developments, due to its expectation of investments and an expansion of its existing trade and cultural relations with Iran. Turkish-speaking Iranians would play a major role in bridging such cooperative and constructive relations between Turkey and Iran. If Iran and Iraq could use their immense oil and gas incomes for economic development rather than military expenditures, this would help to increase their international influence. The economic development of these two countries would create opportunities for Turkish investments and increase trade relations with the region. Further in- and out-migration of well-skilled peoples can be expected in both directions between Iran and Turkey as a result of economic development, or worse scenario as a consequence of military conflict between Iran and the West (the US and possibly the UK).

Of course, in the end, the new world order will emerge and subsequently Turkey will find its appropriate role within that order, according to the requirements of its pragmatic and realistic policies. These policies will be affected by several factors: Turkey's energy needs, long term national and private economic considerations, defence requirements

against external threats, minority and cultural issues. China's attempt to dominate its neighbouring countries in the Asia might not directly affect Turkey. However, the Turkish authorities might be in a position to voice their concerns about the treatment of the Turkish speaking minority in the north-west of China (Xinjiang region), and China's relations with the Turkish Central Asian countries. The European countries will have to find alternative ways to diversify their energy supplies in the coming decades. Therefore, the lucrative energy stock of Central Asia will be decisive for the formation of alliances and co-operation between regional and international powers. Turkey will not be excluded, as a middle range power in world politics and a considerable power in the region, due to its strategic, cultural and socio-political importance. China might offer new horizons for Turkish entrepreneurs and skilled migrants. Nevertheless they will also face competition from Western and Asian rivals.

In the above possible scenarios, the most critical and crucial policy choices will be awaiting Turkish policy-makers. First, further shifts are likely in the basic orientation of US policy to stabilise and extend American influence in the SWAC and Central Asia. Such a possibility could materialise thorough the establishment of a puppet government in Iraq and by pressurising Syria and Iran using the terrorism card and regime change. Afghanistan and the Turkish republics in Central Asia might help to realise the American dream. However, to sustain such aims requires enormous amounts of economic resources, which might be obtained from the invaded areas. Nevertheless, American public opinion might turn against maintaining American influence in the SWAC if they start to receive unbearable numbers of

American military casualties in the region.¹⁷³ In this situation, Turkey could play crucial roles in making easier either or more difficult the acceptance of US policies in the region. So, to disregard Turkey will be difficult, whether for its vital support or due to its hostile stances. Quite simply, Turkey has become too important to be ignored.

Despite its serious limitations and obstacles, bilateral and multilateral security and trade projects were initiated by Turkey within the Balkan states. However, to get full clear support the multi-culturally diversified communities of the Turkish state is not always possible. The projects had to be defined clearly, well-argued and developed within the Turkish communities in order to be accepted. Nevertheless, Turkey will have always opportunities and initiatives as long as it occupies a crucial strategic position. In this sense, Feroz Ahmad's conclusion best describes what the Turks can do: "If the history of modern Turkey is any guide, it seems fair to conclude that the Turks have shown the ability to deal creatively with changing situations in the world order at least on two occasions. They did so after the two World Wars when they showed great flexibility in finding solutions to problems that beset them. Given their rich experience there is little doubt that they will do so again and go on to make a Turkey they can be proud of." (Ahmad 1993:227)

The growing presence of Turkish citizens in Western Europe as refugees bolstered the image of Turks as oppressors. The Turkish state was blamed on its uncompromising policies and brutal methods that forced its citizens to flee. Public opinion has been so preoccupied by the military regime's brutal activities

¹⁷³ 73 American military personnel were killed in Iraq since the President George W. Bush (Junior) declared that the Iraq war is over (BBC World News on 12 September 2003).

during the 1980s that even those who were 'illegal' economic migrants found a receptive atmosphere in Western Europe (Robin 1996:117).

The precise number of ethnic Kurds in European countries is not clear. The suggested numbers varied, according to different sources, from seventy-five to four hundred thousands by 1996 (Robin 1996:117). These estimations are usually based on those Turkish citizens originated from the east and southeast regions of Turkey, which might be assumed to be around 1 million at present. There are many different organisational bodies among Turkey's Kurdish émigrés, including social, cultural, media and political organisations. Predominantly ethnic Kurdish Turkish citizens were smuggled by human traffickers. The chief player in this 'migration business' was the PKK organisation, which caused difficult relations between Turkey and European countries in general, Germany in particular.

Turkey's economic, cultural and security relations played crucial roles in the direction of Turkish political history. From time to time one or two of these factors was more dominant than other factors. Nevertheless, all these factors became dominant reasons in the selection of political relations and final destinations and in Turkish subsequent political history. Similarities and differences between the socio-economic, cultural and political backgrounds of Turks relative to European countries either assisted or impeded migrants' eventual decisions to integrate and/or ability to cooperate with the European democratic systems. Multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic entities of Turkey helped to establish generally peaceful and constructive, but sometimes hostile, relations between Turkey and European countries. The economic gains of individuals and countries can be further improved by political,

educational, and cultural cooperative relations between the parties involved. The Turkish minority in Western countries became in effect Turkish ambassadors in Europe. Their welfare, therefore, is important if Turkey is to maintain peaceful and harmonious relations with the EU.

CONCLUSION

Modernisation in the Osmanlı State: European Turkophobia originated in the negative historical experiences of the Middle Ages, which adversely affected European understanding and perceptions of Turks and Turkish culture. The Osmanlı State's domination over Southeast Europe started to decline in the 18th century. The beginning of this change was marked by the adaptation of new technologies and imported European military, cultural and political institutions, commonly understood as the “modernization” of the Osmanlı State.

Some reforms and foreign institutions were adopted easily while others faced resistance and rejection by different interest groups. The first extensive adaptation of the Western life-style was experienced during the *Lale Devri* (the Tulip period), mostly by the élites of the capital, Konstantiniyye (İstanbul).

Those who were poor or negatively affected by the introduction of the new reforms of the administrative bodies and élites of Konstantiniyye, reacted against the new institutions and luxury life-styles of the rulers. Nevertheless, the Sultans invited in European military experts, academics, scientists and other people who had special skills and knowledge and who could help to transplant European advances to the Osmanlı State. Humbaracı Ahmed Paşa was one of the many Western experts who trained and equipped the Osmanlı armed forces along the lines of Western Armies. These invited experts, academics, scientists, instructors, teachers, special envoys and merchants

brought their own distinctive cultures which affected first and foremost the élites of the capital and other major cities' population of the Osmanlı State.

The reigns of Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) saw the most extensive reformation and modernization of the Osmanlı State ever carried out. A number of bureaucratic, administrative and social institutions were replaced by the new modernized establishments, while traditional educational and military organizations were remodelled along modern Western lines.

Modernization began at first in the Osmanlı armed forces, which enabled army personnel to meet with Western military experts and receive Western education, training and Western products for their daily lives in general and for their service in armed forces in particular. Such developments in the Osmanlı armed forces explain why officers played such important leading roles initially in the "modernization" and later the "Westernization" of the Osmanlı State and the Turkish Republic, respectively. The military acquired knowledge of modern Western Europe through the reforms and modernization periods of the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 20th century the concept of modernization was changed somewhat to one of Westernization, which involved the wholesale adaptation of various Western judicial, cultural, social and educational institutions.

The initial influence of the French army system on the Osmanlı Army in the late 18th and the first half of the 19th century was superseded in the second half of the 19th century by Prussian German influence. The alliance between the Turkish and German elites at the beginning of the 20th century had profound effects on both sides' military, cultural and economic relations.

The exchange of military experts, academics and students intensified cultural and economic relations.

The process of modernization in the Osmanlı State spread from the military to the fields of literature, educational and administrative institutions, law and regulation. Towards the end of the 18th century, numerous newspapers were published in Osmanlı Turkish and in European languages such as French and English. Western-educated Osmanlı bureaucrats and intellectuals were able to read Western newspapers, books and other publications, which familiarised them with the West. Numerous books and Western literature were translated by the Translation Office (*Tercüme Odası*), from which many Western-minded diplomats and bureaucrats emerged as a result of study and education, and played extensive roles in the Westernization programmes of the Osmanlı élite.

The translation of books and other literature from European languages, together with the printing and availability of Osmanlı and foreign newspapers, gave rise to a new reading public among the newly-opened Westernized and secularized schools' graduates and the élites of the major cities in the Osmanlı State. The extensive trade and cultural relations between the Osmanlı State and Western European countries enabled people to travel, especially officials, officers, academics, scientists, teachers, missionaries and most importantly the merchants who spread new ideas on organizational reform, nationalism and parliamentarism.

In the second half of the 19th century German military experts and instructors were invited in, which led to the importation of German military equipment and weapons for the Osmanlı Army. One of the most influential German experts was Helmut von Moltke, whose influence was perpetuated by other German

military experts. Ordinary Osmanlı citizens were able to meet with secularised and/or western-educated officers while they were performing their military service. When they returned to their home towns or villages they were at least partly aware Western life-styles and education. This was one of the most influential ways of increasing Osmanlı society's awareness of the West and Western products, particularly those of Germany.

There were also reformed and/or newly established institutions such as the police, postal services, fire brigades, and new Western-style secular schools. The imitation of Westernization and Western life-style by the élites and wealthy people aroused the envy of the poor and tradition-bound conservatives, whose reaction was rejection of wholesale modernization and Westernization processes without proper information and examination. Because of the resistance of the bulk of the Osmanlı population, the initial impact of modernization and Westernization on the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Osmanlı State did not match up to the rulers' hopes. In fact, the policies of Westernization reinforced centrifugal tendencies and imperial disintegration, especially in the Balkan provinces.

The taxation and education systems were reformed and numerous changes occurred in provincial administration. The non-Muslim populations gained extensive privileges through the widening support of the European powers and their Westernization policies. The Western-style secular schools deepened the divisions between conservative tradition-bound people and Europhil secular-minded people. Judicial systems and law codes were adapted from France and Italy, which helped to familiarize the Osmanlı and Turkish people with European judicial systems in the 20th century. The new legal system and law codes also

widened the differences between Turkey and other Muslim-populated countries. This, alongside socio-economic reasons, would in time become a significant factor in Turkish decisions to migrate to European countries rather than in oil-rich Arab countries.

The extensive road and railway construction throughout Rumelia and Anatolia up to *Hicaz* (Hejaz) facilitated communication with European capitals as well between the major cities of the Osmanlı State. The new judicial, structural and social changes fostered a flourishing intellectual life, particularly for foreigners and non-Muslim merchants and populations, while Young Osmanlıs began to argue for parliamentarism as a system of government.

The Young Osmanlıs' insistence and the Western influence were two of the many factors for the proclamation of the first Osmanlı constitution on 23 December 1876. However, the liberal movements among Osmanlı elites were slowed down by the disastrous results of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The Osmanlı economy came close to bankruptcy just before the establishment of the *Duyun-ı Umumiye* (the Public Debt Commission). Despite these economic difficulties, thanks to the *Duyun-ı Umumiye*, infrastructural investments continued - chiefly through foreign companies. Students were also sent to Western countries to study, and foreign schools flourished in many parts of the State. The State, the millets and the foreign schools (each having their own educational systems and aims) created three different kinds of education and many frictions in Osmanlı society. So, Sultan Abdülhamid II's reign chiefly produced secular and Western-minded people who argued that Western ideals and practices were the best way forward for their respective communities and the Osmanlı State. The outstanding examples of these kinds of peoples come together in the *İttihat ve*

Terakki Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress), alias the Young Turks. An array of discontented groups each with expectations of their own united against the Sultan's reign.

Springing from the modernization and unification of the Osmanlı State, two influential arguments and their supporters played important roles in the development of the future Turkish Republic. One of these two currents was Islamism (*İslamcılık*), which aimed at unity and modernization of the State within and based up on Islamic traditions. The second group's strategy was to adopt Western civilization wholesale, in order to become an integral part of modern Europe. A Kurdish sociologist, Ziya Gökalp, and his disciples argued for the promotion of Turkish identity and culture supported by Western-style secular education.

Modern Turkey and Westernisation: The supporters of these two competing tendencies were divided among themselves and vied constantly for domination of the political life of the Osmanlı State. They also influenced the formation of the new Turkish Republic during the 1920s. Despite the Western powers' invasion of Turkey at the end of the First World War and the resistance and defence of the Turkish territories against the Western imperialistic powers' aims and policies, the new leaders of Turkey decided to follow Westernization as the official state policy for the future of their people. Mustafa Kemal gained prestige and a powerful following during the so-called War of Independence (*İstiklâl Harbi*). He followed a step by step approach for the realization of his ideas on Westernization, learning from the mistakes and failures as well as the successes of Sultans Selim III, Mahmud II and Abdülhamid II. As a first step, the *Saltanat* (Sultanate) and the *Halifelik* (Caliphate) were abolished. Numerous new changes were made in Turkish customs, appearance, moral

values, and institutions, for the sake of Westernization and eventual democratisation of newly established state. The ideas and practices of Mustafa Kemal and his close friends became the foundational principles of the new Turkish state, which were called “Kemalism” or “Atatürkism”¹⁷⁴ and codified as “Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Revolutionism and Secularism”.¹⁷⁵ The extensive application of Kemalism, which also aimed at “Westernization”, negatively affected relations between Turkey and other Muslim populated countries while intensifying and harmonizing relations between Turkey and the Christian-dominated Western capitalist world.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Kemal declared in 1937: “There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is the flesh-and-bone Mustafa Kemal who now stands before you and who will pass away. The other is you, all of you here who will go to the far corners of our land to spread the ideals which must be defended with your lives if necessary. I stand for the nation's dreams, and my life's work is to make them come true.” (www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Societies/turksoc/intro/in_atatu.html).

¹⁷⁵ Cumhuriyetçilik, Milliyetçilik, Halkçılık, Devletçilik, İnkılapçılık and Laiklik.

¹⁷⁶ “Nationalism became the driving principle of Atatürk’s party, a nationalism directed at raising the prestige of Turkey by efficient Westernisation rather than by an attempt to recover the Osmanlı State. Many contradictions remained - between, for example, the glorification of everything Turkish, carried to the point of xenophobia, on the one hand, and an open admiration of the technical achievement of the West, with an avid desire to imitate them, on the other; or between an anti-religious secularism, and a pro-Islamic, anti-Christian attitude. The administrative and social problems remained, an illiterate peasantry unconcerned with or hostile to social reforms, and a set of minor officials, ignorant of the purposes and functioning of Western institutions. Nevertheless, so much of the confusions and problems of the Young Turks had either disappeared in the course of events, or had been cleared away by the new and clearer-sighted rulers, that it was possible to tackle seriously the task of converting the new Republic into a modern state on the Western model.” (Stirling 1986; www.era.anthropology.ac.uk/Era_Resources/Era/Stirling/StirlingC1.html)

Democratisation of Turkey: One line of Westernization and democratization in Turkey was the parliamentarism launched by the establishment of the *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* (the People's Republican Party or (PRP), which was a continuation of the organization for the *Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafa-ı Hukuk-ı Milliye Cemiyeti* (the Rights and Defence of Anatolia and Rumeli) against the occupation of Turkey by the Western imperialist powers in 1923. Attempts were also made to form an opposition voice in the *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* (the Turkish Grand National Assembly). The first attempt was the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (the Progressive Republican Party) (17 November 1924 – 5 June 1925) and the second was the *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (the Free Republican Party) (12 August 1930 – 18 December 1930). These two experiences of the formation of parties opposed to single ruling party failed, chiefly because of desires of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü to strengthen the practices of the Kemalism and their personal domination of the state. On the other hand, these two experiments made crystal clear of the existence of considerable opposition to the Kemalism, with the result that those people who opposed Kemalism and the Westernization policies were identified and subsequently eliminated. However, these developments also led an environment suitable for further attempts at democratization. Thus, the ruling party had an opportunity to renew its policies and re-order them in accordance with the new needs and developments of Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s.

The difficulties and obstacles of the Second World War years enabled the ruling RPP governments to suspend initiatives for democratization and liberalisation. However, at the end of the Second World War, Turkey had to decide to take her place in

the Western World and joined the founding UN conference in San Francisco in February 1945. External pressure supported internal demands for the democratization of Turkey, which led to the formation of several new political parties representing the broad political spectrum and wide range of expectations of the Turkish population.

Multi-party Experiences: The President of Turkey, İsmet İnönü, used the new opportunity to show how much he and Turkey wanted democratization by announcing an invitation to form new opposition parties. Such parties were formed, and opposition also emerged within the RPP. The *Demokrat Parti* (the Democrat Party) was established by prominent ex-members of the RPP (Mahmut Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü and Refik Koraltan) whose lives had been made miserable by the same party's hard-liners. The RPP determined to continue in power by every means and it did so in the 1946 election. However, the RPP was unable to stop the DP's coming to power in the freer and fairer election of 14 May 1950. Indisputably, the DP's emergence was a turning point in Turkish politics and in Turkey's democratization process.

With high popular expectations of the DP government, everything went smoothly in the first half of the 1950s. The RPP intensified its heavy and unjust criticisms and attacks on the DP, while losing three consecutive elections (1950, 1954 and 1957) to the Democrats, and became very impatient to re-gain political power. The new socio-economic and political atmosphere was designed for the creation of a suitable situation for political repression, culminating in the military intervention of 27 May 1960, which had the support of some political leading figures. The Turkish armed forces, in order to carry out its constitutional responsibility, fine-tuned and balanced Turkish

political developments in accordance with the new requirement of the Kemalist revolutions –from- above.

Western Influence on Turkey: Under the impact of intensive Westernization in the 19th and 20th centuries, the Turkish people have been extensively educated and indoctrinated into the Western life-style, cultures and institutions, preparing them to embrace and participate in the new emerging world order. The policies and practices of Turkish governments and rulers were supported and encouraged by the direct or indirect influences of the Western world. Western policies towards the Turks aimed to eliminate a longstanding powerful enemy while not alienating them from Western civilization, which was also well-matched to the aims of the ascendant political elites, intellectuals and western-educated bureaucrats of Turkey.

Turkey's Migration Experiences: Whether the policies of the authorities of Turkey and the West were followed deliberately or happened accidentally as a result of developing circumstances, one thing was absolutely certain: the West's influence on Turkey and the Turkish people. This influence became one of the vital preparatory and conditioning elements in the decisions of Turkish people variously to join the West when opportunities arose for them to do so. The first two chapters of this book have examined the nature and extent of the West's fundamental influence on the Turkish people, the changing Turkish perceptions of the West, the growing familiarization of Turkish societal and institutional with the West, and their subsequent acculturation to Western political and cultural norms and values. These chapters have made a circumstantial case for the existence of connections between the influence of modernization, Westernization and democratization policies on the Turkish people's education, outlooks and perceptions,

and the subsequent receptive and integrative leaning of millions of Turks into Western systems. This important historical context or background to Turkish international relations and the subsequent integration of Turkish people into West European societies need to be researched by academics on international relations and political history. This is a theme on which this book has made a humble contribution to the academic field of politics and international relations studies. There have been two dimensions to Turkish politics and international relations, as mentioned in previous chapters: the first concerns the imperatives of geography, strategic location, and the political realities of the requirements of Turkey and Turkish history; and the second concerns the intentions and desires of the individuals and involving countries.

Turkish Minority in Europe and its Influence on Turkish Politics: The present four million Turkish citizens' existence in Western Europe is the result of the legacy of two successive periods of Turkish emigration: the labour migration period of the 1960s and 1970s, and the post labour migration period of 1980s and 1990s. Three distinctive forms of migration characterise the latter period: a) family re-unification dominated by marriage migration; b) politically motivated migration since the mid-1980s; c) clandestine, illegal or undocumented labour migration. The second phase of migratory flows from Turkey clearly indicate very interesting immigration observation to Europe. Despite the suspension of the organised immigration of recruited labourers in the early 1970s, Western European countries continued to accept different form of migration, and contrary to popular expectations of policy makers the numbers coming into Europe have risen considerably. The migration-originated Turkish population in Western Europe has more than doubled in the last two decades.

Nearly two-fifths of this spectacular increase is the result of off-spring of already settled migrant families. The remaining part of the unexpected increase, three-fifths, was due to the stability of ongoing, so-called undesired, emigration from Turkey. The most interesting feature in this latest emigration period was that most receiving countries had become more selective and restrictive, and had also adopted strict selection policies mainly on the basis of family formation and close family ties. In other words, a migration network has developed through the social links between the migrants who are already residing in Europe and their relatives and friends in Turkey. In addition to the established family-oriented migration, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Turkish emigration accelerated mainly through the large numbers of people applying for asylum in West European countries. These asylum flows were assisted into the already established migration networks between Europe and Turkey with close family associations.

The Western-style parliamentary system was chosen for the new Turkish Republic polity which affected the destiny of the country and its relations with neighbouring countries. Mustafa Kemal and his Western-minded friends' policies were codified under the six principles (Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Revolutionism and Secularism) known as 'Kemalism' or 'Atatürkçülük' which managed to take control of the new state.

Traditional 'balanced policy' of the Osmanlı administration in international relations leaned towards the West with the realisation of the new Turkish Republic in a Westernized mode, replacing centuries-old institutions with Western counterparts. Legislative gaps were filled by borrowing laws from European countries, without making substantial changes. A number of religious establishments were

eliminated in the course of further secularisation in social mores, education and laws. It was believed that the only means of survival lay in acceptance of contemporary Western secular civilization. In the course of its Westernization policy, Turkish political life experienced the formation of new political parties representing various positions in the political spectrum. The new world order in post-war years affected politicians' decisions on further democratization of the Turkish political system and on joining the West. The arrival in power by the Democrat Party in the May 1950 election was a sign of the successful achievement of a multi-party system. This opened the way for very impressive economic and political developments, particularly in the first term of the Democratic era. A number of economic and political international ties were established between Turkey and Europe which indoctrinated Turkish people in Western styles of life and cultural norms.

The political structural contexts of changes are influenced by the economic, social, political, cultural, historical, demographic frameworks and by individual behavioural responses. Further studies and research investigations are needed for a broader picture of Turkish political history, which is affected by socio-economic development, poverty, social change, cultural mobility, population increase, political instability, violation of human rights, and geographical and historical consequences.

The rapid expansion of the introduction of machinery and other agricultural advances led to certain changes, including major population increases in many rural areas. Many migrated to the cities via improved transportation and communications which enabled them to establish close contact with modern urban society. Millions of peasants migrated from the relatively less developed areas of the country to the

relatively more developed regions (from east to west) during the massive rural-urban exodus of the 1950s-90s period. However, the urban economy failed to create enough jobs for the burgeoning young urban population which were manipulated by various parties.

Turkish minority in Europe has clear effect in both, Turkish political changes in Turkey and European perception of Turks in the EU. Turkish minority were used by some of the EU member states as well as Turkey in the expense of their minority/citizenship rights in Europe and in Turkey. Nevertheless, their effects on Turkish and European politics are influential and present.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The List of Turkish Political Parties

Table adapted from: Tarık Zafer Tunaya *Türkiye’de Siyasî Partiler 1859 - 1952* İstanbul 1952, pp.773 - 777 and also see Tekin Erer, *Türkiye’de Parti Kavgaları* (2.ci Baskı), Çınar Matbaası, İstanbul 1966, pp.33-70; related political parties’ web pages.

İKİNCİ MESRUTİYETE KADAR 1814 – 1908			
1.	Etniki Eteriya	1814	
2.	Fedailer Cemiyeti(C.)	1859	İstanbul
3.	Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti	1865	İstanbul
4.	Ali Suavi (Üsküdar) Komitesi	1878	İstanbul
5.	Kleanti Skalyeri-Aziz Bey Komitesi	1878	İstanbul
6.	Hinçak Komitesi	1887	Cenevre
7.	Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti	1889	İstanbul
8.	Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Paris Şubesi	1889	Paris
9.	Taşnaksütyun Komitesi	1890	Kafkasya
10.	Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki C.Cenevre Şb.	1897	Cenevre
11.	Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki C. Kahire Şb.	1897	Kahire
12.	Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihat Cemiyeti	1902	Paris
13.	Teşebbüsü Şahsî ve ademi Merkeziyet C.	1902	Paris
14.	Osmanlı İttihat ve Inkilâp Cemiyeti	1904	Cenevre
15.	Cemiyeti İnkilâbiye	1904	İstanbul
16.	Osmanlı Hürriyet Cemiyeti	1906	Selânik
17.	Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti	1907	Şam
18.	Selâmeti Umumiye Kulübü	1907	İstanbul
II. MEŞRUTİYET (İTTİHAT VE TERAKKİ CEMİYETİ DEVRESİ (1908 – 1918)			
19.	Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti	1908	Selânik
20.	Fedakârani Millet Cemiyeti	1908	İstanbul
21.	Nesli Cedit Kulübü	1908	İstanbul
22.	Türk Derneği	1908	İstanbul

23.	Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası	1909	İstanbul
24.	Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası	1909	İstanbul
25.	İttihati Muhammedî Fırkası	1909	İstanbul
26.	Heyeti Müttefikai Osmaniye	1909	İstanbul
27.	Arnavut Başkim Kulübü	1909	
28.	İslâhati Esasiyei Osmaniye Fırkası	1909	Paris
29.	Ahali Fırkası	1910	İstanbul
30.	Osmanlı Sosyal İstanbul Fırkası	1910	İstanbul
31.	Osmanlı Sosyal İstanbul Fırkası Paris Şb.	1911	Paris
32.	Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti	1911	İstanbul
33.	Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası	1911	İstanbul
34.	Cenevre Türk Yurdu	1911	Cenevre
35.	El Müntedi ül Edebî	1911	İstanbul
36.	Türk Ocagi	1911	İstanbul
37.	Halâskâr Zabitan Grubu	1912	İstanbul
38.	Millî Meşrutiyet Fırkası	1912	İstanbul
39.	İstanbulihlâki Millî Cemiyeti	1912	İstanbul
40.	Lozan ve Nöşatel Türk Yurdu	1913	Nöşatel
41.	Paris Türk Yurdu	1913	Paris
42.	Millî Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti	1916	İstanbul
43.	Halka Dogru Cemiyeti 1	1917	İzmir
MÜTERAKE VE MÜDAFAA-İ HUKUK DEVRELERİ (1918 – 1923)			
44.	Radikal Avam Fırkası	1918	İstanbul
45.	Osmanlı İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti	1918	Selanik
46.	Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası	1918	İstanbul
47.	İstanbulihlâsi Vatan Cemiyeti	1918	Manisa
48.	Kars Millî Şura Hareketi	1918	Kars
49.	Karakol Cemiyeti	1918	İstanbul
50.	Selâmeti Amme Heyeti	1918	İstanbul
51.	Teceddüt Fırkası	1918	İstanbul
52.	Osmanlı Sulh ve Selâmet Cemiyeti	1918	İstanbul
53.	Millî Kongre	1918	İstanbul
54.	Ahali İktisat Fırkası	1918	İstanbul
55.	Trakya Paşaeli Müdafaa-i Heyeti Osmaniyesi	1918	Edirne
56.	İzmir Müdafaa-i Hukuku Osmaniye C.	1918	İzmir
57.	Selâmeti Osmaniye Fırkası	1918	İstanbul
58.	Kilikyalılar Cemiyeti	1918	İstanbul

59.	Sosyal Demokrat Fırkası	1918	İstanbul
60.	Sulh ve Selâmeti Osmaniye Fırkası	1918	İstanbul
61.	Vahdeti Milliye Heyeti	1919	İstanbul
62.	Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti	1919	İstanbul
63.	Millî Ahrar Fırkası	1919	İstanbul
64.	İngiliz Muhipler Cemiyeti	1919	İstanbul
65.	Vilâyat-i Şarkıye Müdafaa-i Hukuk C.	1919	İstanbul
66.	Şarkî Anadolu Müdafaa-i Hukuk C.	1919	Erzurum
67.	Hareket-i Milliye Reddi İlhak Teşkilâtı	1919	Ege böl.
68.	Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası	1919	İstanbul
69.	Osmanlı İlâyi Vatan Cemiyeti	1919	İstanbul
70.	Millî Türk Fırkası	1919	İstanbul
71.	İlhakı Red Heyeti Milliyesi	1919	İzmir
72.	Trabzon ve Havalisi Ademi Merkezîyet C.	1919	İstanbul
73.	Aydın Heyeti Milliyesi	1919	Aydın
74.	Denizli Heyeti Milliyesi	1919	Menderes
75.	Vilson Prensipleri Cemiyeti	1919	İstanbul
76.	Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası	1919	İstanbul
77.	Nıgehban Cemiyeti Askeriyesi	1919	İstanbul
78.	Osmanlı Mesaî Fırkası	1919	İstanbul
79.	Osmanlı Çiftçiler Derneği	1919	İstanbul
80.	Mağdurini Siyasiye Teavün Cemiyeti	1919	İstanbul
81.	Teâli-i İslam Cemiyeti	1919	İstanbul
82.	Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası	1919	İstanbul
83.	Trabzon Muhafaza-i Hukuku Milliye C.	1919	Trabzon
84.	Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk C.	1919	Sivas
85.	İstanbul Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti	1919	İstanbul
86.	Yeşil Ordu	1920	Ankara
87.	Amele Fırkası	1920	İstanbul
88.	Türkiye Komünist Fırkası	1920	Ankara
89.	Gizli Komünist Fırkası	1920	Ankara
90.	Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası	1920	Ankara
91.	Mim Mim Grupları	1920	İstanbul
92.	Türkiye Zürra Fırkası	1920	İstanbul
93.	Tariki Salâh Cemiyeti	1921	İstanbul
94.	Birinci Grup	1921	Ankara
95.	Şarkî Karip Çerkesleri Temini Hukuk C.	1921	-
96.	Müstakil Sosyalist Fırkası	1922	İstanbul
97.	İkinci Grup	1922	Ankara

98.	Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Cemiyeti	1922	Erzurum
CUMHURİYET REJİMİ			
99.	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (P.)	1923	Ankara
100.	Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası	1924	Ankara
101.	Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası	1930	İstanbul
102.	Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası	1930	Adana
103.	Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi P.	1930	Edirne
104.	Millî Kalkınma Partisi	1945	İstanbul
105.	Demokrat Parti	1946	Ankara
106.	Sosyal Adalet Partisi	1946	İstanbul
107.	Liberal Demokrat Partisi	1946	İstanbul
108.	Çifti ve Köylü Partisi	1946	Bursa
109.	Türk Sosyal Demokrat Partisi	1946	İstanbul
110.	Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi	1946	İstanbul
111.	Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi	1946	İstanbul
112.	Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Partisi	1946	İstanbul
113.	Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü P.	1946	İstanbul
114.	Yalnız Vatan için Partisi	1946	İstanbul
115.	Ergenekon Köylü ve İşçi Partisi	1946	İstanbul
116.	Arıtma ve Koruma Partisi	1946	Ankara
117.	İslam Koruma Partisi	1946	İstanbul
118.	Yurt Görev Partisi	1946	İskenderu
119.	İdealist Partisi	1947	İstanbul
120.	Türk Muhafazakâr Partisi	1947	İstanbul
121.	Türkiye Yükselme Partisi	1948	İstanbul
122.	Millet Partisi	1948	Ankara
123.	Öz Demokratlar Partisi	1948	Afyon
124.	Serbest Demokrat Partisi	1948	İzmir
125.	Müstakil Türk Sosyalist Partisi	1948	İstanbul
126.	Toprak, Emlâk ve Serbest Teşebbüs P.	1949	İstanbul
127.	Müstakiller Birliği	1950	İstanbul
128.	Çalışma Partisi	1950	İstanbul
129.	Liberal Köylü Partisi	1950	Ankara
130.	Demokrat İşçi Partisi	1950	İstanbul
131.	Bağımsızlar Siyasi Derneği	1950	İstanbul
132.	İslam Demokrat Partisi	1951	Ankara
133.	Türkiye Köylü Partisi	1952	İstanbul
134.	Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi	1954	Ankara
135.	Vatan Partisi	1954	İstanbul

136.	Hürriyet Partisi	1955	Ankara
137.	Ufak Parti	1957	Ankara
138.	Birlik Partisi	1957	Ankara
139.	Hür Türkiye Adalet Partisi	1957	Ankara
140.	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi	1958	Ankara
141.	Memleketçi Serbest Parti	1961	Ankara
142.	Memleketçi Cumhuriyet Partisi	1961	Ankara
143.	Cumhuriyetçi Mesleki Islahat Partisi	1961	Ankara
144.	Çalışma Partisi	1961	Ankara
145.	Mutedil Liberal Parti	1961	Ankara
146.	Yeni Türkiye Partisi	1961	Ankara
147.	Sosyal Demokrat Parti	1961	Ankara
148.	Türkiye İşçi Partisi	1961	Ankara
149.	Türkiye İşçi Çiftçi Partisi	1961	Ankara
150.	Düstur Partisi	1961	Ankara
151.	Adalet Partisi	1961	Ankara
152.	Millet Partisi	1962	Ankara
153.	Demokrat Parti	1962	Ankara
154.	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi	1965	Ankara
155.	Birlik Partisi-Türkiye Birlik Partisi	1966	Ankara
156.	Güven Partisi	1967	Ankara
157.	Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi	1967	Ankara
158.	İşçi-Çiftçi Partisi	1968	Ankara
159.	Milli Nizam Partisi	1969	Ankara
160.	Türkiye İhtilalci İşçi Köylü Partisi	1969	Ankara
161.	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi	1969	Ankara
162.	Türkiye İleri Ülkü Partisi	1969	Ankara
163.	Demokratik Parti	1970	Ankara
164.	Milli Nizam Partisi	1971	Ankara
165.	Milli Güven Partisi	1971	Ankara
166.	Büyük Anadolu Partisi	1972	Ankara
167.	Cumhuriyetçi Parti	1972	Ankara
168.	Milli Selamet Partisi	1972	Ankara
169.	Türkiye Ulusal Kadınlar Partisi	1972	İstanbul
170.	Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi	1973	Ankara
171.	Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi	1974	Ankara
172.	Vatan Partisi	1975	İstanbul
173.	Sosyalist Devrim Partisi	1975	Ankara
174.	Türkiye Emekçi Partisi	1975	Ankara

175.	Türkiye İşçi Partisi	1975	Ankara
176.	Nizam Partisi	1977	Ankara
177.	Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi	1978	Ankara
178.	Sosyalist Vatan Partisi	1979	Ankara
179.	Sosyalist Devrim Partisi	1981	Ankara
180.	Cumhuriyetçi Muhafazakar Parti	1983	Ankara
181.	Türkiye Huzur Partisi	1983	Ankara
182.	Atılım Partisi	1983	Ankara
183.	Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi	1983	Ankara
184.	Büyük Türkiye Partisi	1983	Ankara
185.	Anavatan Partisi	1983	Ankara
186.	Halkçı Parti	1983	Ankara
187.	Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi	1983	Ankara
188.	Yüce Görev Partisi	1983	Ankara
189.	Yeni Düzen Partisi	1983	Ankara
190.	Doğru Yol Partisi	1983	Ankara
191.	Yeni Doğu Partisi	1983	Ankara
192.	Fazilet Partisi	1983	Ankara
193.	Bizim Parti	1983	Ankara
194.	Muhafazakar Parti	1983	Ankara
195.	Bayrak Partisi	1983	Ankara
196.	Huzur Partisi	1983	Ankara
197.	Refah Partisi	1983	Ankara
198.	Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi	1983	Ankara
199.	Halkçı Parti	1983	Ankara
200.	İslahatçı Demokrasi Partisi	1984	Ankara
201.	Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi	1985	Ankara
202.	Demokratik Sol Parti	1985	Ankara
203.	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti	1985	Ankara
204.	Büyük Anadolu Partisi	1986	Ankara
205.	Vatandaş Partisi	1986	Ankara
206.	Hür Demokrat Parti	1986	Ankara
207.	Büyük Vatan Partisi	1986	Ankara
208.	Halk Partisi	1988	Ankara
209.	Sosyalist Parti	1988	Ankara
210.	Yeşiller Partisi	1988	Ankara
211.	Medeniyet ve Hayvansever Ekonomi ve TarımP	1988	Ankara
212.	Halk Partisi	1989	Ankara

213.	Cumhuriyetçi Demokrat Gençlik P.	1989	Ankara
214.	Yeni Doğu Partisi	1990	Ankara
215.	Halkın Emek Partisi	1990	Ankara
216.	Diriliş Partisi	1990	Ankara
217.	Demokratik Merkez Partisi	1990	Ankara
218.	Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi	1990	Ankara
219.	Demokratik Mücadele Partisi	1990	Ankara
220.	Büyük Anadolu Partisi	1991	Ankara
221.	Sosyalist Birlik Partisi	1991	Ankara
222.	Demokratik Hareket Partisi	1991	Ankara
223.	İşçi Partisi	1991	Ankara
224.	Birlik ve Barış Partisi	1992	Ankara
225.	Özgürlük ve Eşitlik Partisi	1992	Ankara
226.	Bütünleşme Partisi	1992	Ankara
227.	Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi	1992	Ankara
228.	Sosyalist İktidar Partisi	1992	Ankara
229.	Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi	1992	Ankara
230.	Yeniden Doğu Partisi	1992	Ankara
231.	Millet Partisi	1992	Ankara
232.	İşçi Partisi	1992	Ankara
233.	Türkiye İşçi Köylü Partisi	1993	Ankara
234.	Demokrasi Partisi	1993	Ankara
235.	Büyük Değişim Partisi	1993	Ankara
236.	Yeni Ufuk Partisi	1993	Ankara
237.	Türkiye Komünist Emek Partisi	1993	Ankara
238.	Yeni Parti	1993	Ankara
239.	Büyük Birlik Partisi	1993	Ankara
240.	Demokratik Halk Partisi	1993	Ankara
241.	Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi	1993	Ankara
242.	Türkiye İçin Birlik Partisi	1994	Ankara
243.	Sosyal Demokrat Parti	1994	Ankara
244.	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi	1994	Ankara
245.	Birleşik Sosyalist Parti	1994	Ankara
246.	Demokratik Hedef Partisi	1994	Ankara
247.	Birliğe Çağrı Partisi	1994	Ankara
248.	Solda Katılım Partisi	1994	Ankara
249.	Genç Demokrat Parti	1994	Ankara
250.	Milli İrade Partisi	1994	Ankara
251.	Anavatan İçin Bütünleşme Partisi	1994	Ankara

252.	Söz Milletindir Partisi	1994	Ankara
253.	Solda Birlik ve Bütünleşme Partisi	1994	Ankara
254.	Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi	1994	Ankara
255.	Anayol Partisi	1994	Ankara
256.	Liberal Demokrat Parti	1994	Ankara
257.	Yükselen Ülkü Partisi	1995	Ankara
258.	İkinci Değişim Partisi	1995	Ankara
259.	Öz Adalet Partisi	1995	Ankara
260.	Demokrasi ve Değişim Partisi	1995	Ankara
261.	Türkiye Sultan Partisi	1995	Ankara
262.	Büyük Adalet Partisi	1995	Ankara
263.	Türkiye Adalet Partisi	1995	Ankara
264.	Cumhuriyetçi Muhafazakar Parti	1996	Ankara
265.	Devrimci İşçi Partisi	1996	Ankara
266.	Demokrasi ve Barış Partisi	1996	Ankara
267.	Büyük Türkiye Partisi	1996	Ankara
268.	Emek Partisi	1996	Ankara
269.	Türkiye Özürlüsüyle Mutludur Partisi	1996	Ankara
270.	Sosyalist İşçi Partisi	1996	Ankara
271.	Demokratik Barış Hareketi	1996	Ankara
272.	Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi	1996	Ankara
273.	Barış Partisi	1996	Ankara
274.	Emeğin Partisi	1996	Ankara
275.	Demokrat Türkiye Partisi	1997	Ankara
276.	Demokratik Kitle Partisi	1997	Ankara
277.	Fazilet Partisi	1997	Ankara
278.	Devrimci Sosyalist İşçi Partisi	1997	Ankara
279.	Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi	1998	Ankara
280.	Değişen Türkiye Partisi	1998	Ankara
281.	Türkiye Partisi	1998	Ankara
282.	Demokratik Halk Partisi	1998	Ankara
283.	Ulusal Birlik Partisi	1998	Ankara
284.	Kurtuluş Huzur Partisi	1999	Ankara
285.	Demokrat Halk Partisi	1999	Ankara
286.	Sosyalist Birlik Hareketi Partisi	1999	Ankara
287.	Komünist Parti	2000	Ankara
288.	Gönül Birliği Yeşiller Partisi	2000	Ankara
289.	Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi	2001	Ankara
290.	Varlığımız Partisi	2001	Ankara

291.	Eşitlik Partisi	2001	Ankara
292.	Saadet Partisi	2001	Ankara
293.	Radikal Değişim Projesi Partisi	2001	Ankara
294.	Ulusal Muhtariyet Partisi	2001	Ankara
295.	Lider Türkiye Partisi	2001	Ankara
296.	Sosyal Demokrat Parti	2001	Ankara
297.	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi	2001	Ankara
298.	Çözüm Partisi	2001	Ankara
299.	Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi	2001	Ankara
300.	Türkiye Komünist Partisi	2001	Ankara
301.	Yeni Türkiye Partisi	2002	Ankara
302.	Cumhuriyetçi Demokrasi Partisi	2002	Ankara
303.	Bağımsız Cumhuriyet Partisi	2002	Ankara
304.	Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi	2002	Ankara
305.	Toplumcu Demokratik Parti	2002	Ankara
306.	Sağduyu Partisi	2002	Ankara
307.	Yurt Partisi	2002	Ankara
308.	Bağımsız Cumhuriyet Partisi	2002	Ankara
309.	Avrasya Partisi	2002	Ankara
310.	Sosyal Demokrat Parti	2002	Ankara
311.	Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi	2002	Ankara
312.	Yeniyüzler Partisi	2002	Ankara
313.	Özgür Toplum Partisi	2003	Ankara
314.	Cumhuriyetçi Demokrat Türkiye Partisi	2003	Ankara
315.	Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi	2004	Ankara
316.	Türkiye Partisi	2004	Ankara
317.	Milli Demokrat Halkın Partisi	2004	Ankara
318.	Demokratik Toplum Partisi	2005	Ankara
319.	Halkın Yükseliş Partisi	2005	Ankara
320.	Çağdaş Türkiye Partisi	2006	Ankara
321.	Müdafaa-i Hukuk Hareketi Partisi	2007	Ankara
322.	Vatanseverler Partisi	2007	Ankara
323.	Yüce Diriliş Partisi	2007	Ankara
324.	Demokrat Parti	2007	Ankara



Appendix 2: Turkish Republic Governments

1. I. İsmet İnönü Gov. (G.) (30.10.1923 - 06.03.1924)
2. II. İsmet İnönü G. (06.03.1924 - 22.11.1924)
3. Fetyi Okyar G. (22.11.1924 - 03.03.1925)
4. III. İsmet İnönü G. (03.03.1925 - 01.11.1927)
5. IV. İsmet İnönü G. (01.11.1927 - 27.09.1930)
6. V. İsmet İnönü G. (27.09.1930 - 04.05.1931)
7. VI. İsmet İnönü G. (04.05.1931 - 01.03.1935)
8. VII. İsmet İnönü G. (01.03.1935 - 01.11.1937)
9. I. Celal Bayar G. (01.11.1937 - 11.11.1938)
10. II. Celal Bayar G. (11.11.1938 - 25.01.1939)
11. I. Refik Saydam G. (25.01.1939 - 03.04.1939)
12. II. Refik Saydam G. (03.04.1939 - 09.07.1942)
13. I. M.Şükrü Saraçoğlu G. (09.07.1942 - 09.03.1943)
14. II. M.Şükrü Saraçoğlu G. (09.03.1943 - 07.08.1946)
15. Recep Peker G. (07.08.1946 - 10.09.1947)
16. I. Hasan Saka G. (10.09.1947 - 10.06.1948)
17. II. Hasan Saka G. (10.06.1948 - 16.01.1949)
18. Şemseddin Günaltay G. (16.01.1949 - 22.05.1950)
19. I. Adnan Menderes G. (22.05.1950 - 09.03.1951)
20. II. Adnan Menderes G. (09.03.1951 - 17.05.1954)
21. III. Adnan Menderes G. (17.05.1954 - 09.12.1955)
22. IV. Adnan Menderes G. (09.12.1955 - 25.11.1957)
23. V. Adnan Menderes G. (25.11.1957 - 27.05.1960)
24. I. Cemal Gürsel G. (30.05.1960 - 05.01.1961)
25. II. Cemal Gürsel G. (05.01.1961 - 20.11.1961)
26. VIII. İsmet İnönü G. (20.11.1961 - 25.06.1962)
27. IX. İsmet İnönü G. (25.06.1962 - 25.12.1963)
28. X. İsmet İnönü G. (25.12.1963 - 20.02.1965)
29. Suat Hayri Ürgüplü G. (20.02.1965 - 27.10.1965)
30. I. Süleyman Demirel G. (27.10.1965 - 03.11.1969)
31. II. Süleyman Demirel G. (03.11.1969 - 06.03.1970)
32. III. Süleyman Demirel G. (06.03.1970 - 26.03.1971)
33. I. Nihat Erim G. (26.03.1971 - 11.12.1971)
34. II. Nihat Erim G. (11.12.1971 - 22.05.1972)
35. Ferit Melen G. (22.05.1972 - 15.04.1973)
36. Naim Talu G. (15.04.1973 - 26.01.1974)
37. I. Bülent Ecevit G. (26.01.1974 - 17.11.1974)
38. Sadi Irmak G. (17.11.1974 - 31.03.1975)

39. IV. Süleyman Demirel G. (31.03.1975 - 21.06.1977)
40. II. Bülent Ecevit G. (21.06.1977 - 21.07.1977)
41. V. Süleyman Demirel G. (21.07.1977 - 05.01.1978)
42. III. Bülent Ecevit G. (05.01.1978 - 12.11.1979)
43. VI. Süleyman Demirel G. (12.11.1979 - 12.09.1980)
44. Bülent Ulusu G. (20.09.1980 - 13.12.1983)
45. I. Turgut Özal G. (13.12.1983 - 21.12.1987)
46. II. Turgut Özal G. (21.12.1987 - 09.11.1989)
47. Yıldırım Akbulut G. (09.11.1989 - 23.06.1991)
48. I. Mesut Yılmaz G. (23.06.1991 - 20.11.1991)
49. VII. Süleyman Demirel G. (21.11.1991 - 25.06.1993)
50. I. Tansu Çiller G. (25.06.1993 - 05.10.1995)
51. II. Tansu Çiller G. (05.10.1995 - 30.10.1995)
52. III. Tansu Çiller G. (30.10.1995 - 06.03.1996)
53. II. Mesut Yılmaz G. (06.03.1996 - 28.06.1996)
54. Necmettin Erbakan G. (28.06.1996 - 30.06.1997)
55. III. Mesut Yılmaz G. (30.06.1997 - 11.01.1999)
56. IV. Bülent Ecevit G. (11.01.1999 - 28.05.1999)
57. V. Bülent Ecevit G. (28.05.1999 - 18.11.2002)
58. Abdullah Gül G. (18.11.2002 - 14.03.2003)
59. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan G. (14.03.2003 – 22.11.2007)
60. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan G. (22.11.2007 -)

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1. *The Turkish Political History*, Manisa Ofset, Manisa October 2007, 259 sayfa.
2. *Jewish Question in Palestine Accordance with the British Documents*, Manisa Ofset, Manisa October 2006, 150 pages.
3. *Why Turks Turned Their Faces to the West?*, Manisa Ofset, Manisa October 2006, 420 pages.
4. With co-writer Hatice Erdemir, *SARDES A Forgotten Metropolis at the Beginning of the Royal Road*, EBS Basımevi, Manisa September 2006, 112 pages.
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ADNAN MENDERES'İN KONUŞMALARINDA

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